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Abstract 
 
The scarcity of adequate water has been historically a complex policy challenge in 
Mediterranean basins. The conventional response to this problem has focused on 
the construction and exploitation of water works to meet the increasing water 
demand and, when that was not enough, on the regulation of water demand through 
command and control policies. Yet, the evident technical success in harnessing the 
potential of water for economic growth in the past has come along with new 
significant challenges. Coupled with production and population growth, the demand 
of water services has soared up. Besides, climate-change has significantly altered 
water availability, giving rise to a water supply crisis which is perceived by many 
experts to be one of the top global risks.  
Conventional policy making seemed incapable to overcome these challenges and 
demanded some innovations. However, path dependency, the transaction costs of 
policy reforms and other constraints have resulted in policy makers insisting upon 
conventional water policy. Supply policies have escalated, regulatory policies have 
become more complex (and more difficult to enforce) and the water crisis has been 
aggravated. Abundant evidence suggests that this policy mix has ended up 
increasing water demand, reducing water availability and undermining the 
robustness and resiliency of the system and its ability to cope with the water crisis. 
Considering its failure, the longevity of conventional water policy is striking. In many 
areas, only the exhaustion of traditional supply sources has been able to stop it. 
Eventually, the financial and environmental costs of developing new water works 
have begun to exceed the economic benefits in the marginal uses of existing supply 
in many basins, and this has made conventional policies unviable. Also, budgetary 
constraints as a result of the financial crisis have increased the opportunity costs of 
water infrastructures, preventing or delaying further water works.  
It is increasingly accepted that this vacuum in water policy needs to be filled in with 
innovative policies that help achieve water policy objectives through an effective and 
efficient management of water demand. However, achieving the collectively agreed 
goals of water policy through the actions of individuals is a challenging task. 
Experience shows that individuals with common objectives cannot be always 
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counted on to act voluntarily to achieve them (this explains the non-compliance 
problems of regulatory instruments). Therefore, the challenge is to find suitable tools 
that motivate collective action through the use of incentives.  
Evidence in other environmental fields has shown that the best way to manage 
incentives is through economic instruments. Economic instruments replace the 
traditional notions of control and government-led planning by those of incentives, 
motivation and multi-level governance. If successfully combined with conventional 
policies, economic instruments may help to progressively overcome the current 
water crisis. However, developing an effective and efficient economic instrument for 
water management is not an easy task: whereas science has developed technical 
water management to a very large extent, considerations of social, political, 
institutional and financial order (i.e., economics) are still treated in an incipient form, 
with major problems persisting. 
This thesis wants to help bridge this gap and presents a series of methodologies 
and stylized facts that are used to assess the contribution that economic 
instruments can make to water policy in Mediterranean basins. This is done through 
six scientific papers illustrated with applications to different areas located in 
Mediterranean river basins in Spain. First, the thesis assesses the reasons that 
explain the exhaustion of the traditional supply-side approach, as well as the key 
factors behind the rise and failure of the extensive command and control based 
policy that came precisely to complement it. Then, this work examines the role that 
economic instruments may play, in conjunction with conventional policies, in 
reverting the negative trends observed under the current water crisis. It is concluded 
that economic instruments have the potential to improve the status of overexploited 
water bodies, but they are not a panacea: an adequate design, institutional setup 
and policy mix are also needed to start paving the road out of the water crisis. 
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Resumen 
 
La escasez de agua ha sido un reto histórico para el desarrollo de las cuencas 
mediterráneas. Tradicionalmente, la respuesta a este problema ha consistido en la 
construcción y el aprovechamiento de obras hidráulicas que permitieran 
incrementar la oferta y satisfacer así la creciente demanda. Cuando esto ha 
resultado insuficiente, la ingeniería ha venido acompañada de herramientas legales 
que regulaban el uso del recurso. No obstante, el evidente éxito de estas políticas 
convencionales en la gestión técnica del agua y en su aprovechamiento para 
promover el desarrollo económico de las cuencas mediterráneas ha venido 
acompañado de importantes desafíos. Por un lado, el crecimiento económico y el 
aumento de la población han incrementado la demanda de agua. Por otro lado, el 
cambio climático ha generado incertidumbres en torno a la disponibilidad del 
recurso, dando lugar a una crisis de oferta que muchos expertos sitúan entre los 
mayores riesgos ambientales a nivel global.  
Las políticas convencionales no ofrecen suficiente capacidad de respuesta ante 
estos desafíos. No obstante, existen restricciones (path dependency, costes de 
transacción) que han dificultado las reformas necesarias para lograr una transición 
hacia una nueva política del agua. Como resultado, a menudo se ha insistido en las 
políticas de oferta y regulación: se han incrementado las dimensiones de las obras 
hidráulicas y se han aprobado normativas cada vez más complejas y ambiciosas, 
pero también más difíciles de hacer cumplir. La evidencia científica sugiere que 
esta combinación de políticas ha incrementado la demanda de agua, ha reducido la 
oferta y ha hecho al sistema menos resiliente y robusto, socavando su capacidad 
para afrontar la crisis del agua.   
No obstante, este modelo de gestión ha demostrado ser sorprendentemente 
longevo, y solo el progresivo agotamiento de las fuentes de agua tradicionales ha 
frenado el desarrollo de nuevas obras hidráulicas. Como resultado de la 
sobreexplotación, los costes marginales de desarrollar nuevos proyectos han 
superado los ingresos marginales, haciendo estas políticas inviables en numerosas 
cuencas. Además, las restricciones presupuestarias consecuencia de la crisis 
financiera han incrementado el coste de oportunidad de desarrollar estos proyectos, 
paralizando o retrasando numerosas obras.  
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La gestión futura del agua pasa por un uso eficaz y eficiente de políticas de 
demanda innovadoras. No obstante, alcanzar los objetivos colectivos de la política 
del agua a través de acciones individuales no es tarea fácil. La experiencia 
demuestra que incluso los individuos que comparten objetivos comunes no siempre 
llevan a cabo de manera voluntaria las actuaciones necesarias para alcanzarlos (un 
claro ejemplo es el incumplimiento de numerosas regulaciones ambientales). Por 
tanto, el reto en la gestión del agua consiste en desarrollar instrumentos que 
motiven la acción colectiva a través del uso de incentivos. 
La evidencia científica en otros campos de investigación ambiental ha mostrado 
que la mejor manera de gestionar los incentivos es a través del uso de instrumentos 
económicos. Los instrumentos económicos sustituyen los conceptos de regulación 
y toma de decisiones centralizada por los de una gestión multi-nivel, basada en la 
motivación, los incentivos y las decisiones voluntarias. Si se combina de manera 
adecuada esta herramienta con las políticas convencionales, los instrumentos 
económicos pueden contribuir a la solución de la actual crisis del agua. No 
obstante, crear instrumentos económicos eficaces y eficientes no es sencillo: 
mientras la gestión técnica del agua se ha desarrollado en gran medida durante las 
últimas décadas, la gestión social, política, institucional, ambiental y financiera del 
recurso (esto es, económica) se trata todavía de una manera incipiente.    
Esta tesis pretende contribuir al desarrollo de instrumentos económicos que 
permitan una mejor gestión del agua en las cuencas mediterráneas. A través de 
seis artículos científicos que contienen estudios de caso en cuencas mediterráneas 
españolas, se presentan una serie de metodologías y hechos estilizados con dos 
objetivos fundamentales: en primer lugar, analizar los motivos que explican el 
agotamiento de las políticas convencionales, tanto de oferta como de regulación; en 
segundo lugar, examinar el rol que los instrumentos económicos pueden jugar 
complementando a las políticas convencionales en la solución de la actual crisis del 
agua.  
Se concluye que si bien los instrumentos económicos tienen la capacidad de 
mejorar el estado ecológico de las masas de agua sobreexplotadas, no constituyen 
ni mucho menos una panacea: un correcto diseño, una adecuada combinación de 
políticas y la adaptación al marco institucional son requisitos necesarios para lograr 
una gestión sostenible del agua.  
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Part I 
General Introduction 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 A Primer on water economics 
 
Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource that is essential for sustaining life, 
development and the environment (ICWE, 1992). The essentialness of water is 
based on the fact that no production (agricultural, industrial, tertiary and even 
ecological) is possible if this input is lacking (Hanemann, 2006) and on the absence 
of any substitutive good for its final consumption (Savenije, 2002). This 
essentialness is relevant for economics because water is also a finite good. All 
water stems from rainfall, and rainfall is limited by the amount of water that 
circulates through the atmosphere on an annual basis. This combination explains 
why water cannot fully satisfy demand for its alternative uses in some areas 
(therefore, it is scarce) and strengthens the argument that water is an economic 
good (Zaag and Savenije, 2006). In fact, the scarcity of adequate water
1
 to satisfy 
water demand is becoming the most important environmental problem in several 
regions worldwide, especially in those located in arid and semi-arid Mediterranean 
areas. In the face of a potential environmental collapse, what can we expect from 
economics? 
Although economics has been playing an increasingly relevant role in water 
management since the beginning of the XX
th
 century, water was not formally 
catalogued as an economic good until the Dublin Conference on Water and the 
Environment in 1992
2
. The fourth Dublin Principle states: “water has an economic 
value and should be recognized as an economic good, taking into account 
affordability and equity criteria” (ICWE, 1992). However, there is substantial 
confusion about the practical meaning of the statement that water is an “economic 
good” (Hanemann, 2006; Savenije, 2002; Zaag and Savenije, 2006). More 
shockingly, some have even asserted that there is little agreement on what this 
means in theory (Briscoe, 1996). In the midst of this debate, two different schools of 
                                                          
1
 With adequate water we are referring to a certain quantity of water fulfilling some quality 
standards.  
2
 This followed up the 1977 United Nations Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina, 
in which the water crisis was addressed for the first time at an intergovernmental level.  
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thought have appeared. The first school (market proponents) maintains that water 
should be priced through the market and that the economic value of water would 
arise spontaneously from the actions of willing buyers and willing sellers, therefore 
ensuring that water is allocated to uses that are valued highest. On the other hand, 
the second school defends an integrated decision making on the allocation of scant 
water resources, which does not necessarily involve financial transactions 
(Hanemann, 2006; Zaag and Savenije, 2006). 
Free competition in a market is often viewed as the most efficient system for 
allocating resources. Therefore, if water is a commodity and the economic system in 
which water is used meets the preconditions for a market system, government 
interventions could be in principle limited to the establishment of property rights and 
the enforcement of contracts (Briscoe, 1996; Hodgson, 1988). From this point of 
view, markets can be used as a way to reallocate water from lower to higher value 
productive activities. For example, Chong and Sunding (2006) have shown that 
urban users can pay up to 10 times more for water than agricultural users.  
However, market economies experience shortcomings called market failures. 
Market failures occur when the allocation of goods and services by a free market is 
not Pareto-efficient, i.e., when it is possible to make a market participant better-off 
without making someone else worse-off. In other cases, even efficient markets may 
not meet societies' equity criteria and public intervention is necessary to 
compensate for distributional disparities. In the particular case of water, market 
failures tend to multiply due to the unique combination of characteristics of this 
resource (Hanemann, 2006; Zaag and Savenije, 2006). Apart from being essential 
and finite, water is also fugitive but bulky, private and public at the same time and 
variable along space and time. It has several roles, environmental, social and 
financial. Interspersed water bodies are interconnected at a basin level as part of a 
complex system, and therefore water uses are interrelated and affect each other. In 
addition and as a result of all the characteristics above, water is a heterogeneous 
good; this means that we cannot strictly speak about a single water market, but 
about different water markets.  
Despite all these problems, the reasoning of market proponents has become 
widespread and has received the support of international institutions such as the 
World Bank (Briscoe, 1996). Water markets with very limited government 
intervention were designed in water scarce countries like Australia and Chile. Also in 
the EU and the US water markets have been introduced, although the regulation in 
these areas is more restrictive. Allegedly, the (so-called) right price stemming from 
free competition markets would encourage not only a more efficient water allocation, 
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but also water conservation (partially through the spontaneous adoption of more 
advanced water technologies), lower expenditures in civil water works and the 
internalization of the opportunity costs of water use (Tarlock et al., 2009). However, 
market proponents seem to ignore a basic economic principle: market prices are not 
the same as economic value. In fact, observed market prices are only a rough 
indicator of the marginal value of water and they do not reflect non-market water 
uses and third-party impacts of market activities (Colby and Bush, 1987; Colby, 
1987; Hanemann, 2006). This distinction between prices and economic value dates 
back to Adam Smith and was firstly formulated by Dupuit (1844) and Marshall 
(1879) and fully integrated into the economic theory in the 1970s. As a result, the 
advantages above are only feasible if the market is designed in such a way that 
prices become close to the actual value of the resource. In reality, the difficulties to 
make this happen are many, especially in the case of water (Hanemann, 2006). 
Consequently, in spite of their relative financial success, there are many examples 
in the literature concerning the negative environmental and economic impact of 
water markets (Colby, 1990; Donoso, 2011; Hanak et al., 2011; Howe, 2000; Young, 
2010).  
The negative environmental performance of water markets in areas such as Chile 
and Australia has done much damage to water economics, up to a point where 
some regard this field as part of the problem instead of the solution
3
. Critics argue 
that economics fails to internalize all the sources of value of water and therefore 
may be unsuitable to address the problems at stake (Savenije, 2002). However, this 
criticism is narrowly focused on the negative environmental performance of (some) 
water markets and ignores major economic achievements, such as the role of 
positive economics in supporting decision making, with tools such as Cost Benefit 
Analysis or Cost Effectiveness Analysis. 
 
Economics is not the same as markets. While markets focus on the financial 
outcome, the objective of economics is to increase the total welfare or utility. This 
can be done by maximizing the total economic value and minimizing the total 
economic cost. Accordingly, in spite of the confusion that may arise on the practical 
implications of managing water as an “economic good”, economic theory is rather 
standard and straightforward: water economists have to look for those instruments 
                                                          
3
 As a result, a number of disclaimers were added to the classification of water as an 
economic good, stating that water is also a “social” good and that water should be 
affordable to the poor (Zaag and Savenije, 2006), even though this is already included in the 
very notion of “economic good”.  
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that maximize welfare from a social, environmental and financial perspective (i.e., 
from an economic perspective). In some cases, these instruments may be water 
markets and prices. In other cases, the use of water markets per se may be 
insufficient, unviable or even counter-productive, and other economic instruments 
(or a combination of them) can be advanced. In this complex context, economics 
should focus on providing the necessary information and advice for conducting an 
adequate decision making process. Contrary to the arguments of market 
proponents, economics cannot be strictly normative and should never become a 
substitute for policy making: it is just a tool. 
 
1.2 Water policy and economics 
 
For millions of years, hunters and gatherers depended on the wild plants and 
animals sustained by rainfall, which varied significantly from one place to another, 
but was on the whole insufficient to provide food for large, dense, settled 
populations. Over time, families began settling near springs, lakes and rivers to 
supply livestock and crops with water, gradually developing technologies to divert 
water for irrigation and domestic purposes. Many civilizations, from Babilonian to 
Chinese, Mayan or Roman, constructed water delivery systems such as aqueducts 
to carry water to cities (Hassan, 2010; Yevjevich, 1992). Although water demand 
continuously increased and the growing number of water infrastructures made 
possible the supply of increasing amounts of water, most societies were able to 
meet their growing water needs by capturing reliable and relatively inexpensive 
resources until the middle of the XX
th
 century. Consequently, throughout all this 
period, comprising most of humankind’s history, water management was 
approached primarily as an engineering problem. Water demand was in most of the 
places and during most of the time below the threshold that would deem water as a 
scarce good. Therefore, the role of economics in water policy was limited.  
In the last decades, population growth and the improvement of living standards 
brought about by development have generated an unprecedented increase in water 
demand (either in agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, energy production or 
households), exceeding the limits of water supply for the first time in history in many 
areas worldwide (Molden and Sakthivadivel, 1999). In addition, climate-change 
induced alteration of rainfall pattern (form, intensity and timing of rainfall) has 
significantly modified water availability and the frequency and intensity of extreme 
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events such as floods and droughts, up to a point where this water supply crisis is 
perceived by many experts to be one of the top global risks (OECD, 2013). This 
combination of increasing pressures over water bodies and volatile water supply are 
in the origin of the current water crisis. The effects of this water crisis have been 
particularly visible during the last years, as a result of the aggravation of the climate 
change and water demand trends (OECD, 2013) and especially as a consequence 
of poorly designed water policies since the 1950s.  
 
Water policy since the beginning of the crisis has largely ignored the overcoming of 
water supply limits by water demand and has continued focusing on the construction 
of major infrastructures to guarantee water supply. From aqueducts, reservoirs and 
traditional irrigation systems, water works have escalated to inter-basin water 
transfers, major dams, modern irrigation devices, wastewater treatment plants and 
desalination plants, among others (Hassan, 2010). This is a consequence of the 
prevailing political consensus, which still considers that water management policies 
must play an instrumental role aimed at providing a package of services, which are 
either essential for life or strategic for the economy. Besides that, it was believed for 
a long time that water demand should be taken as exogenously defined outside the 
field of water management policy (Dinar and Saleth, 1999). In this context, the 
limited capacity to support the increasing water resource abstraction and discharge 
rates has led to a growing demand for major infrastructures and increased public 
support to put larger amounts of water services available to users. In turn, the 
positive response of water authorities to this demand has led to unrealistic 
expectations concerning the capacity of the system to absorb additional pressures. 
This perverse dynamics has ended up increasing water demand, reducing water 
availability and undermining the robustness and resiliency of the system and its 
ability to cope with the water crisis (Anderies et al., 2004; Ruttan, 2002). 
As time has passed and this sort of path dependency has prevailed, water 
authorities worldwide have progressively found themselves facing a potential water 
catastrophe. Yet, managing water is a very complex societal issue that needs to 
involve legal, environmental, technological, financial and political considerations that 
are difficult to co-ordinate in an effective manner. For a long time, this complexity 
has often implied that the political decisions have overshadowed and prevailed over 
other considerations (Martin et al., 2008). In other words, the relevance of 
transaction costs (especially the bargaining costs required to come to an acceptable 
agreement with all the parties involved) has been often magnified while that of 
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environmental costs has been reduced, thus delaying the necessary water policy 
reform. This follows a basic economic principle: as long as the transaction costs of 
the water policy reform are perceived to be larger than the opportunity costs of the 
statu quo, the former will not be implemented (Dinar and Saleth, 1999). 
However, as the water crisis has been aggravated this policy framework has 
become difficult to sustain. Eventually, the financial and environmental costs of 
developing new water works have begun to exceed the economic benefits in the 
least productive (marginal) uses of existing supplies in many basins (Randall, 1981). 
In addition, tighter public budgets and especially water supply limits have increased 
the opportunity costs of supply policies and have made impossible to maintain the 
pace of investments in water works. Therefore, water authorities have been forced 
to alter their policy action and to focus also on water demand. This has been largely 
made through a more intensive use of Command and Control (C&C) policies.  
C&C policies are regulatory instruments that specify a particular type of behavior 
that agents have to comply with. C&C policies are not new in water policy, but 
during the last decades they have evolved from simple rules that restricted the 
pressures over water bodies and that were only casually enforced to more complex 
and foresighted water management plans (see for example EC, 2008 and NDMC, 
2013). However, the effectiveness of C&C tools is often threatened by non-
compliance of water users, and this demands a high level of enforcement. 
Considering the powerful incentives in the economy leading to increased use of 
water in the short term, one of the main critiques to these policies is the expense of 
enforcement (or alternatively, the extensive non-compliance), especially when a 
complex system of rules has been developed (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). This is the 
case for example of the EU Drought Management Plans (Gómez and Pérez-Blanco, 
2012).  
 
Noteworthy, C&C policies are applied by legislation and do not use economic 
incentives; therefore, although C&C tools serve to control water demand, they owe 
little to economic theory. In reality, the role of economics in water policy until recent 
years has been limited and largely consisted in assessing the economic viability of 
projects designed by engineers. This role of economics as an assessor was also 
common in other areas involving projects with environmental impact. As a result, 
environmental economics has been largely focused during the last decades on the 
development and the improvement of techniques to estimate non-market 
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(environmental) values. This initially responded to the need to put a value to non-
market goods and services in Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).  
CBA is a systematic process for calculating and comparing benefits and costs of a 
project, decision or government policy. Since the 1950s, several valuation methods 
have been developed and subsequently refined to improve the results offered by 
CBA. Some of these methods have even moved from being “experimental” to 
business-as-usual (Freeman, 2003). The results obtained during all these decades 
have shown that environmental benefits are significant and sometimes can greatly 
outweigh commercial benefits (Campos et al., 2008, 2007; Hanemann, 2006), thus 
enhancing the role of economics in water policy.  
However, environmental valuation faces many challenges
4
 (Azqueta, 1994; 
Freeman, 2003). In particular it is feared that traditional CBA may, in its calculation 
of the expected net present value, attribute relatively minor importance to a possible 
future disaster with major economic implications. Consequently, we may have the 
paradoxical outcome of a project with an expected positive welfare gain turning into 
catastrophic losses.  
Bishop (1978) remedies this by proposing that safe minimum standards are 
introduced unless the cost to society is unacceptably high. This precautionary 
principle is rapidly integrated into environmental policy and in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development it is stated that: “In order to protect the environment, 
the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation” (UN, 1992). In the case of EU 
water policy, the precautionary principle becomes a key element in the design of the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) (EC, 2000). This directive represents a turning 
point in the relationship between water policy and economics in the EU.  
The objective of the WFD is the attainment of a good ecological status in all surface 
and groundwater bodies by 2015
5
. The precautionary principle underlying the WFD 
                                                          
4
 The prevailing stated preferences methods have problems addressing income constraints. 
Also, it is not clear whether or not values respond accurately to variations in the scope or 
amount of the environmental good in question when a wide range of measures or policies 
are involved. In addition, a major challenge remains in translating sound research results 
into practical and understandable policy advice. 
5
 In accordance to the precautionary principle (Bishop, 1978), there may be some 
exemptions to the general objectives that allow for less stringent objectives, extension of 
deadline beyond 2015, or the implementation of new projects, provided a set of conditions 
are fulfilled (EC, 2000). 
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is that water ecosystems constitute a collective heritage that must be preserved by 
ensuring water uses to be compatible with the preservation of these ecosystems 
(EC, 2000). This makes unnecessary the calculation of environmental benefits for 
the purpose of achieving the goals of the WFD. Accordingly, CBA is replaced by 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). CEA is a proactive decision-support tool that 
enables the assessment of the cost and the effectiveness of alternative policy 
options in realizing a preset objective (i.e., the good ecological status). In brief, it 
aims at identifying a combination of mitigation measures for achieving a given water 
policy goal at the least economic cost. It is in this setting in which economic 
instruments for water management develop.  
 
1.3 Economic Instruments for water management 
 
When the WFD was approved, it was already clear that the amount of water 
available in EU water bodies was not plentiful relative to water demand anymore. 
Water management challenges could not be solved through the capture of 
unclaimed water supply, like in the past, and demanded instead a sustainable water 
management of the existing resources. At this point, the growing marginal costs of 
supplying water and the increasing interdependencies among sequential water 
users had already generated conflicts that gave rise to the appropriation of 
environmental flows/stocks by private uses at high opportunity costs for the society. 
This tradeoff was largely tolerated by authorities until it was too evident that a 
collective action was needed in order to prevent irreversible effects over EU water 
bodies. The WFD came as a response to this need and took into account legal, 
environmental, political and technological considerations from the outset, while 
economics became the instrument to articulate all of them.  
The Article 9 of the WFD introduced for the first time economic instruments for water 
resources management in the EU. However, it did not include any formal definition 
for this term. In reality, although the WFD formally opened the door for the use of 
economic instruments in water resources management, it focused exclusively on the 
role that one particular economic instrument, water pricing, might have in reducing 
the pressures over water bodies: “[...] water-pricing policies provide adequate 
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incentives for users to use water resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the 
environmental objectives of this directive” (EC, 2000)
6
.  
Consequently, with the exception of water pricing, the implementation of economic 
instruments for water management has not been sufficiently encouraged from EU 
institutions. In addition, it remained unclear what an economic instrument for water 
management actually is.  To the best of our knowledge, the most accurate definition 
can be found in Strosser et al. (2013), according to which economic instruments for 
water management are “those incentives designed and implemented with the 
purpose of adapting individual decisions to collectively agreed goals (e.g. the 
environmental objectives of the WFD and of its “daughter” Directives)”.  
Following this definition, some of the economic instruments for water management 
implemented in the EU so far may include pollution taxes
7
 (Daugbjerg and 
Pedersen, 2004), water use tariffs and fees (Hellegers, 2001; Miniaci et al., 2008; 
OECD, 1999), water load fees (ÖKO Zrt. vezette Konzorcium, 2009), water markets 
(Albiac et al., 2006; Calatrava and Gómez-Ramos, 2009; Garrido and Calatrava, 
2009; Rey et al., 2011), voluntary agreements (Bratrich and Truffer, 2001; Gómez et 
al., 2013) and subsidies (Christensen et al., 2011; Institut für Umweltforschung, 
2002).  
According to the little evidence available, the environmental achievements of 
economic instruments for water management in the EU have been very limited so 
far. However, and this is the critical point, it is not clear whether these economic 
instruments actually pursued an environmental outcome and failed because of their 
poor design or if they were in reality a financial tool disguised as an environmental 
instrument to make it more acceptable (Strosser et al., 2013). In fact, those 
economic instruments that did not involve revenue-raising tools or that were 
implemented on a voluntary basis have been among the most successful of all 
(Bratrich and Truffer, 2001; Gómez et al., 2013). So far, the lack of ex-post data 
impedes obtaining more concluding evidence. Moreover, there is also a lack of ex-
ante assessments and many economic instruments with the potential to encourage 
a more sustainable water use have not been explored up to this point. As a result, 
the policy discussion regarding the implementability and the expected environmental 
outcome of most economic instruments is based on a mix of “theoretical and less 
rational arguments” (Strosser et al., 2013).  
                                                          
6
 More recently, the EU blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources has insisted upon 
this idea (EC, 2012).   
7
 Actually, most of these taxes are in reality tariffs (EEA&OECD, 2013).  
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The present work intends to shed light over this discussion. Chapters 3 and 4 
develop methodologies that are used to identify relevant factors that help explain the 
failure of conventional supply and C&C policies in Mediterranean river basins. 
Chapter 5 builds on this and develops additional methods to assess the 
implementability and potential of some economic instruments that have been 
advanced in Mediterranean areas. Rather than offering a brand new water policy the 
goal is to explore how these economic instruments can be streamed into current 
water management practice in order to make a significant contribution to 
meaningfully solve some relevant water governance problems. 
These methodologies are illustrated with applications to different areas located in 
Mediterranean river basins in Spain. Spanish Mediterranean river basins are a 
paradigmatic example of the exhaustion of conventional water policies. Combined 
with growing water demand and decreasing water supply, this policy failure has led 
to increasing scarcity and more frequent and intense droughts.  
Accordingly, the methods introduced in this thesis are largely focused on water 
policy challenges stemming from water scarcity and droughts (irrigation 
modernization plans in Chapter 3, Drought Management Plans in Chapter 4 and 
drought insurance and water pricing in Chatper 5)
8
, although they also deal 
indirectly with qualitative issues. In addition, there is one methodology that is used 
to solve water quality problems (voluntary agreements in Chapter 5).  
The methodologies presented in this thesis are based on standard economics and 
aim to be general and applicable in basins that face water management problems 
similar to those experienced in the case study areas. This mostly refers to 
Mediterranean basins, but the methods may also be of use in several areas 
worldwide increasingly exposed to the water crisis (OECD, 2013).  
For example, in the EU evidence shows that scarcity and droughts are not anymore 
a Southern European challenge (EEA, 2009). Further to scarcity, droughts have 
sorely increased in number and intensity throughout the EU. There have been 
recent drought events or threats in Portugal, Spain, southern France, Greece, 
Cyprus, Italy, Hungary, southeastern England and even in Germany or the North 
Atlantic Faroe Islands, the self-governing region of Denmark  (JRC, 2013). Also in 
                                                          
8
 It is true that if properly designed and contextualized these policies may also help to 
improve the qualitative status of water bodies, but their primary goal is a different one. 
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Finland and the Netherlands Drought Management Plans have been approved as a 
response to the increasing scarcity and drought exposure (EC, 2008).  
The three innovative economic instruments assessed in this thesis do fit in this 
policy context marked by the water crisis, and therefore could be transferred with 
some caveats to other geographical areas. In addition, the discussion included in 
this thesis is meant to feed into some of the ongoing reflections regarding water 
policy reform and the use of economic instruments.  
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2 Objectives, Thesis Outline and 
Research Context 
 
2.1 Objectives 
 
This thesis consists of six scientific papers that have been published or are under 
review in international journals. The thesis presents a series of methodologies and 
stylized facts that are used to assess the contribution that economic instruments can 
make to water policy in Mediterranean basins. The goal is twofold: i) first, to identify 
the factors explaining the failure of conventional C&C and supply policies. ii) 
second, to assess the viability and expected outcomes of a set of economic 
instruments for water management that are being implemented or whose 
implementation is being considered in Mediterranean basins in Spain. Associated 
with these two main objectives there are five specific goals:  
 
i) Objectives related to the understanding of the failure of conventional water 
policies (Chapters 3 and 4) 
 
 Chapter 3 develops an analytical framework with the objective of 
determining under what conditions irrigation modernization projects 
rebound, i.e., under what conditions farmers end up demanding and 
consuming a larger amount of water than before.  
 The objective of Chapter 4 is to evaluate the incentives that farmers have 
to incur in informal groundwater abstractions after the implementation of 
Drought Management Plans, as well as the impact that this may have over 
aquifers. Some evidence for the Segura River Basin (southeastern Spain) 
is provided.  
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ii) Objectives related to the assessment of the implementability and potential 
of economic instruments (Chapter 5) 
 
 Section 5.1 develops a methodology that can be used to estimate the 
opportunity costs of the periodical release of flushing flows in rivers whose 
regimes are controlled by hydropower generating facilities. This method 
may help to articulate voluntary agreements between water users in highly 
engineered rivers. Some insightful results from the implementation of this 
tool in the Lower Ebro (northeastern Spain) are provided.  
 Section 5.2 assesses the implementability of drought insurance for irrigated 
agriculture through the calculation of the minimum long term cost that 
would be faced by a private insurance company. Some results from field 
experiments in the Segura and Guadalquivir river basins in Spain are 
provided.  
 Section 5.3 develops a flexible revealed preferences model that is used to 
assess the impact of water pricing over agricultural water demand and 
consumption. Insightful results for the case study area, the Segura River 
Basin (southeastern Spain), are provided. 
 
2.2 Thesis outline 
 
This thesis is structured in four parts: 
 Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) serves as an introduction and presents the 
objectives, thesis outline and research context of this work.  
 Part II (Chapters 3 and 4) introduces the role of supply and C&C policies in 
water management and explores the factors that may help explain why 
conventional policies have failed in attaining water policy goals.  
o Chapter 3 presents the role played by supply policies and intends 
to identify the reasons that help explain why they failed to solve 
the water crisis. In particular, it addresses the case of irrigation 
modernization plans such as the Spanish Irrigation Plan (Plan 
Nacional de Regadíos).  
o Chapter 4 focuses on C&C policies, which have become 
increasingly relevant as a way to control water demand. This 
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chapter focuses on the powerful economic incentives surrounding 
water use and explores how these incentives may impede a 
sustainable water use even when C&C and supply policies are 
combined. The particular case of Drought Management Plans in 
Spain is presented. 
 Part III (Chapter 5) builds on Part II and evaluates the role that economic 
instruments may play as a complementary policy of conventional C&C and 
supply policies in order to attain water policy goals.  
o Section 5.1 evaluates the potential of voluntary agreements to 
contribute to the goals defined in the water policy. The case study 
focuses on the public-private partnership between the hydropower 
operator and the river basin authority to release flushing flows to 
improve the qualitative status of the Lower Ebro (northeastern 
Spain).  
o Section 5.2 presents drought insurance for irrigated agriculture as 
a water saving instrument during drought events and estimates its 
long term cost. These costs are estimated in two Agricultural 
Districts in the Segura and the Guadalquivir River Basins.   
o Section 5.3 focuses on water pricing and uses a revealed 
preferences model to assess the impact that higher water prices 
may have over agricultural water demand in the Segura River 
Basin (southeastern Spain).  
Part II and Part III are the core of this thesis. Each chapter of the Parts II and III is 
backed by at least one scientific paper that addresses relevant issues for water 
management in Mediterranean river basins. Most of these papers have been 
published in international scientific journals. 
 Part IV (Chapter 6) summarizes the main conclusions of the thesis along 
with some political recommendations that can be inferred from the work.  
 
2.3 Research context 
 
This thesis is the outcome of the author’s participation in different research projects 
at a national and EU level in the University of Alcalá and the Madrid Institute for 
Advanced Studies in Water Technologies (IMDEA-Water). The list of projects in 
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which the doctoral candidate has been involved during the development of this 
thesis comprises a FP7 project (Economic Policy Instruments for Water 
Management in Europe), two projects developed within the EC Freshwater Policy 
Framework Contract awarded to IMDEA-Water (Potential for Growth and Job 
Creation through the Protection of Water Resources, with a Special Focus on the 
Further Implementation of the Water Framework Directive and Floods Directive and 
Support to the various Water Framework Directive Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS) groups) and two national projects (Contrato entre la Universidad de 
Alcalá y la Agrupación Española de Entidades Aseguradora de los Seguros 
Agrarios Combinados SA, para el estudio de las probabilidades de restricción del 
agua para riego en las demarcaciones hidrográficas españolas and Contrato entre 
la Universidad de Alcalá y la Agrupación Española de Entidades Aseguradora de 
los Seguros Agrarios Combinados SA, para la elaboración de un estudio sobre la 
sequía hidrológica). Although all these projects were relevant for the development of 
this work, most of the research contained in this thesis was carried out within the 
EU’s 7
th
 Framework Contract project Economic Policy Instruments for Water 
Management in Europe (EPI-Water).  
EPI-Water (Grant Agreement 265213) is a FP7 project (FP7/2007–2013) led by Dr. 
Jaroslav Mysiak from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) and coordinated by Prof. 
Carlos Mario Gómez Gómez for the IMDEA-Water team, formed by himself and 
Gonzalo Delacámara, Miguel Solanes, Marta Rodríguez, Estefanía Ibáñez and the 
doctoral candidate. EPI-Water aims to assess the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
economic instruments in achieving water policy goals, and to identify the 
preconditions under which they complement or perform better than alternative policy 
instruments (e.g. regulatory). The work done by IMDEA-Water focused on the 
development of two ex-post case studies in the Tagus and Ebro river basins and in 
particular on a comprehensive ex-ante case study in the interconnected Tagus and 
Segura river basins. Within this project, the author completed two stays of two 
months each in the Flood Hazard Research Centre of the Middlesex University. This 
was partially funded by the Fórmula Santader Scholarship.  
The EC Freshwater Policy Framework Contract (ENV.D.1/FRA/2012/0014) defines 
preferred suppliers with the objective of providing services to the Water Unit in DG 
Environment. The projects to provide these services are awarded through individual 
contracts in competition with the other consortiums included in the Framework 
Contract. The contractual period lasts for three years, with annual renovations. The 
Framework Contract is led by Chris Hughes from AMEC (UK) and coordinated by 
Prof. Carlos Mario Gómez and Prof. Gonzalo Delacámara for the IMDEA-Water 
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team, formed by themselves and Miguel Solanes, Marta Rodríguez, Estefanía 
Ibáñez and the doctoral candidate. 
The project Potential for Growth and Job Creation through the Protection of Water 
Resources, with a Special Focus on the Further Implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive and Floods Directive is a project awarded within the EC 
Freshwater Policy Framework Contract. The project was led by Dr. Pierre Strosser 
from ACTeon Environment (France) and coordinated by Prof. Gonzalo Delacámara 
and Prof. Carlos Mario Gómez for the IMDEA-Water team, formed by themselves 
and Miguel Solanes, Marta Rodríguez, Estefanía Ibáñez and the doctoral candidate. 
The primary objective of this study was to assess the likely impact of the protection 
of water resources, and in particular of the implementation of the WFD and Flood 
Directive, on growth and job creation. 
The project Support to the various Water Framework Directive Common 
Implementation Strategy (CIS) groups is a project awarded within the EC 
Freshwater Policy Framework Contract. The project is led by Dr. Andrew Farmer 
and coordinated by Prof. Carlos Mario Gómez for the IMDEA-Water team, formed 
by himself and Gonzalo Delacámara, Miguel Solanes, Marta Rodríguez, Estefanía 
Ibáñez and the doctoral candidate. The requested services include the provision to 
the Water Unit in DG Environment (ENV D1) of independent, high quality and timely 
support and advice on scientific, socio-economic and technical issues related to the 
issues dealt with within the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) of the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) and Floods Directive. 
The projects Contrato entre la Universidad de Alcalá y la Agrupación Española de 
Entidades Aseguradora de los Seguros Agrarios Combinados SA, para el estudio 
de las probabilidades de restricción del agua para riego en las demarcaciones 
hidrográficas españolas and Contrato entre la Universidad de Alcalá y la 
Agrupación Española de Entidades Aseguradora de los Seguros Agrarios 
Combinados SA, para la elaboración de un estudio sobre la sequía hidrológica were 
privately awarded by the Spanish Association of Agrarian Insuring Firms 
(Agroseguro S.A.) to the University of Alcalá. The project was coordinated by Prof. 
Carlos Mario Gómez Gómez. The other members of the team were Alberto del 
Villar, David Nortes and the doctoral candidate. The objective of these projects was 
the assessment of the viability of drought insurance systems in Spain.   
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2.4 Conferences 
 
In the context of this thesis, the work of the doctoral candidate was presented and 
discussed in different conferences. These are listed below:  
 
Insuring water: A practical risk management option in water scarce and 
drought prone regions? In Frontiers in Economics of Natural Hazards and Disaster 
Risk Reduction - Financing Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Adaptation. 
Belpasso (Italy), 1-7 September 2013.  
Simple myths and basic maths about greening irrigation. In New Directions 
in the Economic Analysis of Water. Lisbon (Portugal), 18-19 July 2013 
Water efficiency and water conservation in irrigated agriculture. In 
Instrumentos económicos para la gestión del agua en España. Alcalá de Henares 
(Spain), 20-21 June 2013. 
Simple myths and basic maths about greening irrigation. In 5th European 
Association of Agricultural Economists PhD Workshop. Leuven (Belgium), 29-31 
May 2013. 
Myths and Maths of Water Efficiency: An Analytical Framework to Assess 
the Real Outcome of Water Saving Technologies in Irrigation. In 87th Annual 
Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society. Warwick (UK), 8-10 April 2013. 
Can Markets Save Water? Towards a Methodological Framework to 
Develop a Private Drought Insurance System in Semi-arid Basins: An Application to 
a Mediterranean Catchment. In International Water Resource Economics 
Consortium (IWREC) 10th Annual Meeting. Stockholm (Sweden), 26-31 August 
2012. 
Design of optimum private insurance schemes as a means to reduce water 
overexploitation during drought events. A case study in Campo de Cartagena 
(Segura River Basin, Spain). In International Society of Ecological Economics 2012 
Conference – Ecological Economics and Rio+20. Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 16-19 
June 2012. 
Do drought management plans reduce drought risk? A risk assessment 
model for the Segura River Basin. In International Society of Ecological Economics 
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2012 Conference – Ecological Economics and Rio+20. Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 16-
19 June 2012. 
Design of optimum private insurance schemes as a means to reduce water 
overexploitation during drought events. A case study in Campo de Cartagena 
(Segura River Basin, Spain). In Vth AERNA Conference. Faro (Portugal), 31 May-2 
June 2012. 
Design of optimum private insurance schemes as a means to reduce water 
overexploitation during drought events. A case study in Campo de Cartagena. In 
86th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society. Warwick (UK), 16-
18 April 2012. 
Do drought management plans reduce drought risk? A risk assessment 
model for a Mediterranean river basin. In 86th Annual Conference of the Agricultural 
Economics Society. Warwick (UK), 16-18 April 2012. 
Design of optimum private insurance schemes as a means to reduce water 
overexploitation during drought events. A case study in La Campiña (Guadalquivir 
River Basin, Spain). In The Governance of Sustainability. Cambridge (UK), 11-12 
April 2012. 
Development of private insurance schemes as a means to reduce water 
overexploitation during drought events. A case study in Campo de Cartagena 
(Segura River Basin, Spain). In 123rd European Association of Agricultural 
Economists Seminar. Price volatility and farm income stabilization. Dublin (Ireland), 
23-24 February 2012.  
 
2.5 Publications  
 
Chapter 3 gave rise to the following paper: 
Gómez, C.M., Pérez-Blanco, C.D. (under review). Simple Myths and Basic 
Maths about Greening Irrigation. Under review.  
 
Chapter 4 gave rise to the following paper: 
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Gómez, C.M., Pérez-Blanco, C.D., 2012. Do drought management plans 
reduce drought risk? A risk assessment model for a Mediterranean river basin. 
Ecological Economics 76, 42–48.     
 
Chapter 5 gave rise to the following papers: 
Pérez-Blanco, C.D., Gómez, C.M., 2013. Designing optimum insurance 
schemes to reduce water overexploitation during drought events: a case study of La 
Campiña, Guadalquivir River Basin, Spain. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Policy 2, 1–15. 
Gómez, C.M., Pérez-Blanco, C.D., Batalla, R.J., 2013. Tradeoffs in river 
restoration: Flushing flows vs. hydropower generation in the Lower Ebro River, 
Spain. Journal of Hydrology (in press, available online at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022169413006161) 
Pérez-Blanco, C.D., Gómez, C.M. (forthcoming). Insuring water: A practical 
risk management option in water scarce and drought prone regions? Accepted for 
publication in Water Policy.  
Pérez-Blanco, C.D., Delacámara, G., Gómez, C.M. (under review). Water 
pricing and water saving in agriculture. Insights from a Revealed Preferences Model 
in a Mediterranean basin. Under second review in Agricultural Water Management. 
 
Other peer reviewed publications of the doctoral candidate include: 
Gutiérrez, C., Pérez-Blanco, C.D., Gómez, C.M., Berbel, J. (forthcoming). 
Price Volatility and Water Demand in Agriculture. A Case Study of the Guadalquivir 
River Basin (Spain). Accepted for publication in Bournaris, T., Berbel, J., Manos, B., 
Viaggi, D. (Eds.), Economics of Water Management in Agriculture. Science 
Publishers.  
Pérez-Blanco, C.D., Gómez, C.M., del Villar, A. (2011). El riesgo de 
disponibilidad de agua en la agricultura: una aplicación a las cuencas del 
Guadalquivir y del Segura. Estudios de Economía Aplicada 29 (1):333-358 
Pérez-Blanco, C.D., Gómez, C.M., Garrido-Ysete, R. (2010). Cambio 
estructural regional y agua: escasez, dependencia e impactos sobre el tejido 
económico. El caso de Andalucía. Estudios de Economía Aplicada 28 (2):423-446 
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3 Supply policies for water 
management 
 
In spite of the substantial advances made by water economics in the last decades, 
the comprehension of water management still seems largely influenced by the 
archaic views of John Locke and Francis Bacon, according to which “nature is only 
subdued by submission”. Water policies worldwide, just like those of a couple of 
millennia ago, are usually approached as an engineering problem and are still 
intensive in physical capital. Consequently, since the beginning of the water crisis 
the scarcity of adequate water has been battled through the construction of major 
infrastructures. However, there is abundant evidence that shows that supply 
policies, even if combined with C&C policies, are unlikely to achieve a sustainable 
water use unless they are complemented with (carefully developed) economic 
instruments  (Bratrich and Truffer, 2001; Gómez et al., 2013; Strosser et al., 2013). 
Moreover, in many cases conventional water policies have generated unrealistic 
expectations on the capacity of the system to absorb additional pressures and have 
ended up increasing water demand and aggravating the water crisis. 
 
Among all the Mediterranean countries, Spain is a paradigmatic example of water 
management captured by supply policies. For many decades, economic growth in 
its water scarce and drought prone Mediterranean basins has been closely linked to 
the capacity of public institutions to make increasing amounts of water available to 
users. As a result, the main strategy followed by river basin authorities consisted in 
coordinating the public effort required to supply the water services demanded as a 
result of advances in the many areas of the economy, including population growth, 
urban sprawl, irrigation development, growing manufacturing activities, etc. The 
main objective of water policy, therefore, consisted in finding inexpensive and 
reliable means to meet water demand. Nonetheless, as early as the 1980s it was 
acknowledged that water demand had started to overcome water supply and some 
basins were declared overexploited (BOE, 1986). As a result, this supply-oriented 
modus operandi is currently under transition to a new one aimed at making all water 
services used by the economy consistent with the preservation and adequate 
protection of the water bodies (i.e., to decouple growth from increases in water 
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supply). However, even during this transition period some large water works have 
been built and others have been expanded. This includes dams, water transfers, 
subsidies to drill wells, the modernization of transportation, distribution and irrigation 
networks and more recently the development of non-conventional water sources, 
including treated wastewater and, especially, desalinated water. 
 
Spain is among the countries with the most regulated rivers in the world. Total dam 
storage capacity has been multiplied by 50 since the 1920s and now equals 55 324 
million cubic meters (or cubic hectometers, hm
3
), 51% of the average annual runoff 
of 109 488 hm
3
 (EEA, 2009; MAGRAMA, 2013a). This continued large investment 
has gradually reduced the marginal return of each project. For example, Gómez 
(2009) showed that while the total hydropower installed capacity grew by 145% from 
1928 to 2012, average hydropower production remained very similar. It seems 
therefore that these water works aim at granting a minimum output and reducing 
variability instead of making additional profits.  
Water policy in Spain is also rich in water transfers. Both intra and inter-basin water 
transfers have been implemented for centuries, although the latter usually generate 
the most relevant socioeconomic conflicts (ERBA, 2008; SRBA, 2008; TRBA, 2008). 
Only the Ebro River Basin comprises nine inter-basin water transfers, of which two 
of them supply water to the urban areas of Tarragona and Bilbao (ERBA, 2008). 
However, the largest and also the most conflictive water transfer in Spain is the 
Tagus-Segura Water Transfer, a major diversion project with the capacity to transfer 
up to 1 000 hm
3
/year to the Segura River Basin from the Tagus headwaters located 
242 km away. Since its opening in 1978, this infrastructure has nonetheless been 
working much below its legal capacity of 600 hm
3
/year and has transferred in 
average 329.3 hm
3
/year (SRBA, 2008); in addition, it is said to have passed on 
water scarcity problems to the Tagus River Basin (TRBA, 2008) and has been the 
cause of a major conflict between the regions of Castile-La Mancha (NUTS2: ES42) 
(largely belonging to the Tagus River Basin District) and Murcia (ES62) (largely 
belonging to the Segura River Basin District). The failure of this transfer to deliver its 
expected outcome is one of the reasons explaining the derogation of the polemic 
Ebro Water Transfer, which projected the transfer of 1 050 hm
3
/year of water from 
the Ebro River Basin to various areas in the Spanish Mediterranean coast in the 
framework of the Spanish Hydrological Plan (MIMAM, 2000).  
The Ebro Water Transfer was substituted by the A.G.U.A. Programme (standing for 
Actuaciones para la Gestión y la Utilización del Agua, or Actions for the 
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Management and Use of Water). This initiative also projected an increase of 1 050 
hm
3
/year in water supply in water scarce Mediterranean areas, but this time mostly 
through the use of desalination plants. The programme forecasted the construction 
of 20 desalination plants and the modernization of the existing ones at a cost of €3 
900 million (BOE, 2005a). Since A.G.U.A. relied on saltwater instead of freshwater, 
this project did not put additional pressures over continental water bodies. However, 
while the (financial) cost of conventional water sources in Mediterranean areas is in 
average below 0.1 €/m
3
, that of desalinated water is around 1 €/m
3
 (Maestu and 
Villar, 2007). As a result, desalinated water needed to be heavily subsidized in order 
to guarantee the minimum demand that would make desalination plants financially 
viable (desalinated water for agricultural production in southeastern Spain is sold at 
0.36 €/m
3
)
9
. Even so, desalination capacity is being used below 20% in many areas 
(SRBA, 2008). More recently, the high financial costs of these plants and the 
budgetary constraints resulting from the financial crisis have increased the 
opportunity costs and threatened the viability of this programme. In 2012 the 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and Environment negotiated a €500 million loan 
used to rescue the public water company that manages the production and supply 
of desalinated water in Southeastern Spain, Acuamed. In 2013, further budgetary 
pressures have forced public institutions to negotiate an additional €700 million loan 
(GWI, 2013).  
Other relevant supply policies comprise the subsidies for drilling new wells (which 
triggered the aquifer depletion witnessed in many areas in southeastern Spain since 
the 1960s) (Sevilla et al., 2010), and wastewater treatment plants (which 
nonetheless are able to provide a very limited supply, estimated between 50-60% of 
the urban water demand) (Maestu and Villar, 2007). But the most ambitious supply 
policy implemented in Spain in recent years has been the irrigation modernization 
project known as Plan Nacional de Regadíos 2000-2008 (National Irrigation Plan, 
PNR). 
 
Irrigated agriculture has historically played a key economic role in Mediterranean 
rural areas. Even today, irrigation represents the only real pathway towards 
development in many of these areas. Without irrigated agriculture, these areas 
would face depopulation, the abandonment of the land (with potentially negative 
environmental effects) and a great imbalance in the population distribution. Water 
                                                          
9
 This is not to say that the use of desalinated water is not viable. Actually, the total 
economic costs of conventional water sources in overexploited areas of the Southeast are 
likely to be very close to (or even above) those of desalinated water (SRBA, 2008).  
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT IN SPANISH MEDITERRANEAN BASINS  
28 
scarcity, being especially intense in the most productive agricultural districts of the 
Mediterranean, is currently the main threat to the subsistence of irrigated 
agriculture
10
 (OECD, 2010). The Spanish PNR aimed to help the irrigation-based 
agriculture to face all these challenges.  
The PNR invested €7 368 million over the period 2000-2008 to modernize 2 244 
570 ha of irrigated lands across Spain, and planned a reduction in water 
withdrawals of 3 662 hm
3
/year (MAGRAMA, 2013b). From a technical perspective, 
this project achieved an overwhelming success: while in 2002 gravity irrigation 
represented 40.5% of irrigated surface, drip irrigation 34.3% and sprinkler irrigation 
18.4% (other irrigation systems accounted for 6.9% of irrigated lands), by 2009 the 
more efficient drip irrigation already represented 48.6% of irrigated surface, 
replacing both gravity (32.3%), sprinkler (15%) and other irrigation systems (4.1%) 
(Lopez-Gunn et al., 2012; MAGRAMA, 2013b).  
However, according to some ex-post evidence, the PNR did not perform as 
expected in terms of water savings/conservation (Corominas, 2010; Gutierrez-Martin 
and Gomez, 2011; Rodríguez-Díaz et al., 2012). There are some reasons that may 
explain this outcome. First of all, the most relevant opportunities to save water 
through technical efficiency gains
11
 in Spain are located in areas where water is less 
scarce and therefore less valuable. In turn, the opportunities to save valuable water 
are increasingly located in places where shifting to more efficient devices is not 
profitable due to the higher operation costs (e.g., energy demands) and more 
complex management practices (Corominas, 2010). On top of that, it has been 
shown that after an irrigation modernization water demand may “rebound” (i.e., 
increase). According to some authors, this may be the case of some areas in 
                                                          
10
 This menace has been recently aggravated with other problems, including decreasing 
subsidies, compliance with a more restrictive environmental legislation, price instability 
and, at the same time, the need for farmers to produce competitive goods in a global 
market. 
11
 Water is often linked to the idea of efficiency. Nonetheless, water efficiency is a rather 
vague concept that needs further clarification. Specifically, it is important to differentiate 
between technical and economic or allocative efficiency. Up to this point, with “efficiency” 
we were referring to the allocative efficiency concept. In economics, the allocative 
efficiency is reached when the social surplus is maximized with no deadweight loss, i.e., 
when the value that the society assigns to the outputs produced is larger than the value 
that the society assigns to the inputs consumed. Here, though, we are referring to the 
technical efficiency, i.e., the effectiveness with which inputs are used to produce an output, 
or alternatively the ratio of outputs (in economic terms) to inputs (water use). Although the 
difference may seem subtle, it does matter. For example, better irrigation technologies 
increase technical efficiency, but they do not guarantee steady or declining resource use. As 
a result, rebound effects may appear, offsetting the technical efficiency gains and possibly 
generating an allocative ineffiency. 
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southern Spain (Gutierrez-Martin and Gomez, 2011; Rodríguez-Díaz et al., 2012). 
This inevitably raises the following question: why would water demand increase 
after an increase in the technical efficiency?  
Water is fugitive and ultimately flows under gravity (Zaag and Savenije, 2006). Since 
water is rarely fully consumed by a single user
12
, what is left can be reused by 
another user located downstream. This implies that a single molecule of water can 
have multiple and sequential uses, thus generating multiple and sequential 
economic values. However, it is very difficult to keep track of every single molecule 
of water, and consequently it is difficult to enforce property rights over return flows. If 
technical efficiency is increased, consumptive uses also increase and the whole 
water dynamics may be significantly altered. Authors have identified two effects that 
may result in a “rebound” of irrigation modernization plans like the PNR: an increase 
in water use due to the shift to more water intensive crops and the increase in use 
during dry periods, known as the Jevons’ Paradox (Gómez, 2009); and an increase 
in water depletion due to lower water returns, known as the Hydrological Paradox 
(Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012; Rodríguez-Díaz et al., 2012; Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 
2008). While the latter is widely known and cited in the scientific literature, there is 
no methodological framework that identifies under what conditions a Jevons’ 
Paradox will appear.  
 
The next paper, prepared by the doctoral candidate and the Prof. Carlos Mario 
Gómez Gómez, presents an analytical framework that identifies the preconditions 
under which a Jevons’ Paradox may occur. The paper is entitled Simple Myths and 
Basic Maths about Greening Irrigation, and is currently under review. Previous 
versions of this paper have been presented in the 87
th
 Annual Conference of the 
Agricultural Economics Society in Warwick, UK (8-10 April 2013); in the 5th 
European Association of Agricultural Economists PhD Workshop in Leuven, 
Belgium (29-31 May 2013); and in the conference New Directions in the Economic 
Analysis of Water in Lisbon, Portugal (18-19 June 2013). 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Water use refers to the amount of water demanded by users. The share of water use 
that either evaporates or becomes contaminated is consumed (i.e., water consumption) 
(Kohli et al., 2010). The water that remains in the system can still be incorporated into 
other water use/s.  
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Abstract: Greening the economy is mostly about improving water governance and not only 
about putting the existing resource saving technical alternatives into practice. Focusing on the 
second and forgetting the first risks finishing with a highly efficient use of water services at the 
level of each individual user but with an unsustainable amount of water use for the entire 
economy. This might be happening already in many places with the modernization of irrigated 
agriculture, the world’s largest water user and the one offering the most promising water 
saving opportunities. In spite of high expectations, modern irrigation techniques seem not to be 
contributing to reduce water scarcity and increase drought resiliency. In fact, according to the 
little evidence available, in some areas they are resulting in higher water use. Building on basic 
economic principles this study aims to show the conditions under which this apparently 
paradoxical outcome, known as the Jevons’ Paradox, might appear. This basic model is 
expected to serve as guidance for assessing the actual outcomes of increasing irrigation 
efficiency and to discuss the changes in water governance that would be required for this to 
make a real contribution to sustainable water management. 
 
Keywords: Jevons’ Paradox; Rebound effect; Agricultural economics; Water economics; 
Irrigation efficiency. 
JEL classification: Q15, Q18, Q25, Q51, Q58. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change, water supply limits, continued population growth and the improvement of 
living standards brought about by development are making water scarcity one of the most 
pressing environmental problems worldwide. Among all the competing uses, agriculture is the 
world’s largest water user and is often believed to be wasteful. Consequently, policy makers 
have recently called for measures to save water in this sector. Among these measures, subsidies 
to increase irrigation efficiency (or technical efficiency, i.e., the effectiveness with which water 
is used at a plot level to produce agricultural goods) have rapidly become widespread (OECD, 
2008)
1
. It is widely believed that more efficient irrigation technologies save water, making it 
available for other productive uses and also for the environment. However, technical options to 
reduce water use and withdrawals
2
 are but a social opportunity that might be wasted if no 
other measures necessary to improve water governance are set (e.g., enforcing property rights, 
water pricing and metering, etc.). In fact, recent empirical work shows that even when the 
desired technical shift is successfully implemented, it might end up reinforcing the already 
unsustainable trends in water use (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012; Rodríguez-Díaz et al., 2012). There are 
two arguments that help to explain this apparently paradoxical outcome: i) the hydrological 
paradox, based on the hydrological assessment of irrigation efficiency increases; and ii) the 
Jevons’ Paradox, grounded on economic theory and on which the present work focuses. 
The hydrological paradox argument comes from the hydrological study of the water balance
3
 
within a basin. Take for example a traditional irrigation system. Due to its low technical 
efficiency, a large share of the water used does not effectively contribute to satisfy 
evapotranspiration (i.e., the consumptive use of water or water consumption) and is therefore 
“lost”. But much of this water is later on recaptured and returned to the watercourse, and is 
still available for alternative uses. However, after an increase in the irrigation efficiency, 
although water use may actually fall, water availability for other uses may decrease through 
increased consumptive use, reduced return flows and lost aquifer seepage. This hydrological 
paradox can be found for example in Jensen (2007), Rodríguez-Díaz et al. (2012), Scheierling et 
al. (2006), Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008). 
The Jevons’ Paradox argument comes from the economic study of water: without any 
complementary policy, an increase in irrigation efficiency makes water a more productive input 
                                                          
1
 Government subsidies for irrigation modernization are common across OECD 
countries, covering the totality or part of the irrigation modernization costs. This is the 
case for example of Australia, Austria, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal or Spain 
(OECD, 2008).  
2
 Water withdrawal is water removed from its source for a specific use, while water 
use refers to the amount of water demanded by users. The two flows are not the 
same because of leaks. In this paper we assume that there is no change in the 
transportation efficiency and we will refer directly to water use.  
3
 In hydrology, a water balance equation can be used to describe the flow of water in 
and out of a system. A general water balance equation is: ܲ ൌ ܳ ൅ ܧ ൅ οܵ 
Where ܲ  is precipitation, ܳ  is runoff,ܧ  is evapotranspiration and οܵ  is the change 
in water storage (in soil or the bedrock). 
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and may result in an increase, rather than a reduction, in water use
4
. The idea that under 
certain conditions an increase in the irrigation efficiency may lead to an increase in the use of a 
resource is well known in economics at least since the XIX
th
 century and has received different 
names, such as the Khazzoom-Brookes Effect or the Jevons’ Paradox (Alcott, 2008, 2005; 
Khazzoom, 1989). There is considerable interest in determining under what conditions this 
paradox appears, and much research is ongoing in fields such as energy or transportation 
(Brookes, 1990; Greene et al., 1999; Hong et al., 2006; Vringer et al., 2007). Surprisingly, its 
study in the field of water economics is relatively new and mostly based on ex-post empirical 
results (Ding and Peterson, 2006; Gutierrez-Martin and Gomez, 2011; Lecina et al., 2010; 
Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012). There is no methodological framework that explains under what 
conditions an increase in the irrigation efficiency will result in a Jevons’ Paradox. Therefore, it is 
difficult to predict ex-ante the impact that an increase in the irrigation efficiency will have over 
water use. This knowledge gap is shocking if we consider the prominent role that has been 
assigned to the modernization of irrigation devices in drought and water scarcity strategies 
worldwide, as well as the high costs of these projects in a time of financial crisis. This paper 
wants to help bridge this gap. In the following pages we present an analytical framework to 
discriminate the determinants of the emergence of the Jevons' paradox. This study may serve 
as a methodological guidance for empirical papers analyzing the issue. 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The change in water use following an increase in the irrigation efficiency depends on three 
opposing effects, namely, a technical effect, a cost effect and a productivity effect. 
First of all, an increase in irrigation efficiency will reduce the amount of water required to 
obtain the same products as before (technical effect). Accordingly, water use could be reduced 
in the same percentage as the increase in irrigation efficiency, provided that the farmers obtain 
the same crops as before. This over-simplistic scenario, where no other effects are considered, 
is the hidden assumption of many studies assessing the expected water savings from irrigation 
modernization plans (a good example of this can be found in the Spanish Irrigation Plan
5
). 
However, the technical shift means also a change in the incentives in place and farmers will not 
normally continue producing the same products as before. Two additional effects over water 
demand need to be considered. 
                                                          
4
 There is a third possibility: neither an increase, nor a decrease, but rather no change. 
That is, the same amount of water is used as before; none is saved for (1) other uses 
or (2) the natural environment. For the purpose of rejecting irrigation efficiency 
increases as a water-saving measure it is enough to show that there is no change in 
water use, i.e. no savings. 
5
 The Spanish Irrigation Plan (Plan Nacional de Regadíos, PNR) 2000-2008 was a large 
investment effort with the aim of reducing agricultural water use. This Plan was 
complemented with the Shock Plan 2006. Both plans invested 7,368 M EUR to 
modernize 2,244,570 ha of irrigated lands and forecasted a reduction in water use of 
3 662 hm3/year (MAGRAMA, 2013). However, since the implementation of the PNR, 
water use from agriculture in these areas are far from decreasing (Gutierrez-Martin 
and Gomez, 2011; Rodríguez-Díaz et al., 2012). 
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The second effect stems from the higher water application costs associated to more efficient 
irrigation technologies and, similar to the first one, reduces water use (cost effect). The increase 
in the water application costs is largely explained by the higher energy costs of the more 
sophisticated irrigation devices (e.g., drip irrigation) as compared to traditional devices (e.g., 
gravity irrigation) (Soto-García et al., 2013). For example, recent empirical work has found that 
the intense irrigation modernization in Spain has increased energy consumption in irrigated 
agriculture by 1,800% since 1950 (Corominas, 2010).  
The third effect refers to the fact that more efficient irrigation systems make water more 
productive (productivity effect). Therefore, for a given amount of water use, the last drop 
generates a larger agricultural product than before and, for this reason, farmers would probably 
be willing to use more water than before. This productivity effect may have a large impact over 
water use and result in a Jevons’ Paradox, though it has been traditionally ignored in the 
assessment of irrigation modernization plans. 
Summing up, the increase in irrigation efficiency leads to three different effects making possible 
to obtain the same production with less water use and higher water application costs, but also 
with higher water productivity. The relevant question we want to solve is what would be the 
combined effect of the technical shift over water use. In other words, under what conditions an 
increase in the technical efficiency with which water is used in agriculture will lead to an 
increase in water use and therefore to a Jevons’ Paradox. In order to answer this question, we 
develop a methodology in two stages: in the first one we obtain water demand as a function of 
irrigation efficiency; in the second one, we assess the impact of an increase in the irrigation 
efficiency over water use, identifying the determinants of the incidence of each of the three 
effects above. 
 
2.1. The water demand function 
Water used by farmers (ܹ) is bought at a unitary price, P, (for example, per cubic meter of 
water used) and applied to the crops incurring in a unitary water application cost, ܿሺܧሻ. 
Therefore, the marginal cost of water use (ܯܥሺܹሻ) is equal to: ܯܥሺܹሻ ൌ ܲ ൅ ܿሺܧሻ       [1] 
Where ܿሺܧሻ is an increasing function of the technical efficiency ܧ (ܧ א ሾͲǡ ͳሿ) of the irrigation 
devices in place
6
, since more sophisticated techniques are costlier (ܿᇱሺܧሻ ൐ Ͳ) (Corominas, 
2010; Soto-García et al., 2013).  
The amount of water that effectively satisfies the agronomic water needs of the crops, or water 
consumption (ܧܹ), is only a fraction ܧ of the total water use (ܹ). Therefore, to consume one 
unit of water, farmers use 
ଵா units of water. Accordingly, the marginal cost of the water 
consumed (ܯܥሺܧܹሻ) is equal to:  
                                                          
6
 ܧ measures the technical efficiency of the irrigation technology in place with, for 
example, typical values of 0.5 for traditional gravity, 0.7 for sprinklers and 0.9 for drip 
devices. 
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 ܯܥሺܧܹሻ ൌ ௉ା௖ሺாሻா       [2] 
Water consumption serves to produce crops (ܻ) with a decreasing marginal productivity: ܻ ൌ ݂ሺܧܹሻ, with ݂Ԣሺܧܹሻ ൐ Ͳ and ݂ԢԢሺܧܹሻ ൏ Ͳ   [3] 
Farmers will demand water up to the point where the marginal productivity of the water 
consumed (݂Ԣሺܧܹሻ) equals its marginal cost (ܯܥሺܧܹሻ): ݂Ԣሺܧܹሻ ൌ ௉ା௖ሺாሻா        [4] 
Accordingly, the water demand function can be expressed as: ܲ ൌ ݂Ԣሺܧܹሻܧ െ ܿሺܧሻ      [5] 
 
2.2.  What happens with water use after an increase in the irrigation efficiency? 
The answer to this question lies formally on the response of water use (ܹ) to an increase in the 
irrigation efficiency (ܧ), that is to say, on the sign of the following derivative: 
డௐడா         [6] 
A positive sign (i.e.,
డௐడா ൐ Ͳ) means that more water is used after an increase in the irrigation 
efficiency, and thus that the Jevons’ Paradox applies.  
Provided that following the irrigation efficiency increase there is no complementary pricing 
policy and thus water prices remain constant (οܲ ൌ Ͳ)7, the effect of an increase in the 
irrigation efficiency over water use can be obtained from the demand function [5] as follows: 
డ௉డௐ ܹ݀ ൅ డ௉డா ݀ܧ ൌ Ͳ ൌ൐ ௗௐௗா ൌ െ డ௉ డாൗడ௉ డௐൗ        [7] 
 That is to say: 
ௗௐௗா ൌ െቀௐா ൅ ௙ᇱሺாௐሻ௙ᇲᇲሺாௐሻாమ െ ௖ᇲሺாሻ௙ᇲᇲሺாௐሻாమቁ     [8] 
Which, after multiplying both sides by 
ாௐ, can be transformed into the efficiency elasticity of 
water use (߳ௐǡா):    ߳ௐǡா ൌ െͳ െ ଵఢ೑ᇲǡಶ ൅ ൬ ఢ೎ǡಶఢ೑ᇲǡಶ൰ቀ ௖ሺாሻ௉ା௖ሺாሻቁ     [9] 
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 This is the case in most of the irrigation modernization plans, such as those of Spain, 
Portugal, Mexico or Australia (OECD, 2008).  
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Where:   ߳ௐா ൌ డௐడா ாௐ  is the efficiency elasticity of water use. ߳௖ǡா ൌ డ௖ሺாሻడா ா௖ሺாሻ ൌ ܿԢሺܧሻ ா௖ሺாሻ ൐ Ͳ is the efficiency elasticity of the water application cost. 
௙߳ᇱǡா ൌ డ௙ᇱሺாௐሻడா ா௙ᇱ ൌ ௙ᇲᇲሺாௐሻ௙ᇱሺாௐሻ ܧܹ ൏ Ͳ is the efficiency elasticity of the marginal productivity of 
water consumption. 
 
Equation [9] contains the three effects identified above, namely: 
· A technical effect, meaning that increasing irrigation efficiency by one percentage 
point would reduce water use by one percentage point, a reduction in water use 
proportional to the relative increase in irrigation efficiency (indicated by െͳ).  
· A cost effect, meaning that the higher application cost of water resulting from a more 
efficient irrigation technique will lead to a reduction in water use. This is measured by ൬ ఢ೎ǡಶఢ೑ᇲǡಶ൰ ቀ ௖ሺாሻ௉ା௖ሺாሻቁ ൏ Ͳ. The incidence of this effect over water use depends on two 
ratios: the first ratio ൬ ఢ೎ǡಶఢ೑ᇲǡಶ൰ is the quotient of the efficiency elasticity of the water 
application cost (߳௖ǡா) to the efficiency elasticity of the marginal productivity of water 
consumption ( ௙߳ᇱǡா); and the second ratio ቀ ௖ሺாሻ௉ା௖ሺாሻቁ is the quotient of the application 
cost ܿሺܧሻ to the unitary water costs (ܲ ൅ ܿሺܧሻ).  
· A productivity effect, meaning that the increase in water productivity will lead to an 
increase in water use. This is measured by െ ଵఢ೑ᇲǡಶ ൐ Ͳ and its importance depends on 
the vale of ௙߳ᇱǡா.  
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have developed an analytical framework that may be used to predict ex-ante 
the likelihood of a Jevons’ Paradox in irrigated agriculture. This study may serve both as 
guidance for future empirical papers and as an analytical framework to better understand the 
opposing effects existing behind an increase in the irrigation efficiency.  
Subsidies to increase irrigation efficiency have rapidly become a widely used policy in water 
stressed countries as a means to reduce water use. However, the common belief that considers 
more efficient irrigation devices as synonymous of water saving technologies is rather naive as 
it tends to ignore the entire physical, economic and institutional framework where these 
alternatives are implemented. Actually, making a real contribution to reduce water pressures 
out of a technical shift is a difficult task. To start with, water availability may decrease through 
increased consumptive water use, reduced return flows and lost aquifer seepage, leading to a 
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Hydrological Paradox. More importantly, if the productivity effect resulting from a better 
irrigation technology is large enough, total water use may even increase (Jevons’ Paradox).  
Consider for example the following extreme, but still likely, case. Assume an agricultural area 
where energy is heavily subsidized and the more efficient irrigation devices do not increase the 
cost of applying water (for the sake of the argument, let us assume that ߳௖ǡா ൌ Ͳ).  In addition 
to that, water is scarce in such a way that most of the time there is idle irrigation capacity and 
the technical shift will allow higher water consumption at the same cost as before (ห ௙߳ᇱǡாห ൏ ͳ). 
Then the productivity effect is higher than one ൬െ ଵא೑ᇲǡಶ ൐ ͳ൰ and will overcome the technical 
effect (െͳ). In such a situation increasing the irrigation technology will lead to a Jevons’ Paradox 
and, contrary to the common belief, water availability will decrease and the real outcome of the 
presumed water saving technologies will worsen the already unsustainable use of water. The 
intuition behind the example shows that water technologies might be less effective precisely in 
the situations where water savings are more needed; that is to say, in water stressed areas with 
subsidized infrastructures and low water and energy prices (this is the case in many 
Mediterranean countries like Australia, Portugal or Spain). 
If the policy goal is simply to use or consume less water for irrigation, there are other measures 
for doing this. They are direct, inexpensive and by definition effective: caps and/or taxes. 
However, the actual objective of irrigation modernization policies is twofold: reducing water 
use  without impairing agricultural welfare. More efficient technologies may help to attain this 
dual objective, but they should not be used as a panacea and need to be part of a 
comprehensive policy mix towards a sustainable water management. For example, the 
technical shift can increase farmers’ income, and this may be used as an opportunity to agree 
upon a reduction in energy subsidies and/or the implementation of metering and volumetric 
tariffs. This policy mix, rather than a simple technical shift, can find the way to make the 
reduction of water scarcity compatible with the maintenance and eventual improvement of 
farmers’ welfare. Technical options are only opportunities; the real challenge in the transition 
towards a sustainable water use relies on building better institutions and putting effective 
incentives in place. 
C.M. Gómez and C.D. Pérez-Blanco (under review)                                                       8 
 
Acknowledgements 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh 
Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 265213 (EPI-WATER - 
Evaluating Economic Policy Instruments for Sustainable Water Management in Europe)
C.M. Gómez and C.D. Pérez-Blanco (under review)                                                       9 
 
References  
 
Alcott, B., 2005. Jevons’ paradox. Ecological Economics 54, 9–21. 
Alcott, B., 2008. Historical Overview of the Jevons Paradox in the Literature, in: The Jevons 
Paradox and the Myth of Resource Efficiency Improvements. Earthscan, London (UK), 
pp. 7–78. 
Brookes, L., 1990. The greenhouse effect: the fallacies in the energy efficiency solution. Energy 
Policy 18, 199–201. 
Corominas, J., 2010. Agua y energía en el riego, en la época de la sostenibilidad. Ingeniería del 
Agua 17, 219–233. 
Ding, Y., Peterson, J.M., 2006. Comparing the Cost Effectiveness of Several Policy Tools at 
Conserving Groundwater in the Kansas High Plains, in: 2006 Annual Meeting. 
Presented at the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association 2006 Annual 
meeting, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural 
and Applied Economics Association), Long Beach, CA. 
Greene, D.L., Kahn, J.R., Gibson, R.C., 1999. Fuel Economy Rebound Effect for U.S. Household 
Vehicles. The Energy Journal 20, 1–31. 
Gutierrez-Martin, C., Gomez, C.M., 2011. Assessing irrigation efficiency improvements by using 
a preference revelation model. Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research 9, 1009–
1020. 
Hong, S.H., Oreszczyn, T., Ridley, I., 2006. The impact of energy efficient refurbishment on the 
space heating fuel consumption in English dwellings. Energy and Buildings 38, 1171–
1181. 
Jensen, M.E., 2007. Beyond irrigation efficiency. Irrig Sci 25, 233–245. 
Khazzoom, 1989. Energy Savings from More Efficient Appliances. A Rejoinder. The Energy 
Journal 10, 157–166. 
Lecina, S., Isidoro, D., Playán, E., Aragüés, R., 2010. Irrigation modernization and water 
conservation in Spain: The case of Riegos del Alto Aragón. Agricultural Water 
Management 97, 1663–1675. 
MAGRAMA, 2013. Plan Nacional de Regadios [WWW Document]. Ministerio de Agricultura, 
Alimentación y Medio Ambiente. URL 
http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/agua/temas/gestion-sostenible-de-regadios/plan-
nacional-de-regadios/texto-completo/ (accessed 9.30.13). 
OECD, 2008. Environmental Performance of Agriculture in OECD Countries Since 1990 (Report). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris (France). 
C.M. Gómez and C.D. Pérez-Blanco (under review)                                                       10 
 
Pfeiffer, L., Lin, C.-Y.C., 2012. Groundwater pumping and spatial externalities in agriculture. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64, 16–30. 
Rodríguez-Díaz, J.A., Urrestarazu, L.P., Poyato, E.C., Montesinos, P., 2012. Modernizing water 
distribution networks: Lessons from the Bembézar MD irrigation district, Spain. 
Outlook on Agriculture 41, 229–236. 
Scheierling, S.M., Young, R.A., Cardon, G.E., 2006. Public subsidies for water-conserving 
irrigation investments: Hydrologic, agronomic, and economic assessment. Water 
Resources Research 42, 1–11. 
Soto-García, M., Martínez-Alvarez, V., García-Bastida, P.A., Alcon, F., Martin-Gorriz, B., 2013. 
Effect of water scarcity and modernisation on the performance of irrigation districts in 
south-eastern Spain. Agricultural Water Management 124, 11–19. 
Vringer, K., Aalbers, T., Blok, K., 2007. Household energy requirement and value patterns. 
Energy Policy 35, 553–566. 
Ward, F.A., Pulido-Velazquez, M., 2008. Water conservation in irrigation can increase water use. 
PNAS 105, 18215–18220. 
 
CHAPTER 4: COMMAND AND CONTROL POLICIES FOR WATER MANAGEMENT 
41 
4 Command and Control policies for 
water management        
 
In the last few decades, water resources management has become a problem that 
can no longer be treated exclusively from the technical standpoint (i.e., through 
water supply policies). The unparalleled increase of water withdrawals has forced 
policy makers to implement some measures concerning also water demand. This 
has been done through a more intensive use of Command and Control (C&C) 
policies. C&C policies are not new in water policy, and they have been used as a 
complement to supply policies for centuries. However, in the last decades they have 
evolved from simple rules that were only casually enforced by law to more complex 
and sophisticated water management plans, fully supported by regional, national 
and/or supra-national institutions (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010).  
The mechanism called C&C refers to a set of regulatory instruments that specify a 
particular type of behavior that agents have to comply with. Traditionally, the 
intended behavior was decided unilaterally and enforced by legal disciplining 
through the use of the power of the state. More recently, many institutions worldwide 
have opted for a more integrative approach in which the objectives of the C&C 
policies are designed through a social agreement including all the agents affected, 
although decisions are ultimately enforced by the public sector (EC, 2008, 2007; 
NDMC, 2013).  
 
In the EU, complex and sophisticated C&C policies have proliferated during the last 
decades. Initially, C&C policies at a Community level aimed towards defining 
minimum standards for water quality across the EU. We can identify two milestones: 
the Drinking Water Directive (EC, 1991) and the Wastewater Directive (EC, 1998). 
Although they have performed relatively well, their implementation has been (and 
still is) challenging mainly because of the financial and planning aspects related to 
major infrastructure investment such as sewerage systems and water treatment 
facilities (EC, 2013; KWR, 2011). More recently, C&C policies have also addressed 
the challenges posed by floods (EC, 2007) and droughts (EC, 2008). Although it is 
still early to assess the outcomes of these policies, some authors have already 
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claimed that these policies should be defined in a less rigid, more adaptive way to 
be successful in the long and even in the medium term (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). At 
a national level, C&C policies have also played a significant role, either through the 
transposition of Community Directives or through the development of 
complementary C&C policies. For example, in the overexploited Segura River Basin 
in Spain the allocation of new water rights for irrigation was prohibited by Royal 
Decree in 1986
13
 (BOE, 1986). Another example can be found in the rigid norms 
that regulate the Tagus-Segura Water Transfer (BOE, 2001, 1985, 1980). 
From the perspective of an omniscient and omnipresent state, C&C policies appear 
enough to achieve the objectives of water policy. However, in reality the effective 
implementation of these regulations presents a series of difficulties. The costs of 
enforcing C&C policies depend on the economic incentives towards non-compliance 
and on the complexity of the C&C policy. The latter is of special relevance in the 
case of water, since the status of the water resources is the result of the action of 
multiple agents, and this makes complex to command and control all the factors 
involved to achieve the desired objectives (including those to impose law-
enforcement mechanisms which require structures to inspect and apply fines and 
penalties, with increasing difficulties because of the magnitude of the problem). This 
is particularly true when the system is operating under critical situations of water 
stress (multiple sources of point pollution, overexploitation, etc.) that increase the 
marginal value of water and strengthen the incentives towards non-compliance 
(Porto and Lobato, 2004). In addition, C&C policies are often non-flexible and lack 
adaptive capacity (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). This is due to the fact that C&C policies 
either ignore uncertainties or assess them quantitatively in a way that ignores the 
non-linear changes that are making surprise and crisis increasingly common in 
many Mediterranean river basins worldwide (e.g., climate change). Consequently, 
C&C policies may be effective only for roughly stable systems with reliably recurring 
phenomena. 
The relevant shortcomings associated with the implementation of C&C policies in 
combination with supply policies have made researchers to question the adequacy 
of the current paradigm
14
 for water management. In fact, some have argued in favor 
of a looser water management approach that does not aspire to comprehensive 
                                                          
13
 Although in practice this norm has been seldom enforced (WWF, 2006). 
14
 By paradigm we refer to the “intellectual and operational environment within which 
scientists ’do’ science. It shapes the nature of problems to be addressed as well as the 
methods to be used and the interpretive lens through which the legitimacy and utility of 
findings are judged” (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). 
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command and control (Bucknall, 2006; Mayntz, 1998; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). In 
any case, this does not mean that C&C policies should be removed from the water 
policy mix; rather the contrary, both supply policies and economic incentives are 
inherently linked to C&C policies, which are necessary in order to define a common 
legal framework in which agents interact and to set a general direction in water 
policy for the achievement of collectively agreed goals. This is the case of Drought 
Management Plans (DMPs): although per se and even in combination with supply 
policies DMPs may be unable to attain the objectives of the WFD, they are a 
prerequisite for the development of efficient and effective water markets and drought 
insurance systems that may lead to a more sustainable water use.  
 
DMPs are inspired in the drought contingency plans implemented in the US since 
the ‘80s and thus follow similar rules (NDMC, 2013). Basically, DMPs define the 
precise thresholds of possible drought situations and set the water constraints that 
will come into force in each of these cases, with the aim of guaranteeing water 
supply to priority uses. Drought thresholds are obtained from the historical 
assessment of water supply, while the extent of water constraints varies from one 
basin to another and depends largely on the ratio between water demand and water 
supply, being more restrictive in overexploited basins and focusing on agricultural 
uses (the water use with the lowest priority) (EC, 2008). As a result, the declaration 
of a drought will automatically reduce, in a predictable amount, the quantity of water 
delivered to the irrigation system from publicly controlled water sources.  
In spite of being relatively new and voluntary, DMPs have rapidly spread across 
Southern EU countries such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain
15
. In particular, 
Spain has pioneered the adoption of DMPs and currently every inter-regional 
(NUTS2) river basin in the country has already approved its DMP. This is particularly 
shocking if we consider that there are no assessments available on the potential 
impact of DMPs over the environment and over the productive activities exposed to 
water restrictions. Since DMPs focus exclusively on surface water and do not 
develop any instrument to regain control over loosely controlled and overexploited 
aquifers, we may expect that during droughts the pressures over surface water are 
at least partially transferred to groundwater through illegal abstractions. This effect 
                                                          
15
 Unlike other water management instruments such as River Basin Management Plans, 
DMPs are not prescriptive. However, apart from these set of Southern EU countries, DMPs 
have been also implemented in Finland, the Netherlands and the UK. 
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was not considered in the development of DMPs and its impact is basically 
unknown.  
 
The following paper, prepared by the doctoral candidate and the Prof. Carlos Mario 
Gómez Gómez, intends to help bridge this gap. The paper develops a stochastic 
methodology to estimate the expected water availability and the potential for illegal 
groundwater abstractions in agriculture resulting from the decision rules of the 
recently approved DMPs in Spain. This method is illustrated with an application to 
the Segura River Basin. The paper is entitled Do drought management plans reduce 
drought risk? A risk assessment model for a Mediterranean river basin, and was 
published in Ecological Economics in the year 2012. Different versions of this paper 
were presented in the 86th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics 
Society in Warwick, UK (16-18 April 2012) and in the International Society of 
Ecological Economics 2012 Conference – Ecological Economics and Rio+20 in Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil (16-19 June 2012). 
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Groundwater resources are traditionally overexploited in arid and drought-prone regions with proﬁtable ir-
rigated agriculture, and the depletion of this groundwater results from a combination of the physical scarcity
of surface sources and the lack of effective control of use rights on the part of water authorities. This is the
case in the Segura River Basin of southern Spain. As a result, drought risks and structural deﬁcits have steadily
increased over the last 50 years. The Drought Management Plan recently approved by the Segura River Basin
Authority aims to enforce more stringent water supply restrictions from surface sources, but the plan does
not include any explicit policy to handle illegal groundwater abstraction. By using a stochastic risk assess-
ment model, this paper shows that the implementation of the drought plan will increase the expected irriga-
tion deﬁcits of surface water and can, paradoxically, lead to higher drought and aquifer depletion risks than
the traditional rules that the new plan replaces.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many semiarid and drought-prone regions have signiﬁcant com-
petitive advantages for irrigated agriculture because the land is abun-
dant and cheap and few alternative uses for the land exist.
Furthermore, solar radiation is guaranteed and, apart from the abun-
dance of cheap labour, many of these areas are located near high-
demand markets. In fact, everything except water seems to be in
place for developing a prosperous agricultural sector. In this context,
water for irrigation can become the critical production factor that de-
termines the viability of, and returns from, the agricultural sector.
This is the case in many European Mediterranean regions where the
survival of a competitive and highly productive agriculture critically
depends on the ability to satisfy the water demands of a water-
intensive irrigation system.
In these regions, although the water demand for irrigation is high,
water property rights are poorly deﬁned and enforced. Therefore,
during frequent droughts, incentives are in place to use more water
than the amount provided from publicly controlled sources. In fact,
when current demands cannot be handled by publicly controlled
sources, farmers have powerful incentives to switch to the more de-
pendable, mostly uncontrolled groundwater sources. Uncertainty,
coupled with the legacies of past management actions, often leaves
decision makers few options other than to reinforce the current tra-
jectory of the system (Anderies et al., 2006). The resulting overexploi-
tation of the aquifers may reduce the robustness and resiliency of the
system and its ability to cope with future droughts, thus leading to a
vicious circle of increasing risk, vulnerability and water scarcity
(Anderies, 2005; Anderies et al., 2004; Anderies et al., 2006; Holling,
1973; Perrings, 1989; Ruttan, 2002).
Some important measures have recently been taken to tackle the
structural problem of recurrent droughts in the European Union. In
what was perceived as an advanced replacement of past emergency
responses by the apparently more appropriate planned and anticipat-
ed risk management response, several river basin authorities from
Spain, the UK, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium have recently
approved their respective Drought Management Plans (DMP) (EC,
2008). Basically, for the case of drought events, these plans establish
more stringent constraints to access to publicly provided water
while guaranteeing priority uses, such as drinking water, and ensur-
ing minimum environmental services. As a result, the declaration of
a drought will automatically reduce, in a predictable amount, the
quantity of water delivered to the irrigation system from publicly
controlled water sources. The DMP deﬁnes the precise thresholds of
possible drought situations and sets the water constraints that will
come into force in each of these cases (EC, 2008). For example, in
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the Segura River Basin in Spain, a four-stage classiﬁcation system is
used (normality, pre-alert, alert and emergency). In the case of an
emergency, an optimistic2 50% of planned irrigation resources will
be conceded in an attempt to guarantee, as highest priority, the sur-
vival of ligneous crops (although water distribution can be revised
by the local authorities). Less stringent water constraints are estab-
lished for alert (75%) and pre-alert levels (90%) (CHS, 2010b).
The plans reduce, de jure, the water supply during drought events.
However, neither the DMP nor the water authorities introduce any
instrument to handle the illegal abstraction of groundwater.3 The ille-
gal abstraction of groundwater is a major cause of the increased scar-
city of water and drought risk in arid and semiarid catchments and
also represents an important limit to the ability of the water authority
to reduce water use during droughts. In fact, the imperfect enforce-
ment of property rights over groundwater use in several European
Mediterranean basins raises some serious doubts about the effective-
ness of the DMP. Reductions in water supply from controlled sources,
although proven efﬁcient regarding surface water, are more difﬁcult
to enforce regarding legal and illegal groundwater sources (CHS,
2010a; Llamas, 2007). As has happened in the past, farmers may at-
tempt to use informal and more reliable groundwater to compensate
for the lack of formal surface water. Under the existing drought man-
agement rules, aquifers can be considered an insurance against
drought,4 making drought risk equivalent to groundwater depletion
risk.
Controlling property rights is a necessary condition for managing
the collective challenge of water scarcity and drought risk. The main
hypothesis in this paper is that when water property rights are not
perfectly enforced, making the formal water supply contingent on
drought levels can paradoxically worsen both the water deﬁcits and
the risk of drought. To test this hypothesis, we develop a methodolo-
gy to compare and assess the water supply deﬁcits resulting from two
alternative drought responses. In the ﬁrst case, the baseline response
results from the traditional decision rules historically applied in the
basin. In the second case, the counterfactual response stems from
the decision rules of the recently approved DMP.5
The basic conclusion of this paper is that if the new decision rules
are not complemented by proper enforcement of water use rights,
they will lead to increased water deﬁcits and will reinforce the exist-
ing incentives to increase the depletion of the largely uncontrolled
groundwater resources
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
area where the case study is applied, the Campo de Cartagena agricul-
tural district in the Segura River Basin (Spain). Section 3 presents the
risk assessment model, and Section 4 presents and discusses the re-
sults obtained under the two alternative decision rules. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Background for the Case Study: Campo de Cartagena, Segura
River Basin (Spain)
Because most of the variables involved are site- or crop-speciﬁc,
such as rainfall, water demand, water supply and risk exposure, we il-
lustrate each step of the model with the results for the particular case
of the ligneous crops in the Campo de Cartagena agricultural district
in the Segura River Basin (SRB).6
The SRB is a semi-arid water scarce basin exposed to an increased
drought risk, and it is characterised by an imperfect enforcement of
water use rights. For example, in 2008, according to the rainfall-
runoff models used by the water authority, the average household,
manufacturing industry and agriculture demand was estimated to
be 1.9 billion cubic metres per year (1900 million cubic metres or
hm3, 85% of which was from irrigated agriculture), whereas the aver-
age renewable resources amounted to only 0.75 billion cubic metres
(CHS, 2010a, 2011). These data thus yield a water exploitation
index greater than 2.5.7 Indeed, apart from the transfer of water
from the Tagus River Basin, which has never accounted for more
that 20% of the Segura water demand,8 strong evidence (CHS,
2010a, 2011; WWF, 2006) suggests that the existing water supply
deﬁcit of the last several decades has been effectively covered by
using the mostly uncontrolled groundwater sources.9 10 Rather than
enforcing property rights by closing illegal mills, the traditional re-
sponse has been to tolerate offenders11 (CHS, 2010a; Llamas, 2007).
Not surprisingly, the drought risk has increased along with the in-
crease in water scarcity, and as the evidence presented in this paper
shows, under the current water supply and demand, a drought can
occur in one of every six years.
Campo de Cartagena, in the SRB, is an agricultural district with ap-
proximately 13,000 ha of irrigated ligneous crops (28.9% of the total
irrigated land), which demand approximately 58 million cubic metres
(hm3) of water for irrigation in a normal hydrological year, of which
approximately 16.7 hm3 per year come from already overexploited
aquifers (CHS, 2010a; MARM, 2007). Although it suffers from severe
water scarcity, Campo de Cartagena, where the main ligneous crop
is citrus fruit (CHS, 2011), is one of the largest and most proﬁtable ir-
rigated areas in Spain (CHS, 2010a), with production levels well over
20,000 kg/ha for some fruit trees (such as lemon, mandarin, orange
and peach trees) (Pérez et al., 2011). Thus, the incentives for aquifer
overexploitation are high, even in the presence of high abstraction
costs.
The three aquifers in the Campo de Cartagena agricultural district,
Carrascoy, Victorias and Campo de Cartagena, are overexploited even
in non-drought periods. In a normal hydrological year, irrigation re-
sources from these aquifers account for 29% of the irrigation demand,
2 During past drought events, the conceded observed irrigation resources have
reached, in many cases, levels well under the 50% of the initially planned irrigation re-
sources. This was the case in the last drought in 2005–2008, when the conceded irriga-
tion resources were less than 25% of the resources initially planned for the entire
period (CHS, 2010b and 2011).
3 On the contrary, river basin authorities have explicitly postponed compliance with
the environmental European quality and state standards for aquifers beyond the ini-
tially planned deadline of 2015 (CHS, 2010b, 2011; EC, 2003)
4 The traditional response against illegal water abstraction has been the result of in-
frastructure and the concession of additional irrigation rights (Gómez, 2009). This
partly explains why irrigated land in CHS has grown more than 275% since 1990.
5 No drought has been declared since its implementation; however, this is the result
of a succession of relatively rain-abundant years (CHS, 2011).
6 Campo de Cartagena is, simultaneously, one of the most overexploited and proﬁt-
able agricultural districts in Spain (CHS, 2010a).
7 The water exploitation index (WEI) is calculated as the ratio of total freshwater ab-
straction over total renewable resources. According to the European Environment
Agency (2009), this index was 1.27 in 2003, indicating a meaningful trend towards a
greater water scarcity in the last 20 years. Previous studies (Martínez Fernández and
Esteve Selma, 2002) estimated that water consumption was already 2.25 times greater
than the available renewable resources nearly a decade ago.
8 Tajo-Segura Water Transfer was intended to provide an average of 55% of the total
water resources in SRB and 35.78% of the irrigation resources between 2005 and 2010
(CHS, 2010b).
9 The SRB accumulated groundwater overexploitation amounts to 7000 hm3 (CHS,
2010b), including aquifers whose resources have been exhausted to such a degree that,
even in the absence of more abstractions, it would take more than a century for them
to completely recover. This is the case with the Alcoy-Sopalmo aquifer, where during
some hydrological years, it has pumped out twenty times its renewable resources
(CHS, 2010b).
10 This occurs even though the granting of new concessions in the Segura River Basin
has been forbidden since 1986 because of the signiﬁcant water scarcity. Nevertheless,
irrigated areas increased between 1990 and 2000 at a rate of 6500 ha/year (MMA,
2005). For example, in Campo de Dalias (Almería), the number of hectares farmed un-
der plastic has tripled from 1980 to 2005, even though the drilling of new wells is pro-
hibited. In the Segura River Basin, approximately 100,000 ha was irrigated with water
illegally abstracted in 2005 (IDRUICM, 2005). See WWF (2006).
11 The concession of new water use rights has been legally forbidden in the Segura
River Basin since 2005, when aquifers were declared overexploited. Nevertheless, agri-
cultural use increased by 5% each year since 2005 (CHS, 2010a, 2011). This is possible
because of a lack of control over irrigation water demand. For example, only
155,313 ha of the 225,356 ha irrigated in Murcia (71.4% of the total irrigated land in
the SRB) are ofﬁcially registered by the water authority.
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36% of which is non-renewable groundwater (CHS, 2010a). This over-
exploitation is further exacerbated by the low technical efﬁciency of
the abstraction, distribution and irrigation systems (25.5% according
to CHS, 2010b) because only one-fourth of the water abstracted effec-
tively contributes to satisfying the agronomic water requirements.
3. The Risk Assessment Model
To analyse the alternative drought management rules, we use a
two-stage risk assessment method. The ﬁrst stage consists of repre-
senting both the water required and the water available for a given
set of ligneous crops at any moment in time as stochastic variables.
In the second stage, we use these stochastic variables to determine
the resulting water supply deﬁcit associated with each decision rule.
We can describe the two stages as follows:
• The ﬁrst stage uses a standard method to obtain water require-
ments for each ligneous crop. We compare the evapotranspiration
requirements with the amount of water available, which is from
the following ﬁve sources: three stochastic sources (rainwater, run-
off and stored water), the existing stock of groundwater and a var-
iable but deterministic amount of non-conventional sources
(wastewater reuse and desalinated water).
• The second stage allows us to determine the amount of water deliv-
ered to the irrigation system in accordance with the two alternative
decision rules (traditional vs. drought contingency rules) and serves
to measure the resulting excess demand for water as well as the
moral hazard incentive to engage in illegal abstractions. The alter-
native decisions are obtained as follows:
i) In the baseline (traditional) case, the water authority decides the
amount of surface water to be delivered to the irrigation system
using the same discretionary rules that can be deduced from past
decisions, which basically depend on the amount of runoff ob-
served in any moment in time.
ii) In the alternative case, the water authority follows the decision
rule approved as part of the DMP. When the natural supply of
water is “normal”, that is, the stored water and/or runoff may
be sufﬁcient, the decision is the same as in the traditional rule.
However, in the case of a drought emergency, that is, in an
alert or pre-alert state (which occur with a probability of 14%
in our model), the amount of water delivered must be adjusted
to the speciﬁc predetermined thresholds.
3.1. First Stage. The Decision Context: Water Requirements and Water
Availability
Following the Spanish Ministry of Environment standard method
(MARM, 2009b),12 the amount of water required by a single crop, or
its evapotranspiration (ET), is measured by using the evapotranspira-
tion registered during the period from 1941 to 2009 (MARM, 2009b).
In the case of irrigated crops, these water requirements are partially
covered by the effective rainfall (ER) received from nature, which is
a function of rainfall (a stochastic variable in the model). Thus, the
amount of water required from the irrigation system, or the agro-
nomic water required (WR) by a particular crop, is equivalent to the
difference between the crop's evapotranspiration (ET) and the effec-
tive rainfall (ER). Agronomic water requirements can either be satis-
ﬁed or not satisﬁed, depending on the region's natural capital
(stochastic runoff) and human capital (surface water stored).
The effective coverage of the agronomic water requirements de-
pends on three stochastic variables: rainfall, runoff and surface
water stored. We consider the probability density function (PDF) of
these three factors to determine the water supply at any moment in
time.
3.1.1. Effective Rainfall
Effective rainfall (ER) is the amount of rainfall in mm (p) that ef-
fectively contributes to satisfy evapotranspiration13:
ER ¼ g pð Þ: ð1Þ
To represent ERi under every possible state of nature, the observed
data were adjusted to a probability density function (PDF)14 that al-
lows assigning a probability (y=h(p)) to each rainfall level (p). This
function is obtained as the best ﬁt gamma function15 of the following
type (Martin et al., 2001; McWorther et al., 1966):
y ¼ z pja; bð Þ ¼
1
baΓ að Þ
p
a−1
exp
−p
b
! "
ð2Þ
where a and b are, respectively, the scale and the shape parameters.
Table 1 presents the maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) of this
function's parameters. As Fig. 1 indicates, higher probabilities corre-
spond to rainfall levels that are low or even very low for a region sup-
porting a highly productive and water-dependent agriculture.16
The water deﬁcit (WR) representing the part of evapotranspira-
tion (ET) that is not covered by effective rainfall (ER) is also a stochas-
tic variable, which can be deﬁned as:
WR ¼ ET−g pð Þ: ð3Þ
3.1.2. Runoff
The amount of water available to cover the agronomic water re-
quirements is estimated using two proxy variables measured in per-
centage units. The ﬁrst proxy variable is the percentage of annual
cumulative runoff over the river basin surface water storage capacity
(r), and the second proxy variable is the percentage of water stored
over the river basin surface water storage capacity at the beginning
of the crop season (s) (CHS, 2010b; Gómez-Ramos et al., 2002).
Both are stochastic variables.
Table 1
Rainfall Gamma function. The dependent variable is mm of
rainfall.
Variable Coefﬁcient
a (Scale) 16.358a
(2.821)
b (Shape) 22.9964a
(2.286)
No. of observations 68
Source: Authors' elaboration from MARM, 2009b.
a Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
12 MARM methodology follows a combination of the Thornthwaite and Penman-
Monteith Methods (see, for example, Allen et al., 2006).
13 Effective rainfall (ER) is estimated using the Soil Conservation Service–USDAmethodol-
ogy for Spain (Cuenca, 1989), and it is a function of humidity deﬁcit (f(D)), rainfall (p) and
evapotranspiration (ET). It is measured in annual mm: ER=f(D)·[1,25 p0,824–2,93]−
100,000955·ET.
14 Data on cumulative annual rainfall are obtained from the Sistema Integrado de
Información del Agua (SIA) (MARM, 2009b) for the period 1941 to 2009.
15 The gamma function is deﬁned by a scale parameter (a) and a shape parameter (b).
It is consistent with rainfall measures because negative values are not allowed. The
function reaches a maximum for intermediate values, decreases according to its scale
parameter and converges to a normal distribution function as the shape parameter
increases.
16 The Segura River Basin (SRB) is exposed to a higher meteorological drought risk in
Spain. The average evapotranspiration is similar to that of the Guadalquivir River Basin,
although the time distribution is concentrated in low values (90% of rainfall values are
between 400 and 800 mm, whereas, for example, values are above 500 mmwith a 92%
probability in the Ebro River Basin).
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Following Martin et al. (2001), we adjust the runoff probability
distribution function to a gamma function.17 This allows assigning a
probability (q) to each runoff level (r):
q ¼ f rja; bð Þ ¼
1
baΓ að Þ
r
a−1
exp
−r
b
! "
ð4Þ
Table 2 and Fig. 2 show the best ﬁt parameters for the runoff
function.
3.1.3. Available Surface Stored Water
FollowingGómez-Ramos et al. (2002) and Pérez et al. (2011), we ad-
just the probability distribution function of the level of available stored
surfacewater by using theWeibull function,18which allows assigning a
probability (w) to each stored water level (s)19 (see Table 3 and Fig. 3):
w ¼ j sja; bð Þ ¼
b
a
a
b
! "b−1
exp − s
a
! "b# $
: ð5Þ
3.2. Decision Rules
At the beginning of each crop season, the water authority observes
the level of water stored in the reservoirs and assesses the overall ir-
rigation water required (TIR).20 Accordingly, the water authority then
applies a rule to determine the amount of water to be delivered to the
crop ﬁelds.21 The amount of irrigation resources actually delivered
each year is a public decision that is based on water availability, and
it may consist of using traditional decision rules (baseline) or apply-
ing the new decision rules of the recently approved DMP.We now an-
alyse separately the two types of decisions (Fig. 3).
3.2.1. Traditional Decision Rules to Determine Water Delivery for
Irrigation
In contrast with the situation created by the recently approved
drought plans, the decision rules followed thus far have been the
result of a combination of social agreements, opinions of expert judg-
es and discretion with no written rules to be applied in any case,
depending on the water available for the crop season. To formalise
these decisions, we use the available data on the amount of water ef-
fectively delivered to farmers measured as a percentage of irrigation
resources conceded over TIR. Available data span a range of 15 years
(1992 to 2007) (CHS, 2010b), and as is normal in this type of analysis,
the number of observations is fewer than required by a robust esti-
mation of a probability distribution function. To compensate for the
problem caused by the small number of observations, we follow the
standard approach of increasing the sample size by representing the
percentage of TIR satisﬁed as a proportion of runoff, r22 23 (h(r)) by
using ordinary least squares (Gómez-Ramos et al., 2002).24 The func-
tion relating h(r) with runoff is presented in Table 4.
Finally, the effective surface irrigation resources (EIR(r)), or the
part of the irrigation resources (TIR) that effectively satisfy evapo-
transpiration, can now be expressed as a function of the runoff
(through g(h)) and the overall efﬁciency of the irrigation system (es):
EIR rð Þ ¼ TIR%h rð Þ%esw: ½6'
Other publicly controlled water sources, such as the groundwater
legally used (gw), the treated water (tw) and the desalinated water
(dw), are provided to farmers in proportion to the irrigation resources
delivered (h(r))25 from reservoirs. The amount of water delivered
from each of these sources is converted into an effective irrigation re-
source by using its own technical efﬁciency index (egw for groundwa-
ter, etw for treated water and edw for desalinated water),
26 as follows:
gw rð Þ ¼
λ
η
%TIR%h rð Þ%egw ð7Þ
tw rð Þ ¼
γ
η
%TIR%h rð Þ%etw ð8Þ
17 Runoff values range from 0% to 225% over the river basin dam storage capacity.
18 The Weibull distribution is a continuous probability distribution with a scale pa-
rameter (a) and a shape parameter (b).
19 The s data series, as a percentage of the total dam storage capacity, is obtained from
Anuario de Aforos (MARM, 2009a).
20 TIR is the maximum amount of irrigation resources that can be conceded in an ide-
al hydrological year. Spanish river basins estimate TIR as the agronomic water required
to cover the 80th percentile of annual historical evapotranspiration (from 1941 to
2009) with a global efﬁciency of the water provisioning system of 60% (MARM,
2008). TIR is then higher than %TIR, and it is generally higher than WR.
21 The irrigation resources actually conceded by the river authority in the SRB cover
only a percentage of the estimated TIR (%TIR).
Table 2
Runoff gamma function. The dependent variable is the percent-
age of runoff over the total surface water storage capacity.
Variable Coefﬁcient
a (Scale) 6.1813a
(1.088)
b (Shape) 0.1143a
(0.012)
No. of observations 68
Estimated bymaximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors' elaboration from MARM, 2009a.
a Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
22 The r data as a percentage of dam storage capacity were obtained from Anuario de
Aforos (MARM, 2009a).
23 Stored water (s) was not found to be statistically correlated with the percentage of
TIR satisﬁed, which could be a consequence of the small storage capacity of the Segura
River Basin. The ratio of reservoir storage capacity (1141 hm3) over average yearly wa-
ter use (1905 hm3) is only 60% in the SRB, far lower than that of the drought-prone
Guadalquivir (238%) and the rainfall-abundant Ebro River Basin (90%) (see: CHE,
2011; CHG, 2011; CHS, 2011).
24 For values of TIR over 100%, the function is truncated and equals 1.
25 In an average hydrological year, Campo de Cartagena irrigation resources come pri-
marily from dam stored water (65.31%, η, 37.6 hm3 of effective water) and groundwa-
ter (29%, 16.92 hm3 of effective water, λ). Desalinated water (0.39%, θ) and treated
water (5.3%, γ) are negligible (3.32 hm3 of effective water) (MARM, 2007). These per-
centages are assumed to be constant in the model.
26 Piping and irrigation techniques determine the ﬁnal amount of effective water ap-
plied to satisfy a certain amount of a crop's water demand. Global efﬁciency of the sys-
tem for the Campo de Cartagena region is approximately 87% for dam stored water,
60% for desalinated water and treated water and 25% for groundwater (CHS, 2010a;
MARM, 2007).
Source: Authors’ elaboration from MARM, 2009b. See table 1. 
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Fig. 1. Rainfall probability density function, SRB, 1941–2008.Source: Authors' elabora-
tion from MARM, 2009b. See Table 1.
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dw rð Þ ¼
θ
η
%TIR%h rð Þ%edw ð9Þ
The percentage of the evapotranspiration satisﬁed (%ET) can now
be obtained from expressions (7) through (10), as follows:
%ETp;r ¼
g pð Þ þ EIR rð Þ þ gw rð Þ þ tw rð Þ þ dw rð Þ
ET
: ð10Þ
Each %ET has an associated probability (prob%ET), which depends
on runoff (r) and rainfall (p) values. Using expressions [2] and [4],
this probability can be expressed as follows:
prob%ETp;r ¼ f rð Þ
%z pð Þ: ð11Þ
The expected level of evapotranspiration coverage (E%ET0) and the
resulting expected irrigation deﬁcit (ID) in the traditional rule scenar-
io can be represented as:
EET ¼ ∫
225
r¼0
∫
1300
p¼0
z pð Þ % g pð Þ þ f rð Þ % EIR rð Þ þ gw rð Þ þ tw rð Þ þ dw rð Þð Þ½ ' ð12Þ
ID ¼ ET−EET : ð13Þ
Illegal groundwater abstraction is a positive function of irrigation
deﬁcits. The use of surface water is observable and controlled by the
water authority within the limits of the existing legal property rights.
In contrast, access to groundwater is a moral hazard decision made by
the farmer and is unobservable by the water authority. When water
allowances from publicly controlled water resources fall short with
respect to agronomic needs, as the evidence in the Segura River
Basin shows, farmers will have positive incentives to seek uncon-
trolled groundwater sources. Illegal groundwater abstraction (GW)
is then a positive function of the irrigation deﬁcit:
GW ¼ c
ID
egw
 !
: ð14Þ
3.2.2. DMP Decision Rules over Water for Irrigation
The recently approved DMP for the SRB quantiﬁes the particular
situation at hand and the severity of the problem by using an objec-
tive and publicly observable drought index, Ie. This plan establishes
the following four drought thresholds (CHS, 2010b) i) when water
stored levels are regarded as normal (Ie>0.5), there are no additional
explicit restrictions, and thus water delivery (%TIR) is the same as in
the baseline or traditional rule scenario; ii) water for irrigation is re-
duced by 10% (h=0.9) when available water falls below the pre-
alert threshold (0.35b Ie≤0.5); iii) if the alert limits are exceeded
(0.2b Ie≤0.35), water for irrigation is reduced by at least 25%
(h=0.75); and iv) in emergency situations (Ie≤0.2), water for irriga-
tion is halved (h=0.5). According to historical data, a drought is quite
likely in the SRB, occurring with a probability of 14%.27
In the case of Campo de Cartagena in the SRB, the drought index
(Ie) depends on the observed values of both runoff and stock
28
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Fig. 3. Dam stored water probability density function, SRB, 1941–2008.Source: Authors'
elaboration from MARM, 2009a. See Table 3.
Table 4
Irrigation resources estimation under the traditional decision. The dependent variable
is a percentage of irrigation resources conceded in the SRB over TIR.
Variable Coefﬁcient
Runoff (percentage over dam storage capacity) 1.351a
(.131)b
R2 89.14
Adjusted R2 88.31
No. of observations 15
Source: Authors' elaboration from CHS (2010b).
a Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
b Estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3
Surface water stored: Weibull function. The dependent variable
is the percentage of dam stored water over dam storage
capacity.
Variable Coefﬁcient
a (Scale) 0.3411a
(0.063)
b (Shape) 4.1286a
(0.497)
No. of observations 68
Estimated maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors' elaboration from MARM, 2009a.
a Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Fig. 2. Runoff probability density function, SRB, 1941–2008.Source: Authors' elabora-
tion from MARM, 2009a. See Table 2.
27 This is a minimum threshold. Historical data underestimate drought risk because
the data do not consider that today's water resources are jeopardised signiﬁcantly mo-
re than in the past.
28 Ie is calculated as follows (CHS, 2010b):
Ie ¼
1
2
1þ
V i−Vmed
Vmax−Vmin
# $
; if V i≥Vmed
Ie ¼
1
2
V i−Vmin
Vmed−Vmin
# $
; if V ibVmed
where Vi is an indicator that is unique for each junta de explotación (a group of agricul-
tural districts of comarcas). In Sistema Cuenca, which is Campo de Cartagena's corre-
sponding sub-basin, Vi, is obtained as follows: V i ¼
2 %DSC % rþDSC % s
3 Where r is the runoff
as a percentage of the total dam storage capacity (DSC) and s is dam stored water as
a percentage of the total DSC. Using r and smaximum, minimum and average observed
values during the reference period, we obtain Vmax, Vmin and Vmed, respectively
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(CHS, 2010b). Therefore, we deﬁne lr, s as a discrete water restriction
variable whose value depends on the drought index (and thus on
runoff and stock values) and its corresponding h. As the empirical
data suggest, the estimated satisﬁed agronomic crop requirements
under the new drought plan are too optimistic compared with past
events. Therefore, we set lr, s as the minimum between h(r) deﬁned
in the baseline scenario and the SRB's DMP parameters above (h):
lr;s ¼
min h rð Þ;0:5ð Þ; if Ie≤0:2
min h rð Þ;0:75ð Þ; if 0:2bIe≤0:35
min h rð Þ;0:9ð Þ; if 0:35bIe≤0:5
h rð Þ; if Ie > 0:5
:
8><
>: ð15Þ
In every case, the percentage of evapotranspiration satisﬁed with
rainfall and surface water (%ET2) and its associated probability
(prob%ET2) can be obtained from:
%ET2r;s;p ¼
g pð Þ þ
lr;s
h rð Þ
% EIR rð Þ þ gw rð Þ þ tw rð Þ þ dw rð Þð Þ
ET
ð16Þ
prob%ET2r;s;p ¼ f rð Þ
%z pð Þ% j sð Þ: ð17Þ
We can also obtain expected evapotranspiration satisfaction and
expected deﬁcit under the Drought Management Plan scenario by
conditioning evapotranspiration satisfaction to the impact of the
drought threshold indices (lr, s):
EET ¼ ∫
225
r¼0∫
1300
p¼0 ∫
100
s¼0 z pð Þ%g pð Þ þ f rð Þ%
lr;s
h rð Þ
% EIR rð Þ þ gw rð Þ þ tw rð Þ þ dw rð Þð Þ
+ ,
ð18Þ
ID ¼ ET−EET: ð19Þ
Again, illegal groundwater abstraction would be a positive func-
tion of irrigation resources [14]. The entire methodology must be per-
formed for every crop in every agricultural district considered.29
4. Drought Decision Rules and Water Deﬁcits
Table 5 compares the outcome of the two decision frameworks in
terms of the expected rates of evapotranspiration covered and the as-
sociated irrigation deﬁcits (in both volume and per cent units). The
last row, PotGW, shows the expected amount of non-authorised
water abstractions that would be required to fully cover the irrigation
deﬁcits in the Campo de Cartagena region with the existing technical
efﬁciency of the irrigation system.
In the baseline, droughts occur with a 14% probability, and the
expected deﬁcit amounts to 1.82 hm3 of effective water (this deﬁcit
is conﬁrmed by the water authority in CHS, 2008), which means
that the technical efﬁciency of the irrigation system would require
the abstraction of an additional 7.28 hm3. Implementing the decision
rules of the drought plan will increase this expected deﬁcit by 35% to
2.4 hm3. As a result,30 the implementation of the new planned deci-
sions for drought conditions will add pressure to the already over-
exploited aquifers in the area because at least a portion of the
increased supply deﬁcit will be satisﬁed by increasing uncontrolled
groundwater.
Water deﬁcits and incentives for aquifer overexploitation are par-
ticularly high during drought emergency events (Iet, j≤0.2), which
occur one in ten years (with a probability of 9.88% in our model). A
drought emergency would imply a severe cut in water allowances
for irrigation, which would have a signiﬁcant impact on evapotranspi-
ration satisfaction and the irrigation deﬁcit, decreasing production
and income (Pérez et al., 2011). Thus, incentives for illegal groundwa-
ter abstraction, in this case, are even greater, as shown in the table
below.
Compared with previous decision rules, the expected irrigation
deﬁcit will increase from 17% to 22% (see Table 6), and it will require
an additional 8 hm3 of water, meaning that there will be higher in-
centives to use poorly controlled groundwater sources. By trying to
reduce water use, responses planned for drought conditions that are
similar to those in the case of the Segura River Basin can reinforce
the existing moral hazard incentives to groundwater depletion and
thereby lead to the paradoxical result of decreased resilience and in-
creased drought risk in the future.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The results presented in this paper provide relevant insights not
only within the ﬁeld of ecological economics but also in the broader
area of drought risk management. The main conclusion is that DMPs
must be properly designed and should consider all possible water
sources to guarantee that a comprehensive social–ecological water
conservation framework is put into place. Otherwise, the water de-
mand stemming from the implementation may result in local overex-
ploitation of illegal water sources such as aquifers and thus result in a
loss of resilience and robustness.
Such is the case in the SRB in Spain. Irrigated agriculture in this
area is among the most extensive and most proﬁtable in Spain
(CHS, 2010a; Pérez et al., 2011), although its sustainability is compro-
mised by structural water scarcity and recurring droughts (CHS,
2010a, 2010b; EEA, 2009). The farmers' traditional response to use
groundwater as an insurance against drought (Llamas, 2007; WWF,
2006) generates a vicious cycle of higher water deﬁcits, lower resil-
ience and more frequent and severe droughts. This dynamic can be
reversed only when water use is curved downward to match the
long-term renewable resources of the river basin, which is not
29 Most parameters in the model can be taken at a river basin level, except K coefﬁ-
cients and system global efﬁciency, which are unique for each crop and district,
respectively.
30 Only 12 proceedings for illegal water abstraction have been initiated between 1996
and 2005 in the SRB, which offers a perspective on the immunity under which of-
fenders operate (WWF, 2006).
Table 5
Expected evapotranspiration satisfaction, expected irrigation deﬁcit and expected po-
tential illegal groundwater abstraction in absolute terms (hm3) and as a percentage
of ET satisﬁed (%ET) for all possible states of nature in the Campo de Cartagena agricul-
tural district.
Baseline
scenario
DMP
scenario
Difference
Total expected evapotranspiration
satisfaction
EET (hm
3) 43.89 43.31 −0.59
E%ET 94.73% 92.32%
Expected irrigation deﬁcit ID (hm3) 1.82 2.41 0.59
ID%ET 3.99% 7.68%
Expected potential groundwater
depletion
PotGW (hm3) 7.15 9.45 2.3
Source: Authors' elaboration.
Table 6
Expected evapotranspiration satisfaction, expected irrigation deﬁcit and expected po-
tential illegal groundwater abstraction in absolute terms (hm3) and as a percentage
of ET satisﬁed (%ET) under emergency in the Campo de Cartagena agricultural district.
Baseline
scenario
DMP
scenario
Difference
Total expected EET (hm
3) 37.84 35.82 −2.02
Evapotranspiration satisfaction E%ET 82.76% 78.34%
Expected irrigation deﬁcit ID (hm3) 7.88 9.90 2.02
ID%ET 17.24% 21.66%
Expected potential groundwater
depletion
PotGW (hm3) 30.90 38.83 7.92
Source: Authors' elaboration.
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possible without the enforcement of existing water property rights
(Raffensperger, 2011). The existing data and the risk assessment
analysis presented in this paper suggest that more stringent water
constraints over publicly controlled water sources, which are the es-
sence of the recently approved Drought Management Plans, will not
effectively reduce drought risk. Furthermore, without recovering the
control of groundwater resources, these norms will only contribute
to the water scarcity, making water an even more valuable resource
and resulting in new incentives for farmers to engage in the moral
hazard type of behaviour that now pervades irrigated agriculture in
many Mediterranean areas including the SRB.
For example, under the new Drought Management Plan in the
SRB, a likely drought with a rainfall less than 400 mm and a drought
index below 0.2 would lead to an expected deﬁcit in effective irriga-
tion water of 18.23 hm3, thereby requiring the abstraction of as
much as 71.51 hm3 of groundwater (more than four times the
amount required in a normal hydrological year). This event actually
occurred between 2005 and 2008, when the drought index remained
below the emergency level throughout the majority of the period. The
failure of the emergency responses used at that time was one of the
principal arguments for designing the drought plans that were ap-
proved in 2008. However, the emerging decision rules ignore the
basic fact that quantitative water constraints can be successful only
if water property rights are properly designed and enforced. In effect,
according to the results presented in this paper, the Drought Manage-
ment Plan will make future droughts more likely and more severe.
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The current water crisis is now recognized as being largely a crisis of governance
16
, 
and not of resources or technological problems (Bucknall, 2006). In fact, while the 
technical capacity of the society to put additional amounts of water at the service of 
growing water demand has increased exponentially, society seems to have failed to 
acknowledge nature’s physical constraints. Consequently, whereas science has 
developed technical water management to a very large extent, considerations of 
social, political, institutional and financial order (i.e., economics) are still treated in 
an incipient form, with major problems persisting. This failure is perfectly exemplified 
by the lack or the inadequacy of the current policy mix to match the decisions made 
by the different water users in the local economy with the ability of the existing water 
resources to satisfy these uses in a sustainable manner.   
In order to overcome the current water crisis, some researchers and policy makers 
have demanded a paradigm shift in which conventional water policy is 
complemented with economic instruments in order to replace the traditional notions 
of control and government-led planning by those of incentives, motivation and multi-
level governance (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). However, evidence demonstrates that 
there is still a major gap between the political rhetoric and the operational level. With 
the exception of water markets and water pricing, economic instruments for water 
management are seldom found outside the academia, and in many cases they 
consist of financial tools disguised as economic instruments to make the ultimate 
goal of raising revenues more acceptable (Strosser et al., 2013).  
As a result of the little evidence available and of the misuse of economic 
instruments, there is significant confusion regarding what an economic instrument 
for water management actually is. Although it is generally accepted that taxes, fees, 
subsidies and markets can be all considered economic instruments, there is still 
disagreement regarding the inclusion of non-market mechanisms in this group and 
the purpose and design of economic instruments. This confusion is perceivable 
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 Noteworthy, some of these governance failures have an economic explanation 
(Hanemann, 2006).  
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even in the academia. Different definitions have been made available, and in some 
points they conflict with each other. For example, NCEE (2001) considers that 
economic instruments are financial tools (i.e., market based) that “provide monetary 
and near-monetary rewards” for accomplishing environmental goals. In the same 
line, Stavins (2003) puts economic instruments at the same level as market based 
instruments and labels them as “harnessing market forces”, because if they are well 
designed and implemented, they “encourage agents to undertake pollution control 
efforts that are in their own interest and collectively meet policy goals”. Kraemer et 
al. (2003) provide a clearer definition and finally open up the category to non-market 
economic instruments, but they do not separate economic instruments for water 
management from revenue raising tools: “When the primary aim of an 
environmental charge or tax is not to create incentives but to raise revenue, the 
relevant distinction lies whether the revenue is earmarked or simply added to the 
general government budget”. Although financial instruments are of paramount 
importance for the accomplishment of the goals defined in water policy, they are not 
economic instruments for water management per se, since they do not need to 
pursue an environmental objective. In addition, even if financial instruments are 
earmarked for environmental purposes, the relevant economic instrument here 
would be the mechanism in which this money is used, and not the revenue raising 
tool. ONEMA (2009) provides a very similar definition and incurs in the same 
mistake as Kraemer et al. (2003).  
In spite of the contradictions already mentioned, all the definitions above agree to 
point out that the key elements in an economic instrument are those of incentives, 
motivation and voluntary choice. Moreover, they all stress that at least one of their 
objectives should be that of adapting individual decisions to collectively agreed 
environmental goals. Strosser et al. (2013) gather up all these contributions and 
create a synthetic definition. According to these authors, economic instruments are 
“those incentives designed and implemented with the purpose of adapting individual 
decisions to collectively agreed goals (e.g. the environmental objectives of the WFD 
and of its “daughter” Directives)”. This implies that financial instruments aimed 
primarily at raising revenues are not economic instruments for water management 
(although cost-recovery can be a secondary objective of these); on the other hand, 
co-operative agreements and other non-market instruments that lead to behavioral 
changes may be economic instruments for water management even in the absence 
of financial transactions.  
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Economic instruments for water management are not a substitute of conventional 
C&C and supply policies; rather, they should be designed to complement them
17
. 
Nonetheless, once the potential of water works has been developed far beyond the 
capacity of the system and C&C policies have become more and more sophisticated 
without attaining the preset objectives of water policy, the alternatives available to 
achieve a sustainable water use must be found in a combination of new economic 
instruments capable of articulating the increasing water demand, limited water 
supply, water policy goals and the existing infrastructures and legal framework. This 
is exactly the situation in which we find many Mediterranean basins. 
 
Economic instruments for water management have been consistently developed in 
Spain during the last decades. For example, water scarcity and recurrent droughts 
in Mediterranean basins (EEA, 2009) have promoted the adoption of water markets 
and have made Spain a laboratory to test the outcomes of this instrument under the 
particular EU legal framework
18
. Nonetheless, the experience of Spain with 
economic instruments is not restricted to water markets. Voluntary agreements 
(Gómez et al., 2013), subsidies (Lopez-Gunn et al., 2012), water pricing instruments 
(through water tariffs) (EEA&OECD, 2013) and risk management schemes (Pérez-
Blanco and Gómez, 2013) have been also explored and/or implemented.  
In the next sections we present a series of methodologies that have been used in 
the assessment and in some cases in the implementation of innovative economic 
instruments for water management in Spain. The methodologies used are ex-ante 
and grounded in economic theory. Since these methods are quantitative, they are 
illustrated with case studies that provide some insightful results.  
Therefore, our objective in the following sections is to present some methods and 
stylized facts that can be used to assess the implementability of some of the most 
relevant economic instruments that have been advanced in Mediterranean basins, 
namely, voluntary agreements, drought insurance and water pricing. 
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 This makes even more challenging to single out the actual contribution of an economic 
instrument to the water policy goals: economic instruments are never implemented in 
isolation from other supply and C&C policies (nor should they); and many macro-economic 
and sectoral changes that influence behavior and water use also take place at the same 
time (Strosser et al., 2013). 
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 Water markets have been widely developed through different legal figures, namely, lease 
contracts, water exchange centers, purchases of land to use water and inter-basin 
temporary trading, but also through informal water trade (Albiac et al., 2006; Calatrava and 
Gómez-Ramos, 2009; Garrido and Calatrava, 2009; Rey et al., 2011). 
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5.1 Voluntary agreements  
 
In some specific contexts, water policy can attain significant welfare gains through 
the promotion of voluntary agreements that generate (or merge) incentives for a 
win-win situation. Building cooperative agreements is only feasible when private 
interest is somehow compatible with the actual purposes of water policy, such as 
the recovery of some ecological potential of the river system. In these cases, rather 
than altering market dynamics or defining a new set of rules that agents have to 
comply with, the goal of water authorities should focus on creating an environment 
that is favorable for the development of this type of agreements.  
Voluntary agreements cover a wide spectrum and can be used to improve the 
environmental status of water bodies in different ways. This may range from the 
voluntary compliance with a certification scheme that signals a good environmental 
performance (Bratrich and Truffer, 2001) to bilateral agreements involving private 
and public agents (Gómez et al., 2013). Although voluntary agreements have been 
sometimes rejected as an economic instrument (NCEE, 2001; Stavins, 2003), they 
should be fully considered as such (Kraemer et al., 2003; ONEMA, 2009; Strosser 
et al., 2013).  
 
In Spain, one of the most significant and successful experiences with these 
instruments is the voluntary acceptance by the hydropower operator of the 
Mequinenza-Ribarroja-Flix Dam Complex to release flushing flows designed to 
improve the qualitative status of the Lower Ebro (northeastern Spain). This 
agreement was possible due to the coordinated efforts of the hydropower operator, 
the water authorities and the scientific community. The role of the scientific 
community largely consisted in the design of the standard hydrograph of the flushing 
flows and the economic model that served to estimate the private revenue foregone 
following a cost minimizing implementation of flushing flows. Therefore, two models 
were used in this interdisciplinary research: i) first, a hydrological model (Batalla and 
Vericat, 2009) based on the sediment entrainment method (Kondolf and Wilcock, 
1996); ii) second, an economic model (Gómez et al., 2013) aimed at minimizing the 
opportunity costs of flushing flows. The latter constitutes the core of this chapter.  
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The background for the implementation of this economic instrument is the 
construction of the large Mequinenza and Ribarroja dams in the 1960s, which 
significantly modified the hydrology of the Lower Ebro River (Batalla and Vericat, 
2009). Although the river still experiences natural floods, its physical and 
environmental conditions have remarkably changed during the last decades (ERBA, 
2008). These changes have resulted in local incision and riverbed armouring, re-
vegetation of formerly active areas of the river channel, reduction of sediment inputs 
to the delta (modifying the dynamics of the estuary and resulting in salt intrusion) 
and, especially, the proliferation of macrophyte biomass (Batalla and Vericat, 2009; 
Vericat et al., 2006).  
A macrophyte is an aquatic plant that grows in or near water. Although its 
proliferation is beneficial in lakes, where they are regarded as eco-indicators, in 
highly engineered rivers its presence evidences degradation, rather than good 
ecological status. In addition, macrophyte biomass may cause problems in water 
intakes and navigation, may constitute a threat to public health
19
 and may hamper 
the regular functioning of irrigation pumping stations, hydropower and energy plants 
(Batalla and Vericat, 2009; ERBA, 2008). Prior to 2002, costly actions were adopted 
in order to mechanically remove macrophytes. At that time, the delivery of recurrent 
flushing flows in order to remove macrophyte biomass appeared as an alternative to 
avoid costly adaptation to degrading water conditions.  
From a public perspective, the potential benefits of flushing flows were related to the 
partial recovery of the river regime, covering a wide range of benefits including the 
control of invasive species, the abatement of salt intrusion in the river mouth and the 
improvement of water quality along the river. However, the private interest of 
hydropower operators was in principle focused on removing the macrophyte 
biomass located close to the hydropower plants, which required a far less 
demanding flushing flow than one aimed at partially restoring the entire Lower Ebro 
down to the estuary. In any case, the hydropower operator proved to be willing to 
consider water flow patterns that were not only designed to maximize financial 
profits within the range of prevailing regulations, but also to deliver some 
improvements in the ecology of the river system. Besides, although at the beginning 
the possibility of compensation to the hydropower operator in exchange of the 
release of flushing flows was considered, finally the agreement was voluntary. This 
was largely owed to the low share of the hydropower operator’s annual income that 
the flushing flows represented (Gómez et al., 2013). In addition, the hydropower 
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 Macrophytes are also seen as the main cause of the summer plagues of black flies 
(Simulium spp.) which may transmit diseases such as onchocerciasis (river blindness). 
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operator could avoid the costly actions to mechanically remove macrophytes and 
convert the whole intervention into part of its corporate social responsibility strategy. 
Since 2002 a series of flushing flows have been implemented. Initially, this was only 
for experimental purposes, supported by a research program to design flushing 
flows and to monitor and maximize their effectiveness. More recently, these efforts 
were integrated in the design of the river basin management plan and finished with 
the agreement to deliver two controlled flushing flows every year (in spring and 
autumn), deliberately defined to maximize macrophyte removal rates and implying 
the delivery of 36 million m
3
 (hm
3
) in 13 hours in each controlled flood (ERBA, 
2008).  
Despite the relative success of the voluntary agreement, recent evidence has shown 
that the effectiveness of flushing flows to restore the river is now lower than in the 
previous decade, even for macrophyte biomass removal (ERBA, 2013). Effects are 
better in the immediacy of big dams and hastily decrease with only marginal 
changes in the river estuary. Paradoxically, the success in improving the chemical 
status of the river in the last ten years seems to have increased the potential for 
macrophyte proliferation and boosted its rate of renewal after every controlled flood. 
Recent research indicates that flushing flows help in river restoration but are 
increasingly insufficient to offset the many hydromorphological changes affecting the 
Lower Ebro. Better designed environmental flows, presumably with a higher 
frequency and intensity, are required.  
 
The following paper, prepared by the doctoral candidate, the Prof. Carlos Mario 
Gómez Gómez and the Prof. Ramon Batalla, presents an economic model that can 
be used to estimate the opportunity costs of the periodical release of flushing flows 
in rivers whose regimes are controlled by hydropower generating facilities. This 
economic model was designed to support decision making in the bargaining process 
among the different agents involved in the voluntary agreement in the Lower Ebro. 
The paper is entitled Tradeoffs in river restoration: Flushing flows vs. hydropower 
generation in the Lower Ebro River, Spain, and was published in the Journal of 
Hydrology in the year 2013.  
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Although the effectiveness of flushing floods in restoring basic environmental functions in highly engi-
neered rivers has been extensively tested, the opportunity cost is still considered to represent an impor-
tant limitation to putting these actions into practice. In this paper, we present a two-stage method for the
assessment of the opportunity cost of the periodical release of flushing flows in the lower reaches of riv-
ers with regimes that are basically controlled by a series of dams equipped with hydropower generation
facilities. The methodology is applied to the Lower Ebro River in Spain. The results show that the cost of
the reduced power generation resulting from the implementation of flushing floods is lower than the
observed willingness to pay for river restoration programmes.
Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Water is an economic asset necessary to sustaining life, the
environment and the production of many valuable goods and ser-
vices and should be managed accordingly. However, the prevailing
paradigm considers water demand to be exogenous, and water pol-
icy, consequently, has traditionally focused on guaranteeing the
supply of water services at affordable prices. As a result, during
the last decades population growth and the improvement of living
standards brought about by development have increased the pres-
sures on water resources. The negative environmental effects
stemming from this paradigm are visible for instance in the case
of the European and North American rivers, where the need to sat-
isfy a continuously growing demand for water and river services
has resulted in increased water abstractions and polluted dis-
charges along with gravel mining, canalisation, and successive
modifications in river morphologies (e.g., Furse et al., 2006; Za-
wiejska and Wyzga, 2010; Batalla and Vericat, 2009).
Consequently, restoration of river ecosystems has become a pri-
ority for water management in the developed world, especially in
the stressed lower reaches of its rivers (Gupta and Bravard, 2010;
EC, 2000). However, restoration is often obtained at the cost of
impairing the ability of water infrastructures to provide valuable
socioeconomic goods and services, such as hydropower (Bednarek
and Hart, 2005; Palmieri et al., 2001; Robinson and Uehlinger,
2003). There is thus a considerable interest in learning how to bal-
ance river restoration benefits with the production of goods and
services provided by water infrastructures.
As a result of this interest, significant effort in scientific research
has recently been mobilised in two important directions. Consider-
able progress has been made in the assessment of current ecolog-
ical status and trends and in the design of effective technical
alternatives to restoring some basic environmental functions of
rivers. In particular, emerging research in biology and ecological
engineering (e.g., Granata and Zika, 2007) shows that dams and
other infrastructures that alter river systems can also be used as
tools to reproduce artificially a portion of the functions performed
in the past by the natural system. For instance, modifying the rules
of hydropower dam operation to guarantee the periodic release of
properly designed maintenance flows (namely, flushing flows) may
effectively replace the role performed in the past by the natural
floods characteristic of many rivers, which served to maintain
the structure and functions of the river ecosystem (see Hueftle
and Stevens, 2002; Vinson, 2001; Kondolf and Wilcock, 1996). So-
cial sciences have also provided methods and results for the valu-
ation of the economic and social benefits of potential
improvements in the capacity of river systems to increase the
quantity and range of those environmental services that might re-
sult from a successful restoration of river systems (such as
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recreation opportunities, biodiversity support, health services,
water security and flood control) (see, for example, Hitzhusen,
2007; Turner et al., 2003 and Gupta and Bravard, 2010; CSIRO,
2012). However, there is still little research on the costs of practi-
cally applying the available options to improve rivers’ ecology,
which makes the opportunity cost of water the missing element
for the assessment of the policy options at hand.
Information on opportunity costs plays a critical role in the
evaluation of river restoration alternatives for a series of reasons:
to find the most cost-effective way to improve the river environ-
ment and thus minimise the impact over marketable water ser-
vices, to judge whether the associated cost is lower than the
benefits expected from the improvement of the water environment
(and to assess later whether the proposed measures are justified in
the light of cost benefit criteria), to provide the critical information
to assess what would, for example, be the minimum compensation
demanded by water users for voluntarily adapting the use of the
resource to certain new requirements and to know the real cost
of harmonising the provision of water services and the improve-
ment and protection of the water environment.
This paper aims to help bridge this information gap. The paper
presents a model for the evaluation of the opportunity costs of
implementing a given flushing flow programme in an area where
the flow regime is driven by the operation of a hydropower facility.
In such a situation, the requirement to release the flushing flow
means that for certain precise periods of time, the outflow of water
does not depend on the profit maximising criteria used by the
hydropower plant (baseline scenario) but rather on an operating
constraint imposed by an environmental authority (counterfactual
flushing-flow scenario). The opportunity cost of such measures is
therefore represented by the monetary losses of the concerned
commercial activity, namely, hydropower. The overall question
we want to answer can be presented as determining a financial va-
lue for the compensation required by a hydropower operator to
voluntarily accept a predetermined programme of periodical artifi-
cial releases. The model is illustrated with an application to the
Lower Ebro River, Spain.
2. The Lower Ebro River: river diagnosis and the need of
flushing flows
The Lower Ebro River is located in the northeast of Spain and
comprises the area located between the Mequinenza–Ribarroja–
Flix Dam Complex (hereafter MRFDC) and the outlet of the river
to the Mediterranean Sea (see Fig. 1). Water demand from agricul-
ture is significant (1.200 million cubic meters/year, i.e., 90% of the
total water demand), and runoff has been reduced by more than
20% as a result of increasing pressures from upstream and long-
term changes in land use (i.e., afforestation). However, flows are
still relatively abundant, and droughts are rare (ERBA, 2007). The
main environmental concern in the area is related to the impover-
ished ecological status that resulted from the alteration of the riv-
er’s hydrology and, subsequently, the channel morphology after
the construction of the MRFDC (see Table 1).
The large Mequinenza and Ribarroja dams built in the 1960s
substantially modified the flow regime of the Lower Ebro. Among
other hydrological components, flood magnitude and frequency
have been altered. Of particular interest for the river’s ecological
functioning is the 25% reduction, on average, of the relatively fre-
quent floods (i.e., those with a return interval between 2 and
25 years) (Batalla et al., 2004). Although the river still experiences
natural floods, and the impact of regulation is much smaller than
that found in comparable large rivers, such as, for instance, the Sac-
ramento and the San Joaquin Rivers in California (Kondolf and
Batalla, 2005), the river’s physical and environmental conditions
have changed notably in the last decades (e.g., Batalla et al.,
2006; Vericat and Batalla, 2006; Vericat et al., 2006; Batalla and
Vericat, 2009). The main dam induced changes can be summarised
as follows:
– Reduction of flood frequency and magnitude; floods provide the
energy for maintaining an active river channel morphology, and
this reduction has led to the loss of formerly sedimentary active
areas, the encroachment of riparian vegetation and the narrow-
ing of the channel.
– Reduction of the river’s sediment load, which implies the ero-
sion of the gravel fractions in the channel with no replacement
from upstream and simultaneous riverbed armouring during
small frequent floods and during high flow periods.
– Alteration of the river’s ecology, as a compound effect of
impoundment, exemplified by the low frequency of bed moving
floods, slow moving waters, deficit of fine sediment, high tem-
peratures and excess nutrient load. These combined alterations
create a new functioning in the river ecosystem with conse-
quences regarding the river’s ability to provide key environ-
mental services.
This new set of environmental conditions, together with similar
changes in the upstream main tributaries, appears to explain the
uncontrolled proliferation of macrophytes1 in the Lower Ebro River
channel (e.g., Goes, 2002; Palau et al., 2004). Macrophytes threaten
river infrastructures, increasing operating costs, reducing the pro-
ductivity of power-generating plants and water-pumping devices
and reducing the ability of the river to provide navigation and recre-
ation services. Competition for space and resources resulting from
the stabilisation of dense macrophyte stands also affects the biology
of the river ecosystem in many different ways. Macrophyte stands
limit the access to microhabitats that are important for the growth
and survival of juvenile fish, and the decomposition of growing or-
ganic matter depletes the water of its oxygen. Macrophytes commu-
nities also enhance flow resistance, thus exacerbating the reduction
in flow velocity and trapping an important portion of fine sediment
load (Batalla and Vericat, 2009).
Within this context, a considerable body of research has been
devoted to the design and implementation of flushing flows as a
means to improve the ecological status of the Lower Ebro River.
These efforts started in 2002 following two notably dry years.
These drought conditions encouraged cooperation between the
hydropower operator, the water authorities and the scientific com-
munity. With the exception of two dry years in 2004 and 2005,
flushing flows have been regularly performed twice a year (in au-
tumn and spring). These flushing flows have provided opportunity
to the design of such flows to increase their effectiveness, and mac-
rophytes removal rates as high as 95% have been achieved in areas
close to the dam (Batalla and Vericat, 2009). Despite the need to
limit peak floods to avoid damage to riverine villages, flushing
flows in the Lower Ebro are now a tested means to enhance the
biological productivity of the physical habitat, to entrain and trans-
port sediments to restore the dynamism of the river channel, to re-
move pollution loads and improve the water quality, to control salt
intrusion and to supply sediments to the delta and the estuary.
Fig. 2 presents the standard hydrograph of the flushing flow
implemented in the Lower Ebro since 2002 (for an extensive anal-
1 Macrophytes are visible algae and other flora species that are rooted in shallow
waters with vegetative parts emerging above the water surface. In lakes, macrophytes
provide cover for fish and substrate for aquatic invertebrates, produce oxygen, and act
as food for some fish and wildlife, therefore being a symptom of a good
environmental status. However, in a river their proliferation occurs when water is
stagnated and denotes a poor environmental status, having negative effects over the
ecosystem and economic activities.
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ysis of the flushing flow design and field monitoring, as well as a
critical discussion on its effectiveness as a river restoration tool,
see Batalla and Vericat, 2009).
3. Materials and methods
The opportunity cost of artificial flood flows in modified river
reaches, where the flow regime is basically determined by the
operation of hydropower facilities, can be defined as the reduction
of the value of the energy produced resulting from the new envi-
ronmental constraints. The assessment of this opportunity cost re-
quires knowledge of the hydropower operator’s profit maximising
decision-making and how it would react to a change in the operat-
ing constraints imposed by the river basin authority. To solve this
problem, we present a theoretical general model that allows the
calculation of the opportunity cost of flushing flows based on the
previously stated characteristics and we calibrate the general mod-
el to our particular case study in the Lower Ebro River2.
Fig. 1. Location of the River Ebro Basin in the Iberian Peninsula and detail of the Lower Ebro River. Source: Own elaboration from ERBA, 2012a.
Table 1
Characteristics of the Mequinenza–Ribarroja–Flix dam system.
Reservoir Mequinenza Ribarroja Flix
Storage capacity (h m3) 1530 218 5
Licensed flow (m3/s) 760 940 400
Installed capacity (kW/h) 324 262.8 42.5
Height (m) 74 41 12.1
Efficiency 0.8 0.8 0.8
Input output ratio (m3/kW h) 6.2 11.19 37.91
Fig. 2. Standard hydrograph of the flushing flow implemented in the Lower Ebro
River since 2002. Source: Own elaboration.
2 It is important to note that in the calibration stage we use econometric
techniques. An analytical solution to the theoretical problem would demand
accepting strong assumptions about the operator’s behaviour (assuming either
perfect hydrological foresight or accepting strong assumptions about the operator’s
risk attitude) that make preferable to deduce this solution from the decisions that the
operator has taken in the past.
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3.1. The basic opportunity cost evaluation model
From the hydropower operator’s perspective, the dam and its
associated power production facility are capital assets. At any gi-
ven time, the operator decides on the flow of energy to be pro-
duced. This decision is based upon a number of variables, such as
the technical characteristics of the plant, the current operating
rules, the expected evolution of the amount of water stored in
the reservoir and the current and the expected energy prices. From
a private business perspective, these decisions aim at maximising
the value of the expected flow of benefits along the entire life span
of the dam. As the electricity produced cannot be stored for future
selling, the hydropower operator has to make two kinds of deci-
sions simultaneously. The first decision involves choosing how
much water to release every day (xt), and the second involves
choosing how to distribute the electricity generated throughout
the day (xtk). Both decisions aim to maximise the flow of hydro-
power revenues. In what follows, we analyse each of these key pro-
duction decisions:
Decision (1): the volumes of water released everyday can be
represented by the following dynamic optimisation programme.
For simplicity, we assume a zero discount rate:
max
xt
X1
t¼0
E½PtðxtÞ ð1Þ
zðtþ1Þ ¼ zt þ yt ÿ xt ð2Þ
zt 6 zt 6 zt ð3Þ
xt 6 xt 6 xt ð4Þ
where the decision variable xt represents the flow of water used for
power generation on day t; the function Pt(xt) represents the daily
financial revenue at the moment t, which (see below for details) is
assumed to increase at a decreasing rate with the amount of water
used to produce energy. The upper case E underlines the fact that
companies’ decisions are based on imperfect information concern-
ing the future values of critical variables, such as the level of the res-
ervoir and future energy prices (i.e., nature and market uncertainty
imply that the objective function is in fact the expected value of the
energy produced; thus, the model avoids the problem of most opti-
misation models that assume that companies have ‘‘perfect hydro-
logical foresight’’, which leads to unrealistic results). The state
variable zt measures the amount of water stored in the reservoir
on day t; its dynamics are represented by the transition function
(2), where the state of the system on the following day depends,
first, on its state the previous day, second, on the exogenous net in-
flow of water (yt) obtained from the river basin net of the evapora-
tion and the abstractions taken from the reservoir for other uses
that are out of the control of the hydropower operator and, finally,
on the decision made by the hydropower operator on day t, xt.
Constraint (3) shows the boundaries of the state variable zt on
any day. The left term of this constraint shows the minimum level
of water stored (zt 6 zt). This lower bound is the value determined
by the technical requirements of the infrastructure or by the insti-
tutional requirement to guarantee a minimum water availability
for other present and future uses. Thus, the lower limit may vary
in different seasons or months (depending, for example, on sea-
sonal crops requirements). The right term of the constraint (3)
shows the upper bound of the amount of water stored (zt 6 zt),
which also may depend on different factors, such as the reservoir’s
storage capacity or the flood limit to avoid the flooding of down-
stream riverine villages (which may also vary during the year
according to flood risk perceptions).
Constraint (4) shows the boundaries of the daily decision vari-
able, xt. The lower bound (xt 6 xt) may come either from a mini-
mum environmental flow, from the requirement to deliver given
amounts of water to other water uses downstream or, alterna-
tively, from any water authority requirement to release a certain
amount of water at the date t (for example, for an artificial flood).
In a similar way, the relevant upper limit (xt 6 xt) is the higher
value among the quantity of water resulting from the hydropower
generation plant maximum capacity. Provided that the plant is not
always functioning at its full capacity, none of the above-
mentioned constraints is binding, and the operator is able to
distribute the energy produced among the different days of the
year in order to maximise its revenue3.
Decision (2) consists of choosing the hourly production of elec-
tricity in a particular day. This decision can be represented by the
following daily revenue maximisation problem:
max
xt
Pt ¼
X
k¼1
ptkaxtk ð5Þ
xk 6 xk 6 xk ð6Þ
X24
k¼1
xtk ¼ xt : ð7Þ
The objective function in this case, pt, represents the daily
financial revenue. This revenue depends on the following: (i) the
decision variable (xtk),the quantity of water used for power gener-
ation per hour (k), (ii) the corresponding prices, (ptk), which are as-
sumed to vary in a predictable way (t) depending on the season,
the day of the week, weather conditions and other factors that
are known in advance by the operator, and (iii) an input–output
technical parameter (a) measuring the volume required to produce
one unit of electricity. Under these conditions, the operator finds
the optimal distribution of the energy produced during the day
(producing at a maximum capacity at peak price and minimising
the energy delivered to the market when electricity demand is at
its lowest). The variable and fixed costs of producing hydroelectric-
ity can be considered negligible; accordingly, variations in the rev-
enue function reflect changes in financial returns. The decision
variable (xtk) is subject to the same upper and lower bounds as
in the first problem, but the relevant time units are now hours in-
stead of days (as in (6)).
Provided that there is detailed data on both the hourly market
price of electricity and all of the relevant constraints on the deci-
sion variable x, obtaining a closed solution for decision problem
(2) becomes straightforward. The solution of this problem for the
range of all of the likely values of the daily decision xt is the finan-
cial revenue function pt = F(xt). This maximum daily revenue func-
tion is concave and non-decreasing and varies on different days
during the year according to random and seasonal changes in elec-
tricity demand and supply.
Problems (1) and (2) are closely linked. On the one hand, the
overall quantity of water delivered in the solution of problem (2)
must equal the optimal decision of the first problem for the corre-
sponding day (as in constraint (7)). On the other hand and most
importantly, the optimal solution of problem (2) is nested in the
definition of problem (1). In other words, the maximum revenue
as a function of the decision variable (xt) becomes the main argu-
ment, and its expected value in the future is the objective function
of problem (1). Thus, when deciding how much water to use each
3 In fact, the key role played by hydropower in the stabilization of the electricity
supply system implies the presence of spare capacity ready to be used to turbine
water at peak demand hours. In the last 10 years, hydroelectricity in Spain used less
than 20% of its installed power production capital (Gómez, 2009).
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day, the operator knows how this water can be delivered at any
time to obtain the maximum revenue in the electricity market.
3.2. The model calibration
The maximum daily revenue function above is an important
step in the calibration of daily production decisions as represented
in problem (1). Nevertheless, finding the analytical solution to
problem (1) is not an easy task given its dynamic nature, the wide
time span that needs to be considered and the uncertainty associ-
ated with natural water inflows and energy markets. A theoretical
solution requires assuming either perfect hydrological foresight or
accepting strong assumptions about the operator’s risk attitude. In-
stead of finding the analytical solution of problem (1), we have the
option of deducing its solution from the decisions that the operator
has taken in the past under a given set of conditions.
Therefore, we use detailed data on the decisions taken by the
operator in the past (on different days, under different decision
constraints, and in different states of the river system) to obtain
econometrically the operator’s underlying decision function of
using water and producing energy. This function (problem (1))
and the maximum daily revenue function (problem (2)) provide
the representation of the optimal behaviour of the operator in
the baseline scenario. These two functions and the information
set of observed decisions and constraints are all that we need to
represent the operator’s behaviour and assess the opportunity cost
of imposing the delivery of a flushing flow.
The information used in this paper comes first from the daily
data on the level of water stored in the three reservoirs and their
hourly outflow of water provided by the Hydrological Information
Automatic System (SAIH) of the Ebro River Basin Authority (ERBA,
2012a). We use data from September 1997 to October 2008. This
11-year period encompasses several hydrological cycles during
which regulations over water use have been relatively stable, as
defined in the River Basin Management Plan (ERBA, 2012b). Sec-
ondly, the River Basin Authority has also provided an entire set
of data on the relevant constraints with which the operator must
comply. These data include the following: the minimum flows,
set at 100 m3 sÿ1; the amount of water that was required to be sup-
plied by the reservoir system for other uses different from power
generation in any given month; and the monthly changing mini-
mum level of water stored in the MRFDC determined by the water
authorities to guarantee water supply at any time. Finally, the
hourly price of electricity was obtained from the Spanish Electric-
ity Market Operator (SEMO, 2013), and the quantity of electricity
produced by the hydropower operator at any moment was de-
duced from the outflow of water and the technical characteristics
of the power plants in each reservoir (we assume a standard 0.8
energy conversion efficiency). In this way, we have observations
for all the parameters and for all the state and decision variables
implied in the optimisation problems (1) and (2) for a total se-
quence of 4017 days. This sample provides both the data required
for calibrating the base model and the scenario to assess the oppor-
tunity cost of the flushing flow programme.
The first stage in calibrating the model deals with optimisation
problem (2). The daily financial returns are a maximum argument
function of the following: the amount of water used for power gen-
eration, the set of hourly prices of the day, the minimum flow set
by water authorities and the maximum production capacity of
the plant. Fig. 3 shows the daily financial return function obtained
from using hourly prices and the production capacity and the min-
imum flows for three selected months: (i) December, when water
demand and the average price are that their highest, (ii) March,
when prices are the lowest, and (iii) January, when the price is
close to the yearly average. As can be observed, the financial return
function increases at a decreasing rate with the volume of water.
Once the minimum flow is satisfied, the decreasing marginal pro-
ductivity of the water input is caused by the fact that at lower pro-
duction levels, the energy is produced at peak price time; any
increase in water use implies selling the energy at a decreasing
price. Daily income is also bounded by the maximum capacity of
the plant.
Once the optimal financial returns are determined, this infor-
mation is introduced in the intertemporal decision problem (1)
to obtain the optimal decision profile of how much water to use
any day, considering the transition equation (2) and the technical
and policy constraints of the baseline scenario. The ability of the
operator to obtain rents from market price variations is one of
the key elements that are affected by the requirement to adjust
water delivery to a pre-designed flushing flow scenario.
The second stage of model calibration deals with optimisation
problem (1), which is associated with the decision on the daily out-
flow of water. Obtaining an explicit functional form of the optimal
daily decision profile xt is not feasible given the number of param-
eters involved and the stochastic nature of the problem. Neverthe-
less, the number and the details of the available data in the sample
allow for an empirical approximation of this optimal value func-
tion with econometric techniques; this circumstance allows
revealing the functional form that better explains the observed
behaviour of the operator. We thus expect the decision variable
(xt) to be an increasing function of the amount of water stored
(represented by the state variable zt) and the water inflow received
from the basin on the previous days, yt. As this relationship is not
linear, we use a maximum likelihood estimation method to obtain
the better fitting function among the Box Cox power transforma-
tion family of functions. In addition, as restrictions over the mini-
mum level of the stored water and the other uses of water that are
different from electricity production vary from month to month,
we also used dummy variables for every month of the year. The
empirical model is then as follows:
xtðlÞ ¼ a1ztðkÞ þ a2ytðgÞ þ bi; ð8Þ
where k, l and g are the Box Cox transformation parameters:
xðlÞ ¼
xl ÿ 1
l
 zðkÞ ¼
zk ÿ 1
k
 yðgÞ ¼
yg ÿ 1
g
ð9Þ
and the coefficients bi(i = 1, . . . ,12) represent the fixed effect param-
eters for any month that is included in the model as dummy vari-
ables. The variable yT measures the overall net inflow from the
Fig. 3. The optimal daily revenue function in the upstream Mequinenza Power
Plant. Source: Own elaboration.
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upstream river basin and helps to include variations explained by
dry or wet years.
This function of the private decision on how much water to de-
liver on any day, along with the maximum revenue function deter-
mining how to distribute this water during the day to produce
energy, allows the calibration of the model for the complete se-
quence of all of the days in the sample. Table 2 shows the econo-
metric results. Transformation parameters l and g were not
found to be significantly different from 1; therefore, the associated
variables xt and zt enter linearly in the equation. The maximum
likelihood value of the nonlinear transformation parameter (k)
was determined at 0.35. All of the remaining coefficients are signif-
icant at a 1% level. Apart from maximum likelihood criteria, the fi-
nal equation fulfils Wald’s and Lagrange’s multiplier tests for the
optimisation of the econometric estimation. The size and detail
of the sample seem to be important factors behind the robust
and efficient econometric estimation of the daily decision variable.
This baseline scenario and the associated optimisation func-
tions are the basis by which to assess the impact of flushing flows
over the quantity and value of the energy produced.
4. Results
Flushing flows are implemented through the imposition of par-
ticular constraints over the operating rules of the hydropower
plant. These constraints imply a deviation from the profit maximis-
ing decision profile (baseline scenario) with a negative impact on
expected financial profits. The revenue variation, or the opportu-
nity cost, is moreover the net result of two different effects of
opposite sign. The first effect is the immediate revenue increase,
as controlled floods require the delivery of an amount of water that
exceeds the quantity that the operator would have chosen other-
wise. The second effect is the decreased revenue resulting from
the reduction in the stock of water available after the flood4 during
the days or weeks required for the reservoir to come back to its base-
line level. Once this convergence is complete, not only will the
amount of water stored be back to normal but the operator’s deci-
sions and revenues will also be the same as in the baseline scenario.
The absorption period, or the time during which water stocks, flows
and profits diverge from the baseline, is a measure of the time re-
quired by the system to absorb the shock produced by the flood5.
The cost of the flushing flow can be reduced by a careful selec-
tion of the right moment at which to start delivering the water for
the subsequent hours. Although the operator cannot decide upon
the day and the quantity of water to deliver during the artificial
flood, it can choose the right hour at which to start the flood. This
decision allows minimising foregone revenues, as expected energy
prices vary in a predictable way during the day. Fig. 4 shows the
market value of the energy obtained during the flood for the au-
tumn and spring seasons according to the flushing flow hydro-
graph shown in Fig. 2.
The correct selection of the time to start delivering the water
might explain differences as high as 40% of the maximum revenue,
or an opportunity cost of as much as EUR 160,000 per flood. In
what follows, we assume that the delivery of water always starts
at a time that maximises the value of the energy produced during
the flushing flow (thus minimising the opportunity cost of the
flushing flow).
Provided that the artificial flood is feasible (which occurs when
water level is above a minimum critical level) and its starting point
has been chosen to minimise its impact over the value of the elec-
tricity produced, we are now ready to analyse the opportunity cost
of flushing flows. Fig. 5 presents the overall opportunity cost for
the days in the sample when the flood is feasible in autumn
(Fig. 5a) and spring (Fig. 5b). The revenue variation is measured
on the left axis. The figure is complemented with data about the
amount of water stored in the upstream reservoir on the day of
the flood, which is measured on the right axis.
As expected, the opportunity cost of flushing flows changes
with the condition of the system. The profit maximising opportu-
nity cost varies from EUR 33,000 (revenue variation: ÿ33,000) to
EUR 76,000 (ÿ76,000) for the spring and autumn floods, respec-
tively, for a total opportunity cost of 109,000 EUR per year
(ÿ109,000). The standard deviation of the opportunity cost equals
55,000 for the spring flood and 110,000 for the autumn flood,
denoting a high variability that is largely the result of the irregular
water flows observed in the case study area. In the same way, the
absorption time varies from a few days to several months with an
average value of 82 days and a standard deviation of 506.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Flushing flows have been shown to be effective means to
achieve successful river restoration (Hueftle and Stevens, 2002;
Table 2
Box Cox estimation of the daily outflow of water. Source: Own elaboration.
Variable Coefficient Standard
error
Significance
(%)
Water stored (h m3)a 0.0009339 0.0368078 99
Lag water stored (h m3) 0.1480627 0.00718118 99
Water inflow (h m3/day) 0.48437 8.13874Eÿ05 99
October ÿ12.4484 1.34145119 99
November ÿ11.278 1.34805527 99
December ÿ10.647 1.3814159 99
January ÿ8.71131 1.39861698 99
February ÿ9.53085 1.40190417 99
March ÿ8.7341 1.41103021 99
April ÿ10.3591 1.44114208 99
May ÿ10.9435 1.47712765 99
June ÿ13.4476 1.48860571 99
July ÿ12.3389 1.44571131 99
August ÿ12.4329 1.37090634 99
September ÿ12.8491 1.32810979 99
k 0.383011 0.00718118 99
Wald test 34.07
Elasticity of water stored 1.14593
Elasticity of water inflow 0.79495
Elasticity of lag water
inflow
0.35503
a Variables transformed by k.
4 Under extreme events, the implementation of flushing flows may lead to
additional opportunity costs. For example, when the amount of water stored in the
reservoirs is below or at its lowest or minimum acceptable level, flushing flows would
imply a reduction of the water supplied for crops or any other uses. In any case,
despite being technically feasible, the River Basin Authority clearly establishes a
series of priorities under extreme events that rule out the possibility of implementing
flushing flows (ERBA, 2007).
5 The flushing flows alter the decision making process of the hydropower operator,
moving away the observed stocks and released water flows from the optimal path
(baseline). As a response to the lower water stock in the dam resulting from flushing
flows, the hydropower operator will release less water than he would otherwise do in
the baseline scenario without flushing flows. This will happen until the amount of
water stored in this alternative scenario finally converges to the amount of water
stored in the baseline scenario. This time span is known as the absorption period.
6 Operator’s decisions in our model are based on expectations over the water
inflow that the reservoir might receive in the future. These expectations might or
might not be fulfilled, and the consequence of this circumstance is that the
opportunity cost may actually differ from its expected value (depending on rainfall
on the days following the flood) and can even be negative. Given the timing of the
different effects and, particularly, the fact that the increase in revenue occurs at the
start of the flood, while the cost is different along the absorption time, the succession
of wet days can shorten the absorption time, and when the reservoir recovers rapidly
enough, it can even avoid a negative opportunity cost. This outcome is observed on
the days when the revenue variation of the flood is positive (see Fig. 5).
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Vinson, 2001; Kondolf and Wilcock, 1996). While the benefits and
technical effectiveness of this alternative are widely known, the
tradeoffs in terms of the economic uses of water are often consid-
ered too high and prevent the periodical release of artificial floods.
In this paper, we present a planning-level methodology for the
assessment of such opportunity costs in heavily modified down-
stream areas where flushing flows affect the operational rules of
hydropower facilities. We show how the model can be calibrated
with a combination of a deterministic maximum revenue function
for the hourly delivery of water and an econometrically obtained
decision function for the daily amount of water delivered. The
model enables us to analyse the impact of imposing a new opera-
tion rule on the hydropower operator’s optimal decisions. This rule
requires the release of water during certain periods of time in
accordance with an artificial flood regime purposely designed to
restore the basic functions of a river ecosystem. As the technical
design, feasibility and opportunity cost of flushing flows heavily
depend on the intrinsic conditions of river ecosystems, we used
the detailed time information about the stocks and flows of water
in the Lower Ebro River to calibrate and simulate the model for all
of the days in spring and autumn in the sample when an artificial
flood is feasible.
Implementing flushing flows on a regular basis will result in a
reduction in the asset value of affected hydropower facilities, as
they will have to operate under more stringent institutional rules.
The case study shows that hydropower facilities in the Lower Ebro
can provide the artificial flows required for the restoration of the
river channel at a cost that is equivalent to a small fraction of
the energy delivered to the market and the overall annual revenue.
The expected opportunity cost of two floods per year (EUR
109,000) is equivalent to 0.17% of the average yearly revenue and
is only a fraction of the average daily revenue (which amounts to
EUR 250,000 in the sample days).
The cost of guaranteeing the periodical release of flushing floods
by changing the operation rules of hydropower facilities also
seems to be lower than any other alternative of obtaining water
from other sources (such as saving water in agriculture and domes-
tic consumption or water recycling and desalination) to have addi-
tional stored water available for this purpose in the reservoirs.
Each artificial flood requires the delivery of approximately 36 mil-
lion cubic metres over sixteen hours; considering the opportunity
cost estimated at EUR 76,000 and EUR 33,000 for the autumn and
the spring floods, respectively, we can conclude that the cost per
cubic metre delivered is lower than EUR 0.002 for the autumn flood
and less than half of that quantity for the spring flood. Experience
shows that there are few alternatives to obtaining such a large
amount of water at a lower cost from other economic uses.
Provided that flushing flows are implemented with sound eco-
nomic criteria, their opportunity cost is small when compared to
people’s Willingness To Pay (WTP) to secure the benefits of river
restoration programmes. Original estimations in areas that resem-
ble our policy context show that WTP ranges from EUR 5.3 to EUR
63.6 per person per year (Loomis et al., 2000; Meyerhoff and Dehn-
hardt, 2007; Berrens et al., 1998; Brown and Duffield, 1995; Colby,
1993; González-Cabán and Loomis, 1997). Depending on the size of
the population benefited by the programme, the opportunity cost
of flushing flows can range from EUR 0.55 (if we consider the
200,000 people living in the Lower Ebro River) to EUR 0.04 per per-
son per year (if we consider the 2.8 million people living in the en-
tire Ebro Basin) (ERBA, 2012b).
However, these values should be taken with caution. The WTP
for the benefits associated with river restoration programmes
may be actually lower as a result of the distance decay problems
typically associated with environmental quality valuation (Hanley
et al., 2003; Bateman et al., 2006). Also, the opportunity cost of
flushing flows of 109,000 EUR per year should not be regarded
strictly as a lower bound; rather, it is a reference value sensitive
to uncertainty. Actually, the uneven behaviour of flows and stocks
of water in Mediterranean rivers (ERBA, 2012a) and the volatility of
energy prices (SEMO, 2013) make operator’s revenue highly vari-
able. Assuming that hydropower operators are risk averse, they
would be willing to accept a lower compensation for the losses de-
rived from a flushing flow, as long as this value is secure (certainty
equivalent). The difference between this compensation and the
opportunity cost of flushing flows is a function of the operator’s
risk aversion coefficient, which varies for every area and type of
agent (e.g., risk aversion is higher in drought prone areas such as
the Guadalquivir River Basin than in more resilient basins, see Gut-
iérrez-Martín and Gómez, 2011). Although revealing the risk atti-
tude of hydropower operators is beyond the scope of this paper,
these considerations need to be addressed in future research and
bargaining processes.
In spite of this, our results show that the opportunity cost of
flushing flows is expected to be between 9.74 and over 1633 times
lower than the benefits associated with the river restoration pro-
grammes, as measured by individual’s WTP. These figures suggest
that the real policy challenge consists in finding the institutional
agreement to implement the flushing flood programme and agree-
ing on the potential compensations7 to overcome the incentive
problem. The considerable mismatch between the opportunity cost
and the societal benefits provides sufficient room for private opera-
tors and public authorities to conduct successful bargaining and thus
agree on the voluntarily compliance of a soundly designed pro-
gramme of flood releases to restore the critical functions of the water
ecosystem. The cooperation between power generation companies
and water authorities is also a positive signal, showing that flushing
flows for river restoration purposes can be compatible with private
corporate interests. These efforts are now considered to be the pio-
neering phase of a comprehensive restoration programme of the
whole river’s ecosystem and a key piece of the River Basin
Fig. 4. The optimal timing of the flushing flow in the Lower Ebro River. Source: Own
elaboration.
7 The MRFDC was built by the hydropower operator in exchange of a long term
government concession to exploit the dam complex. The contract did not include the
possibility of implementing flushing flows (i.e., larger temporary outflows), nor a
reduction in the water inflows. In the past, the modification of this contract (e.g.,
through increased water rights upstream that reduced water availability for
hydropower generation) has been solved with compensations to the operator,
sometimes in the form of larger concession periods (e.g., GRC, 1997). Accordingly, in
the current context making the hydropower operator pay for the flushing flows cost is
unlikely and would require a modification of the legal framework.
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Management Plan that is being elaborated for the implementation of
the WFD.
Also, this research on the opportunity costs of flushing flows
may offer useful insights for basins that resemble our case study
area. There is still little research on the costs of reallocating water
from economic uses to the environment, with the exception of
some studies on the tradeoff between agriculture and environmen-
tal flows (Sisto, 2009; Troung, 2012; Pang et al., 2013). However, as
shown above, the implementation of flushing flows in heavily engi-
neered rivers like the Lower Ebro River may be more cost-effective
if the necessary water is taken from alternative uses with a lower
opportunity cost than agriculture (i.e., hydropower), provided that
other uses are not affected. Moreover, the large amounts of water
required and the short time span during which flushing flows are
released may make hydropower the only feasible alternative. This
paper aims to provide a standard method to estimate the tradeoff
between flushing flows and hydropower generation. This method-
ology may be transferred to other heavily engineered rivers in
which hydropower facilities can be used to reproduce the func-
tions previously performed by the natural system and thus to
achieve a better ecological status. This is the case of many rivers
in semi-arid areas, which tend to be more heavily impounded
and thus their hydrology more strongly affected than rivers in hu-
mid climates because demand for water is greater and runoff is
out-of-phase with demand. For example, in the Sacramento and
San Joaquin Rivers of California (US) the impounded runoff index
(ratio of reservoir capacity divided by mean annual runoff) is 0.8
and 1.2, respectively, and the flood peaks have declined on average
Fig. 5. The opportunity cost of a flushing flood in the Lower Ebro. (A) Autumn. (B) Spring. The sample of days includes the sequence of autumn (A) and spring days (B) in the
total sequence of 4017 days (ERBA, 2012a). Source: Own elaboration.
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53% and 81%, respectively. Therefore, flushing flows have the po-
tential to achieve a better environmental status (Kondolf and
Batalla, 2005). In these rivers runoff is lower than in the Lower
Ebro River, pressures are more intense and the hydrograph is flat-
ter (the decline of the flood peaks is estimated at 30% in the Ebro
River) (ERBA, 2012a; Kondolf and Batalla, 2005), all this suggesting
larger opportunity costs and absorption periods for flushing flows
than in our case study area (but also potentially larger environ-
mental benefits), though all this should be confirmed with on-site
estimations. Similar results could be expected with the flushing
flows proposed by Wu and Chou (2004) in the Trinity River in
northern California. The estimation of the opportunity costs of
flushing flows is also of relevance in the lower stretches of the Col-
orado River (US-Mexico border), where the recently approved Min-
ute 319 created a pilot programme that required water users in the
U.S. and Mexico to provide a one-time high-volume flushing flow
(or pulse flow) of 129.5 million cubic metres (IBWC, 2012). How-
ever, since water scarcity is much more acute in this area (the delta
of the Colorado River has run dry during most of the last half cen-
tury) (Glenn et al., 2008; Wheeler et al., 2007; ERBA, 2012a),
opportunity costs are likely to affect other uses apart from hydro-
power generation and therefore a more extensive assessment
framework involving other economic activities would be required
in this case. Flushing flows have also been implemented to prevent
algal blooms downstream the Opuha Dam in New Zealand (Lessard
et al., 2013), though with limited results as a consequence of the
inability of the dam to generate floods similar to pre-dam levels.
This area resembles our case study, with hydropower being the
most affected economic activity. In this and similar cases, the esti-
mation of the opportunity costs is of especial relevance in order to
justify (or not) the implementation of flushing flows from a cost-
benefit perspective.
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5.2 Drought insurance for irrigated agriculture  
 
Droughts are a relevant temporary decrease of the average water availability and 
are considered natural phenomena. There are two types of droughts: meteorological 
and hydrological. Meteorological droughts refer to a precipitation deficit over a 
period of time, while hydrological droughts refer to unusually low water levels in 
reservoirs, river flows, streams, lakes and/or aquifers. There is a time lag between 
the lack of precipitation and decreased water levels, which makes that the end of a 
hydrological drought might also be lagging behind the end of the corresponding 
meteorological drought, since large quantities of precipitation are required to restore 
water bodies back to normal conditions (EC, 2008).  
Droughts may have significant effects over the economy. An abrupt fall in the 
amount of water available implies that not all the water uses (agricultural, industrial, 
environmental and households demand) can be fully satisfied during a period of 
time, thus generating relevant welfare losses. Traditionally, policy makers have 
reacted to drought episodes through a crisis-management approach, rather than 
through the development of comprehensive, long term and planned drought policies. 
Although this is changing (e.g., through DMPs –see Chapter 4), the uncertainty 
associated with this emergency response has promoted spontaneous and individual 
actions to enhance the preparedness against droughts. These actions often involve 
significant tradeoffs with negative environmental impacts. This is especially visible in 
the case of agriculture, the world’s largest water consumer (Ward and Pulido-
Velazquez, 2008). 
Farmers are risk averse individuals that are willing to reduce their expected income 
as long as this income becomes more stable (Gutierrez-Martin and Gomez, 2011; 
Lien and Hardaker, 2001). In arid and semi-arid areas, the most important threat to 
agricultural income stability is droughts (OECD, 2010). Accordingly, farmers are 
willing to pay in advance relatively large amounts of money (as compared to their 
income) to soften the impact of droughts. In rainfed agriculture, this can be done 
through drought insurance
20
 (Bielza et al., 2008b). However, drought insurance for 
irrigated agriculture does not exist in the EU (Bielza et al., 2008a, 2008b). As a 
result, especially in drought prone and highly profitable agricultural areas, farmers 
may incur in informal abstractions from loosely controlled groundwater bodies to 
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 Currently only a few countries offer drought insurance for rainfed agriculture in the EU, 
namely, Austria, France, Italy and Spain. 
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stabilize their income (Pérez-Blanco and Gómez, 2013). This may be one of the 
main factors driving overexploitation and aquifer depletion in many Mediterranean 
basins (EC, 2008; EEA, 2009; WWF, 2006). Our main hypothesis is that an 
insurance system provided by financial markets may allow transferring the burden of 
drought risk from nature to the financial sector, thus removing this negative tradeoff. 
Stabilizing farmers’ incomes then becomes a way to reduce incentives to informally 
abstract water from overexploited aquifers
21
.  
 
The implementation of a drought insurance system for irrigated agriculture poses 
many challenges. However, Spain has exceptional enabling conditions as proved by 
the success of the agricultural insurance sector in covering a wide range of natural 
hazards. In fact, Spain has nowadays the most developed agricultural insurance 
sector in the entire EU (Bielza et al., 2008a, 2008b). Moreover, most of the 
challenges faced by drought insurance for irrigated agriculture resemble those faced 
and overcome by drought insurance for rainfed agriculture, and therefore could be 
easily dismantled (Pérez-Blanco and Gómez, 2013). Accordingly, it seems that the 
failure to successfully implement drought insurance for irrigated agriculture has to 
be more with a lack of institutional development and the fears surrounding its 
financial implementability. 
The more practical way to identify the room available for the development of this 
economic instrument consists in estimating the maximum welfare surplus at stake. 
These gains are the difference between the maximum amount farmers are willing to 
pay for the insurance and the minimum costs at which this product may be provided 
by the financial market. This surplus is usually positive because firms can aggregate 
individual risks and are risk neutral while individual farmers are risk averse.  
The total costs faced by an insurance company comprise the expected indemnity, 
transaction costs, asymmetric information and systemic risk costs. Transaction costs 
are in principle negligible since drought insurance for irrigated agriculture would be 
offered as a part of a comprehensive insurance package covering other agricultural 
hazards, known as the combined insurance scheme. Therefore, the increase in 
transaction costs by drought insurance for irrigated agriculture would be only 
marginal. However, in water scarce and drought prone areas the expected 
indemnity (the expected value of the yield losses effectively compensated by the 
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 Precisely because of this, it is of paramount importance that drought insurance for 
irrigated agriculture focuses at least on the farmers whose plots have access to 
overexploited groundwater bodies. 
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insurer
22
, measured in constant prices) can be high, thus increasing the total costs 
and reducing the room to cover asymmetric information and systemic risk costs. In 
addition, drought insurance is especially sensible to asymmetric information (i.e., 
moral hazard and adverse selection) and systemic risk problems, which may result 
in the total costs overcoming the farmers’ willingness to pay.  
In the following papers we estimate the fair risk premium of drought insurance for 
irrigated agriculture for a varied range of ligneous crops. The fair risk premium is a 
key variable in any insurance system and equals the quotient of the expected 
indemnity to the production value in a hydrological year without drought. In other 
words, it represents the direct costs of the drought in the case of irrigated 
agriculture, or alternatively the long term costs of providing this type of insurance in 
a world without information constraints and transaction costs. This value, combined 
with the farmers’ willingness to pay (Gutierrez-Martin and Gomez, 2011), can be 
used to estimate the room that insurance companies have to accommodate 
transaction costs and especially the costs of asymmetric information and systemic 
risk.  
 
This chapter presents two papers, both authored by the doctoral candidate and the 
Prof. Carlos Mario Gómez Gómez. The first one is entitled Designing optimum 
insurance schemes to reduce water overexploitation during drought events: a case 
study of La Campiña, Guadalquivir River Basin, Spain and was published in the 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy in 2013. This paper was presented 
in the conference The Governance of Sustainability in Cambridge, UK (11-12 April 
2012); and in the International Water Resource Economics Consortium (IWREC) 
10th Annual Meeting in Stockholm, Sweden (26-31 August 2012).   
The second one is entitled Insuring water: A practical risk management option in 
water scarce and drought prone regions? and has been accepted for publication in 
Water Policy in 2013. This paper was presented in the 123rd EAAE Seminar. Price 
volatility and farm income stabilization in Dublin, Ireland (23-24 February 2012); in 
the 86th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society in Warwick, UK 
(16-18 April 2012); in the V
th
 AERNA Conference in Faro, Portugal (31 May-2 June 
2012); in the International Society of Ecological Economics 2012 Conference – 
Ecological Economics and Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (16-19 June 2012); and 
in the Belpasso Summer School: Frontiers in Economics of Natural Hazards and 
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 Insurance systems compensate only a fraction of the yield losses. This avoids a full loss 
recovery and reduces the incidence of moral hazard. 
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT IN SPANISH MEDITERRANEAN BASINS  
74 
Disaster Risk Reduction - Financing Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate 
Adaptation in Belpasso, Italy (1-7 September 2013). 
 
Designing optimum insurance schemes to reduce water overexploitation
during drought events: a case study of La Campin˜a, Guadalquivir River
Basin, Spain
Carlos Dionisio Pe´rez Blancoa,b and Carlos Mario Go´mez Go´meza,b
aWater Economics Group, University of Alcala´ de Henares, Plaza de la Victoria, 2, 28802 Alcala´
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In several arid and semi-arid Mediterranean basins, water deficits in irrigated
agriculture during drought events are relieved by illegal abstractions from
aquifers. Illegal abstractions are largely tolerated by the authorities and are
regarded by farmers as a reliable and inexpensive form of insurance against
drought. This framework of illegal abstractions is responsible for the structural
water deficit that is characteristic of many Southern European regions. The
situation is changing with the implementation of River Basin Management Plans
and Drought Management Plans, which demand improvement in the quantitative
and qualitative status of water bodies, improved surveillance of groundwater
resources and more rigorous sanctions for illegal groundwater abstractions.
However, these plans raise distribution and equity issues and may not be sufficient
to stop illegal abstractions in certain areas. Provided that the new framework is
properly enforced, private drought insurance has the potential to stabilise income
levels and reduce the incentives for overexploitation during drought events. This
paper develops a methodology to estimate the basic risk premium and the
potential water savings of private drought insurance. This methodology is based
on concatenated stochastic models (rainfall-stock), a decision model and
agronomic production functions, and is illustrated through the application of
the model in the La Campin˜a agricultural district in the Guadalquivir River
Basin, Spain.
Keywords: drought insurance; stochastic models; groundwater; agriculture;
drought management plan
1. Introduction
Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource that is essential for sustaining life,
development and the environment and should be managed accordingly (ICWE
1992). However, the prevailing paradigm has been that water policies must play an
instrumental role in providing a package of services, thus making water demand
exogenously defined outside of the field of water management policy (Saleth and
Dinar, 1999). In the case of Southern Europe, this paradigm has led to a significant
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expansion of irrigation, which has increased the pressure on water resources. This
increasing demand contributes to the arid and semi-arid climates that are
characteristic of many of these regions, which significantly constrains water
availability. Consequently, this area is now more vulnerable to droughts. In an
attempt to limit the impact of droughts on their activity, farmers have reacted by
increasing illegal abstractions from uncontrolled, dependable aquifers. The
reluctance of the water authorities to penalise this behaviour has made illegal
abstractions inexpensive, and these abstractions have become the true insurance
against drought.
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) was implemented as a reaction against
the poor qualitative and quantitative status of the water bodies, particularly aquifers.
Following the WFD, all members of the EU must have approved River Basin
Management Plans (RBMPs)1 by 2009, which include the achievement of a good
quantitative status in every relevant water body as a priority. The European
authorities also recommended the development of Drought Management Plans
(DMPs) in drought-sensitive basins. Drought Management Plans are intended to
avoid water overexploitation during drought events through a set of objective
drought indicators and abstraction rules2 (EC 2008). Both RBMPs and DMPs
indicate a clear commitment to stop illegal abstractions during drought events
through an improved surveillance mechanism and a more rigorous application of
sanctions (GRBA 2007, 2010). Consequently, the likelihood of detecting and
penalising offenders increases, which may provide a sufficient incentive for farmers to
reduce illegal abstractions, or even to stop them, in areas where the income gap
between irrigated and rain-fed agriculture is small (Mendelsohn and Saher 2011).
However, this incentive may prove to be insufficient in agricultural districts where
the income gap is large and droughts result in significant monetary losses (WWF/
Adena 2006, Llamas 2007).
Drought insurance guarantees a regular income and thus implements incentives to
reduce illegal abstractions, even in high-income irrigated areas. However, drought
insurance for irrigated agriculture does not exist in Europe3 (Bielza et al. 2008a,
2008b) for a variety of reasons. The systemic nature of droughts, moral hazard and
adverse selection are frequently cited problems that raise the price of the product
(Miranda 1991) or even make a certain degree of public support necessary (Rejda
2008), as happens with drought insurance in rain-fed agriculture (Bielza et al. 2008a,
2008b). Such problems are also common to other sources of risk where insurance
markets are nonetheless working (World Bank 2005, Bryla and Syrpka 2007, Dick
2007, Breustedt et al. 2008). In the case of irrigated agriculture, the reason that
drought insurance does not exist is twofold: (i) there is a high uncertainty that stems
from institutional decisions about water availability, and (ii) there is a high cost of
insurance compared to the alternative of illegal abstractions.
Prior to the implementation of DMPs, irrigation restrictions during a drought
event were subject to discretionary assessments made by institutions. The outcome of
the assessment was unpredictable and increased the indemnity variability above
levels that would be bearable by commercial insurance (Pe´rez Blanco et al. 2011).
Therefore, any compensation for farmers would come from public institutions
through expensive emergency funds (Meuwissen et al. 2003). Moreover, emergency
funds did not always guarantee a full refund of the losses. The high uncertainty made
farmers perceive illegal abstractions from dependable aquifers to be a more reliable
form of insurance with the potential to guarantee up to 100% of the yield. In
2 C.D. Pe´rez Blanco and C.M. Go´mez Go´mez
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addition, poor surveillance mechanisms, the tolerance of offenders and the small
chance of being punished by the authorities made illegal abstractions less expensive
than traditional insurance. For instance, the solution to persistent overexploitation
has very often consisted of granting new water use rights to the offenders, thus
generating additional incentives for further water overuse (Go´mez Go´mez and Pe´rez
Blanco 2012). Under these conditions, the development of an insurance market for
irrigated agriculture has not been possible.
If properly enforced, RBMPs and DMPs will increase the cost of illegal
abstractions and largely remove institutional arbitrariness from decisions on water
availability, thus making drought insurance relatively less expensive and more
reliable. All this favours the development of an insurance system that is partially
supported by private capital and more efficient and effective than emergency
compensation, where the informal, spontaneous and individual insurance system of
illegal abstractions can be replaced by a more coherent, formal collective risk-sharing
scheme. This paper develops a methodology to explore the financial viability of
drought insurance markets in irrigated agriculture and the potential water savings
that can be obtained under the new framework characterised by DMPs and RBMPs.
The potential of this methodology is illustrated by its use with the irrigated ligneous
crops in the La Campin˜a agricultural district in the Guadalquivir River Basin
(GRB), Spain. The results indicate that the basic risk premiums would be reasonable
and the expected environmental outcomes significant.
2. Case study background: La Campin˜a, GRB, Spain
Spain has the most developed agricultural insurance system in Europe, in which
all companies operate within a pool and assume the risk in a co-insurance regime
(Bielza et al. 2008a). Spain has also pioneered the introduction of DMPs in the
EU, and every relevant basin has approved its own DMP, including the GRB
(EC 2008). Although the approval of RBMPs in Spain has been delayed, the
GRB’s RBMP is in its last stage, and there is a preliminary report available
(GRBA 2010). The implementation of DMPs and RBMPs is part of a national
strategy organised by the River Basin Authorities to provide a collective response
to the increased frequency and intensity of droughts, especially in the south
(Pe´rez Blanco et al. 2010).
Water demand in the GRB comes mainly from agriculture. Irrigation demands
an average of 3485 hm3 every year and represents 86.8% of the 4016 hm3 annual
water demand. However, renewable resources amount to only 3287 hm3/year, and
this value is reduced to 3028 hm3/year if we consider the minimum environmental
requirements (GRBA 2007, 2010). As a result, water overexploitation in an average
hydrological year amounts to 987.7 hm3, according to official records, with a water
abstraction to renewable resources ratio of 1.22, which is considered severe
overexploitation. Other sources estimate this ratio to be 1.64 (EEA 2009).4
La Campin˜a, located in the GRB in the south of Spain, comprises one of the
most important agricultural districts in Spain. La Campin˜a Agricultural District has
48,764 ha of irrigated land, of which 39.7% is ligneous crops (GRBA 2010). The
most relevant ligneous crops in the area are Prunus armeniaca (315 ha), Cerasus
(4685 ha), Citrus 6 sinensis (408 ha), Olea europaea (9087 ha) and Malus domestica
(997 ha). Greater than 99% of the water demand in the area is from irrigation.
During an average hydrological year, 78.8% of water for irrigation comes from
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 3
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aquifers, with the remaining resources coming from reservoirs. There are three
aquifers in La Campin˜a, all of them are detritic. The two main aquifers, whose
renewable resources amount to 92.8 hm3/year, have an abstraction-to-renewable
resources ratio of greater than 100% in an average hydrological year. The third
aquifer (32 hm3/year) has an exploitation rate of slightly greater than 70% (GRBA
2010). In addition, droughts in the area are common and expected yields are high
(Pe´rez Blanco et al. 2011), which makes the aquifers of La Campin˜a extremely
vulnerable to drought events.
3. Methodology
The viability of an insurance market depends on the experimental design of feasible
scenarios, the financial losses associated with these scenarios and the corresponding
probabilities from which the risk premium is estimated (Skees and Barnett 1999).5
The basic risk premium is the key element in the design of commercial insurance
and is calculated as the ratio between the expected indemnity (a function of the
expected losses) and the expected production value in a reference year (in this case,
a normal or average hydrological year). The basic risk premium should not be
confused with the premium applied in the insurance market, which is actually
larger. This discrepancy between the basic risk premium and the insurance market
premium occurs because of three factors inherent to agricultural insurance
markets: (i) first, insurance markets are plagued with issues of adverse selection
and moral hazard that may significantly increase costs for the insurer (Miranda
1991);6 (ii) second, insured agents are risk averse (Lien and Hardaker 2001, Kim
and Chavas 2003), and their willingness to pay to transfer a portion of the risk
they bear to an insurer is greater than the expected drought losses;7 (iii) finally, the
implementation of an insurance system requires that the insurer constitutes a
financial fund in which stochastic indemnities are compensated by the money paid
by the insured, and this fund has intrinsic operating costs that are assumed by the
insurer and must be recovered. In addition, drought is a systemic risk and is likely
to generate catastrophic events with disproportionate costs for which commercial
insurance may not be prepared; thus, a certain degree of public support is
necessary (Rejda 2008, Bielza 2008a, 2008b).
This methodology calculates the basic risk premium of the ligneous crops in the
area through the implementation of a model that depends on the historical evolution
of the insured product, i.e. water availability (Martin et al. 2001). In La Campin˜a,
the variables determining water availability for irrigation are the water stock in
reservoirs, groundwater and rainfall. However, groundwater levels are difficult to
measure because there are no reliable sources of data for the area. The DMP for the
GRB uses annual rainfall as a proxy variable to assess the quantitative state of the
permeable detritic aquifers of La Campin˜a (GRBA 2007, 2010). Consequently, our
model has two relevant variables: the rainfall and the water stock of reservoirs. We
start by estimating the probability density function (PDF) of both variables.
Subsequently, the quantity of water available for irrigation in every scenario and its
corresponding probability are estimated according to the applicable decision rules,
and the potential water savings are estimated. Finally, we use a deterministic
agronomic model to estimate the yield of every ligneous crop in La Campin˜a, its
corresponding production value and indemnity and the basic risk premium for every
possible scenario.
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3.1. Water availability
In La Campin˜a, water availability is a function of rainfall, piezometric levels and
water stock in reservoirs. In the following sections, we calculate the PDF for the
water stored in the reservoirs and rainfall (which serves as a proxy variable for
piezometric levels) to determine the probability associated with every level of water
availability.
3.1.1. Rainfall
Rainfall is the most important source of water in La Campin˜a agricultural district
for two reasons: (i) it provides effective rainfall captured directly by crops; and more
importantly, (ii) rainfall recharges the permeable detritic aquifers of the area, which
are the main source of water for irrigation. Rainfall is a stochastic variable that can
be adjusted to a PDF, which allows for the assignment of a probability (y ¼ z(p)) to
each level of rainfall, expressed in mm (p). The data used correspond to the period
1941–2008 (MARM 2011). The PDF is calculated with a best-fit gamma function of
the following type (McWhorter et al. 1966, Martin et al. 2001, Go´mez Go´mez and
Pe´rez Blanco 2012):
y ¼ zðpja; bÞ ¼
1
baÿðaÞ
paÿ1exp
ÿp
b
 
ð1Þ
where a and b are the scale and shape parameters, respectively. Table 1 presents the
maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) of the parameters.
3.1.2. Water stock in reservoirs
On the basis of work by Go´mez-Ramos et al. (2002), Pe´rez Blanco et al. (2011)
and Go´mez Go´mez and Pe´rez Blanco (2012), we adjust the PDF of the level of
water stored in reservoirs at the beginning of the irrigation season using the
Weibull function. This function assigns a probability (w) to each stored water
level (s), measured as a percentage of the storage capacity, in La Campin˜a. The
data used correspond to the period from 1968 to 2008 (MARM 2008). The
Weibull function can be expressed as follows:
w ¼ jðsje; dÞ ¼
d
c
c
d
 dÿ1
exp ÿ
s
c
 d 
: ð2Þ
Table 2 shows the MLEs of the parameters in the function above.
Table 1. Rainfall Gamma function. The dependent variable is mm of rainfall.
Variable Coefficient
a (scale) 15.35a (2.79)
b (shape) 37.75a (3.28)
No. of observations 68
Note: aSignificant at 1% level. Source: Authors’ research from MARM (2011).
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3.2. Decision rules
At the beginning of every irrigation season, the water authority estimates the
quantity of water required for irrigation (TIR)8 according to the crops present in the
sub-basin and their historical evapotranspiration rates. Later, the water authority
assesses the water availability in the reservoirs and the annual accumulated
precipitation (GRBA 2010) to determine the quantity of water to be delivered to
agriculture.
Traditionally, the percentage of TIR that was effectively satisfied (TIRr) followed
discretional decision rules. This situation changed with the approval of the DMPs,
which clearly established a set of drought thresholds with specific associated
restrictions. Nonetheless, DMPs still offer the possibility to apply additional water
restrictions, which follow discretional criteria, during exceptional junctures (e.g.
during extreme droughts or after a lasting drought to speed up the recovery) (GRBA
2007). Thus, both decision rules are in force.
3.2.1. Traditional decision rules
In contrast with the situation created by the recently approved DMP in the GRB, the
decision rules followed thus far have been the result of a combination of social
agreements, opinions of experts and discretion depending on water availability, with
no written rules to be applied in any case. To formalise these decisions, we use the
available data on the quantity of water effectively delivered to farmers, measured as
a percentage of TIR satisfied. The data span a range of 19 years (1989–2008). We
found that the relevant variables explaining the percentage of TIR satisfied are water
stored in reservoirs (measured as a percentage over total storage capacity) (s) and
annual rainfall in mm (p). The relationship between the percentage of TIR satisfied
(h(p,s)) and both of these variables are linear (Go´mez Ramos et al. 2002). The
parameters of the function are estimated using ordinary least squares (see Table 3).9
3.2.2. DMP decision rules
The recently approved DMP of the GRB quantifies the particular situation at hand
and the severity of the problem using objective and publicly observable drought
thresholds that are dependent on the quantitative state of the groundwater bodies
and indirectly assessed through the annual rainfall (p). The plan establishes the
following four drought thresholds: (i) when rainfall values are regarded as normal
(p 5 425), there are no additional explicit restrictions, and the quantity of water
available for irrigation is thus the same as in the traditional rules scenario; (ii) the
quantity of water available for irrigation is reduced by 5% (h ¼ 0.95) when the
Table 2. Surface water stored: Weibull function. The dependent variable is the percentage of
dam-stored water over dam storage capacity.
Variable Coefficient
c (scale) 0.61a (0.12)
d (shape) 4.79a (0.57)
No. of observations 40
Note: aSignificant at 1% level. Source: Authors’ research from MARM (2008).
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amount of rainfall is less than the pre-alert threshold (325 5 p  425); (iii) if the
alert limits are exceeded (275 5 p  325), the quantity of water available for
irrigation is reduced by 30% (h ¼ 0.7); and (iv) in emergency situations (p  275),
the quantity of water that is delivered for irrigation is reduced by 70% (h ¼ 0.3)
(GRBA 2007).
3.2.3. Combined decision rules
We define lp,s as a discrete water restriction variable whose value depends on the
DMP’s decision rules (and thus on rainfall), its corresponding h (q for normal, 0.95
for pre-alert, 0.7 for alert and 0.3 for emergency) and the traditional decision rules
that apply under exceptional circumstances (h(p,s)):
lp;s
hðp; sÞ; if p > 425
min ðhðp; sÞ; 0:95Þ; if 325 < p  425
min ðhðp; sÞ; 0:7Þ; if 275 < p  325
min ðhðp; sÞ; 0:3Þ; if p  275:
8><
>: ð3Þ
Water delivered for irrigation is thus a function of rainfall and the water stock in
reservoirs (TIRr(p,s)):
TIRrðp; sÞ ¼ lp;s  TIR: ð4Þ
3.3. Evapotranspiration satisfied
We measure the expected crop evapotranspiration (ET) for every irrigated ligneous
crop in La Campin˜a, according to the Spanish Ministry of Environment standard
method, using data from 1941 to 2009 (MARM 2011).10 The expected evapotran-
spiration is partially addressed by effective rainfall. Effective rainfall (ER) is a
function of stochastic rainfall and a series of parameters that can be safely assumed
to be constant (Cuenca 1989)11:
ER ¼ gðpÞ: ð5Þ
The portion of evapotranspiration (ET) that is not addressed by effective rainfall
is the irrigation water requirement (WR):
WR ¼ ETÿ gðpÞ: ð6Þ
The WR can either be satisfied through irrigation or left unaccounted for,
depending on the available water resources and the decision rules in force. The total
quantity of water delivered for irrigation was estimated in the previous section
(TIRr(p,s)). Nonetheless, only a fraction of the TIRr(p,s) effectively contributes to
satisfy evapotranspiration due to water losses during the abstraction, transportation
and irrigation stages. The effective irrigation resources (EIR(p,s)), or the part of the
irrigation resources that effectively satisfy the irrigation water requirements, are a
function of TIRr(p,s) and the overall efficiency of the irrigation system (es), which is
approximately 61% in La Campin˜a (GRBA 2007):
EIRðp; sÞ ¼ TIRrðp; sÞ  es: ð7Þ
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The percentage of the evapotranspiration satisfied (%ET) can now be calculated
from the previous equations:
%ETp;s ¼
gðpÞ þ EIRðp; sÞ
ET
: ð8Þ
Each %ET has an associated probability (q(p,s)), which depends on the stock (s)
and rainfall (p) values. Using expressions (1) and (2), this probability is expressed as
follows:
qðp; sÞ ¼ zðpÞ  jðsÞ: ð9Þ
The expected evapotranspiration satisfaction (EET), the resulting expected
irrigation deficit (ID) and potential groundwater depletion (PotGW) are defined as
follows:
EET ¼
Z max p
p¼0
Z max s
s¼0
½zðpÞ  gðpÞ þ jðsÞ  zðpÞ  ðEIRðp; sÞÞ ð10Þ
where maxp and maxs are the values of the variables p and s that make the
cumulative density function equal to 1 (i.e. the probability of any value above this
limit is zero).
ID ¼ ETÿ EET ð11Þ
PotGW ¼
ID
es
: ð12Þ
3.4. Agronomic production functions and production value
The agronomic production of a given crop depends largely on the percentage of
evapotranspiration satisfied. However, making the production function of a crop
dependent only on the percentage of evapotranspiration satisfied implies that
other variables that may affect the production function, such as soil type,
fertilisers and phytosanitaries, climatic variables and others, are excluded.
However, if we consider this set of variables to be constant, it is still possible
to develop sound and rigorous agronomic production functions that provide
results close to the observed values (SCRATS 2005, Pe´rez Blanco et al. 2011).
Thus, we obtain the agronomic production in kg (Qp,s) as a function of the
percentage of evapotranspiration satisfied (%ETp,s) and other variables that are
assumed to be constant (k):
Qp;s ¼ fð%ETp;s; kÞ: ð13Þ
The reference agronomic production functions for the considered crops are
obtained after a comprehensive bibliographical review. Subsequently, these
functions are adapted to the characteristics of the area of study, if there are
not site-specific production functions (SCRATS 2005, MARM 2010). To adapt
the production functions, it is assumed that the local characteristics have fixed
8 C.D. Pe´rez Blanco and C.M. Go´mez Go´mez
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effects that shift the agronomic production functions but maintain their elasticity
and marginal productivity. The resulting production functions are quadratic:
Qp;s ¼ a %ET
2
p;s þ b %ETp;s þ c: ð14Þ
Next, we obtain the value of production, which is the product of the agronomic
production (Qp,s) and the updated average prices of the last 10 years (P) (MARM
2007).
Vp;s ¼ Qp;s  P: ð15Þ
The value of production is the reference value for the calculation of the basic
risk premium. Prices are assumed to be constant because neither revenue insurance
(price, yield and costs) nor income insurance (price and yield) exist in the EU,
where yield insurance prevails. As a result, price variability is not considered in our
model.
3.5. Basic risk premium
The main element of any insurance market is the estimation of the basic risk
premium that, given the likelihood of a catastrophic event, guarantees a certain
level of coverage for the insured with no losses for the insurer in the medium-
long term. The indemnity conceded by drought insurance in the case of drought
losses in the EU is subject to two prerequisites: (i) losses must be institutionally
acknowledged; and (ii) losses must be larger than the minimum threshold
predetermined by the insurance company, usually as a percentage of the
production value.
(1) The drought indemnity is only paid when the relevant authorities formally
declare a drought. In the case of La Campin˜a, the system is considered to suffer a
drought when it is subject to at least a pre-alert state (i.e. p  425). We generate a
dichotomous variable, ap, to include this condition in our model.
aðpÞ ¼ 1; if p  425
aðpÞ ¼ 0; if p > 425

ð16Þ
(3) Additionally, insurance systems only cover at most a percentage of the
expected value of the production in a normal hydrological year (Vexp). This
threshold (m), which is 70% in Spain (Bielza et al. 2008b), aims to reduce the impact
of the moral hazard (Miranda 1991). Consequently, the indemnity (IND(p,s)) is
defined as follows:
INDðp; sÞ ¼
m  Vexp ÿ Vp;s; if 0  Vp;s < m  Vexp
0; if Vp;s  m  Vexp

: ð17Þ
The expected indemnity (IEp,s) for each crop is calculated as follows:
IEp;s ¼
Z max p
p¼0
Z max s
s¼0
½zðpÞ  jðsÞ þ aðp; sÞ  INDðp; sÞ ð18Þ
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Finally, the basic risk premium (BRPp,s) is calculated as the ratio of expected
indemnity to expected production in a normal hydrological year (Vexp):
BRPp;s ¼
IEp;s
Vexp
: ð19Þ
4. Results
The methodology above has been applied to the La Campin˜a sub-basin. First, we
have estimated the potential of commercial drought insurance to prevent illegal
water use during all possible drought events (Table 4).
The new legal and institutional framework after the implementation of the DMPs
and the RBMPs results in irrigation restrictions of 6.06 hm3/year in La Campin˜a.
Without the proper incentives in place (i.e. formal drought insurance), this
framework leads to a potential aquifer overexploitation of 9.94 hm3/year (i.e.
informal insurance). This framework results in a deficit of approximately 8% of the
total annual renewable resources in La Campin˜a. This deficit would be much larger
during an emergency drought, when expected illegal abstractions would equal 20.5
hm3/year (16.4% of annual renewable resources in La Campin˜a), according to our
model. It should be noted that this deficit corresponds exclusively to ligneous crops
(39.7% of irrigated surface in La Campin˜a). However, the combination of DMPs
and RBMPs with a formal drought insurance system may prevent these illegal water
abstractions and thus strengthen the sustainability of the system.
Next, we calculate the expected production value in a normal hydrological year
(Vexp), the expected indemnity (considering every possible scenario) (IEp,s) and the
Table 4. Expected evapotranspiration satisfaction (EET), expected irrigation deficit (ID) and
expected potential groundwater depletion (PotGW) during drought events in absolute terms
(hm3) and as a percentage of ET satisfied (%ET) in La Campin˜a.
Variable Value
EET (hm
3) 36.82
EET (%ET) 85.9%
ID (hm3) 6.06
ID (%ET) 14.14%
PotGW (hm3) 9.94
Source: Authors’ research.
Table 3. Irrigation resources estimation under traditional decision rules. The dependent
variable is the percentage of TIR satisfied in the GRB.
Variable Coefficient
S 0.35a (0.13)
p 0.0007 a (0.0002)
R2 0.89
Adjusted R2 0.88
No. of observations 19
Note: aSignificant at 1% level. Source: Authors’ research.
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basic risk premium (BRPr,s,p) for the ligneous crops of La Campin˜a. The values are
displayed in Table 5, along with the irrigated surface of every ligneous crop in La
Campin˜a.
Higher basic risk premiums are observed in citrus trees. Citrus 6 sinensis shows
a BRPp,s of greater than 10%. This high value may pose a significant challenge for
the development of commercial agricultural drought insurance in the region because
Citrus x sinensis is one of the most representative crops not only in La Campin˜a
(21.8% of total surface) but also in southern and south-eastern Spain. The BRPp,s
obtained for Citrus reticulata, although consistent with the values obtained for other
citrus trees, should not be considered representative because of the small surface
covered by these crops in La Campin˜a. The same can be said for the Vitis. Prunus
armeniaca and Cerasus have intermediate drought insurance BRPp,s slightly above
2%. Finally, Malus domestica (0.98%) and Olea europaea (0.5%), which together
represent 52.2% of the irrigated ligneous crops surface, have affordable BRPp,s
below 1%.
5. Conclusions
Drought insurance for irrigated agriculture does not exist in Europe. However, the
necessary conditions for its development in drought-sensitive areas in Southern
Europe are in place after the implementation of RBMPs and DMPs. Our hypothesis
is that under the clearer and publicly enforced rules on water abstractions contained
in both plans, drought insurance has the potential to reduce illegal groundwater
abstractions and stabilise agricultural incomes.
In this paper, we have estimated the cost (i.e. basic risk premium) of this
insurance market in the agricultural district of La Campin˜a (Spain) and the potential
water savings that could be attained with the joint implementation of DMPs,
RBMPs and drought insurance for irrigation. The results obtained in our case study
in La Campin˜a indicate that the basic risk premium is reasonable and the
environmental outcome is significant. Nonetheless, the viability of a private
insurance market also depends on other sources of risk that are independent of
the insured product, namely, adverse selection, moral hazard (Miranda 1991) and, in
the medium-long term, the ability of institutions and private agents to cope with
external shocks, such as climate change. Moreover, droughts are a systemic risk in
Table 5. Expected production value in a normal hydrological year (Vexp), Expected
Indemnity (IEp,s) and Basic Risk Premium (BRPp,s) for irrigated ligneous crops in La
Campin˜a.
Variable/crop
Prunus
armeniaca Cerasus
Citrus
reticulata
Malus
domestica
Citrus 6
sinensis
Olea
europaea Vitis
Irrigated
land (ha)
315 4685 2 997 4208 9087 11
Vexp (EUR) 1457 6626 11,467 3944 5840 2072 7828
IEp,s (EUR) 33 147 1212 39 597 10 14
BRPp,s 2.26% 2.22% 10.57% 0.98% 10.22% 0.50% 0.18%
Source: Authors’ research. Reference agronomic production functions were obtained from MARM (2010)
(all crops), SCRATS (2005) (citrus trees), Pastor et al. (2005) (Olea europaea), Almarza (1997) (Vitis) and
Pe´rez Pastor (2001) (Prunus armeniaca), Parra et al. (2009) (Malus domestica).
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which the risks of the different insured agents are correlated, which may result in
catastrophic losses (Bielza et al. 2008a, 2008b). These factors demand a certain
degree of public initiative (Rejda 2008). In any case, drought insurance for irrigation
still offers a better alternative than the baseline scenario, where drought losses are
compensated through costly emergency mechanisms that are entirely supported by
public institutions and without a water saving target.
Acknowledgements
The research leading to these results received funding from the European Union’s Seventh
Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n8 265213 (EPI-WATER -–
Evaluating Economic Policy Instruments for Sustainable Water Management in Europe) and
from the Spanish Association of Agrarian Insuring Firms (Agroseguro S.A.).
Notes
1. RBMPs are already in effect in every member state, with the exception of Belgium,
Greece, Portugal and Spain.
2. Unlike RBMPs, DMPs are not prescriptive, although they are available in several
southern European basins in Spain, Italy, Portugal and France, and also in Finland,
Netherlands and UK.
3. Only Spain, Italy, Austria and, recently, France have developed drought insurance
markets for rain-fed agriculture (Bielza et al. 2008b).
4. This figure refers to all of the Andalusian basins, which are the GRB, the Andalusian
Mediterranean Basins and the Andalusian Atlantic Basins. The GRB is the largest
Andalusian basin and with its 57,527 km2 covers 59.5% of the total surface of the region.
5. Although alternative insurance methods do exist, such as index financial products or
derivatives, they are still in their early stages and are usually experimental (Barnett et al.
2005, Bielza et al. 2008b).
6. Adverse selection is difficult to clear up in the case of index insurance, although it is easier
to resolve for tailored individual insurance plans, as happens in Europe. However, issues
of moral hazard in the EU are less important than in other areas because to receive
indemnity in the EU, it is necessary to ascertain which event caused the loss, whether the
damage affects a sufficiently significant area (that is, that the risk has not affected only
one individual farmer) and whether the insured or guaranteed yield can be corrected
according to the productive conditions of the insured farm (Bielza et al. 2008a).
Additionally, a deductible (17m) is applied to discourage this type of behavior (e.g. 15%
in France, 20–30% in Italy, 30% in Spain).
7. In most EU countries, including Spain, the insurance market is in the hands of no more
than three insurance companies, and this low competition may result in even higher
premiums.
8. Spanish river basins estimate TIR as the quantity of water required to meet the demand
of the 80th percentile of annual historical evapotranspiration, with a global efficiency of
the water provisioning system of 60%.
9. For values of TIR greater than 100%, the function is truncated and equal to 1.
10. MARMmethodology follows a combination of the Thornthwaite and Penman-Monteith
Methods (see, for example, Allen et al. 2006).
11. Effective rainfall (ER) is estimated using the Soil Conservation Service–USDA
methodology for Spain (Cuenca 1989), and it is a function of the humidity deficit
(f(D)), rainfall (p) and evapotranspiration (ET). It is measured in annual mm:
ER ¼ g(p) ¼ f (D)  [1.25 p0.824 7 2.93]  100.000955  ET.
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Annex: Summary of variables and parameters
Variable Description
p Rainfall (mm)
s Water stored in reservoirs (percentage over the storage capacity)
y ¼ z(pja,b) Gamma PDF
w ¼ j(sja,b) Weibull PDF
a Scale parameter, Gamma PDF
b Shape parameter, Gamma PDF
c Scale parameter, Weibull PDF
d Shape parameter, Weibull PDF
TIR Quantity of water required for irrigation according to the crops present in
the sub-basin and their historical evapotranspiration data
h(p,s) Percentage of TIR satisfied under traditional decision rules
h Percentage of TIR satisfied under the DMP decision rules
lp,s Water restriction variable resulting from the combination of h(p,s) and h
TIRr Percentage of TIR satisfied
ET Expected crop evapotranspiration
ER ¼ g(p) Effective rainfall
WR Irrigation water requirements
es Overall efficiency of the irrigation system
EIR(p,s) Effective irrigation resources
%ET Percentage of ET satisfied
q(p,s) Probability of %ET
EET Expected evapotranspiration satisfaction
ID Expected irrigation deficit
PotGW Expected potential groundwater depletion
Qp,s Agronomic production function (kg)
k Other variables in the production function, which are assumed constant
P Average prices over 10 years
Vp,s Production value
Vexp Expected production value in a normal hydrological year (without drought)
a(p) Dichotomous variable 7 Drought threshold
m Maximum indemnity (% over Vexp)
IND(p,s) Indemnity
IEp,s Expected indemnity
BRPp,s Basic risk premium
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Abstract: Recurrent water deficits in various arid and semi-arid Mediterranean basins are 
largely covered by illegal groundwater abstractions uncontrolled by the water authorities. 
Aquifers thus play the role of buffer stocks and are used by farmers as a reliable, though 
informal, insurance system. This has led to continuous groundwater depletion and 
increased scarcity and drought risk over the last few decades. An effective solution to this 
problem requires the replacement of this spontaneous, informal and uncoordinated 
insurance scheme with a formal and planned system that can be coordinated with the 
objective of reducing overexploitation. In this paper we develop a methodology to 
estimate the fair risk premium  and the potential water savings associated with drought 
insurance for irrigated agriculture. This method is illustrated with its application to the 
Campo de Cartagena Agricultural District in the Segura River Basin (Spain). Results show 
that although the potential for illegal abstractions is high (9.5 hm
3
/year), the cost of the 
insurance system is ten times lower than the amount that risk-averse farmers are willing 
to pay for water security. This information may serve as the starting point for the design 
of a drought insurance system able to cope with other relevant institutional challenges. 
 
Keywords: Agriculture, Drought insurance, Drought Management Plan, Groundwater 
Stochastic models. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Water scarcity is the most pressing environmental issue in EU Mediterranean areas. This 
situation is to a large extent attributable to irrigated agriculture, which in less than 50 
years has doubled its surface and now represents between 70% and 80% of total water 
use (Massarutto, 2003; EEA, 2009). Although irrigation expansion has significantly 
enhanced agricultural income, it has also increased the water dependency of the sector 
and has progressively brought water demand closer to water supply, thus making 
agriculture more vulnerable to drought. This has generated powerful incentives for illegal 
water abstractions, which have increased along with drought frequency and intensity 
(WWF, 2006a; 2006b). Illegal abstractions may threaten the sustainability of the 
ecological system and are particularly difficult to control, since they are usually located 
over dependable and uncontrolled groundwater sources (Gómez & Pérez, 2012). As 
groundwater stocks have been depleted, water scarcity has become chronic and policy 
makers have called for measures to reduce overexploitation and increase water security.  
However, the effectiveness of these measures has been burdened so far by the prevailing 
paradigm that considers water demand as an exogenous variable outside the field of 
water policy. A direct consequence of this paradigm is that water policy has been mostly 
based on expensive supply oriented policies, such as the construction of major 
infrastructure or the modernization of irrigation devices, which paradoxically have ended 
up increasing water use, reducing water availability and undermining the robustness and 
resilience of the system and its ability to cope with future droughts. More recently, the 
high costs of supply policies in a time of crisis and the continuous increase in water use 
have forced EU authorities to implement command and control (C&C) policies. Unlike 
traditional supply policies, C&C policies introduce clear water abstraction rules to avoid 
overexploitation during droughts (Drought Management Plans, DMPs) and new coercive 
mechanisms to enforce these rules (River Basin Management Plans, RBMPs) (CHS, 2008; 
2013). However, although these policies increase the likelihood of detecting and 
penalizing offenders, they do not alter the existing incentives behind illegal water use, 
which in some irrigated areas may generate profits that exceed the potential costs of 
being detected. Accordingly, C&C policies may be mostly ineffective in areas where the 
income gap between irrigated agriculture and rainfed agriculture is large, as is the case in 
many Mediterranean areas (Mendelsohn & Saher, 2011). 
At present, economic instruments are gaining momentum as an alternative means of 
reducing water use. Economic instruments were first introduced into the EU water policy 
agenda through Article 9 of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), dedicated to water 
pricing (EC, 2000)  Economic instruments can be defined as incentives designed and 
implemented with the purpose of adapting individual decisions to collectively agreed 
goals (e.g. the environmental objectives of the WFD). There is a diverse range of 
economic instruments being applied in different EU member states, including tariffs for 
water services, trading schemes or voluntary agreements, among others. On the other 
hand, there are other economic instruments that are still being investigated and for 
which there is no available ex-post evidence on their performance. In these cases, an ex-
ante assessment is necessary to determine whether or not they are implementable, and 
if so, if they will produce the desired environmental outcome. This is the case with 
drought insurance for irrigated agriculture.  
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The EU has mostly classic, individually tailored agricultural insurance schemes (e.g., yield 
insurance in the case of drought insurance for rainfed agriculture). Although alternative 
collective insurance schemes such as index-based or financial derivative products have 
been explored, they have not succeeded so far due to a series of problems
1
 (Bielza et al., 
2008b). Agricultural insurance in the EU is generally private, although a certain degree of 
public support is necessary in a number of cases (as with drought insurance). Competition 
is low and in many countries the market is in the hands of no more than two or three 
insurance companies, who may operate within a pool and assume the risk in a co-
insurance regime. In general, the development of agricultural insurance in the EU 
member states is heterogeneous and depends on the risk level faced by each country and 
the financial support for the insurance system by the public sector (Bielza et al., 2008a). 
Drought insurance for irrigated agriculture may have the capacity to improve drought 
management and reduce illegal overexploitation in EU Mediterranean areas. This system 
guarantees a stable agricultural income during droughts so that the incentives for 
groundwater depletion are reduced. Accordingly, drought insurance may replace the 
current scheme in which farmers are transferring their individual risk to water 
ecosystems and thus to future generations by a formal risk-sharing scheme based on 
intra-generational and voluntary agreements. However, this mechanism requires a 
proper institutional set-up in which data on piezometric levels are transparent and up to 
date, drought indicators are objective, water users are sensitive to the overexploitation 
problem and drought insurance systems for irrigated agriculture are implementable. 
While the implementation of the DMPs and RBMPs has served to make relevant progress 
with the first three preconditions (CHS, 2008; 2013), the latter is still pending since 
drought insurance for irrigated agriculture does not exist in Europe (Bielza et al., 2008a). 
The main problem for the development of drought insurance for irrigated agriculture is 
related to the systemic nature of droughts. Droughts may affect large areas and 
consequently drought indemnity in profitable irrigated areas may result in unaffordable 
losses for a conventional insurer. In addition, insurance markets are usually plagued with 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and drought insurance for irrigated 
agriculture is no exception. Nonetheless, insurance systems have developed strategies to 
reduce the impact of these problems: moral hazards can be significantly reduced with the 
establishment of a deductible of the insured product that avoids full loss recovery, and 
thus the existence of individual strategic behavior; the adverse selection problem can be 
addressed within the so-called combined insurance scheme — a system that offers 
                                                          
1
 Index-based products are best suited for homogeneous areas where all farms 
have highly correlated yields (for example, in the Corn Belt in the USA). Given 
the heterogeneity of climates, geography and production systems in many EU 
countries, the efficiency of index-based products is lower here. In addition, time 
series of yield losses in the EU are often only available at a regional level, 
comprising relatively large regions. Some of these regions (like Andalusia or 
Castile and León in Spain) are large and heterogeneous, making it difficult to 
create an index that can be used for all farmers in the region; in these cases, the 
use of yield data at a more disaggregated level would be advisable or even 
necessary. Finally, there are also some regulatory problems that may make 
index-based products incompatible with the Community directives (Bielza et al., 
2008b).  
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drought insurance only as a part of a comprehensive insurance package that covers a 
varied range of agricultural risks (not only those that are more likely to happen) and thus 
reduces the uncertainty for the insurer; and the systemic risk is tackled with public 
support
2
. These strategies have made possible the development of drought insurance 
markets for rainfed agriculture in some EU countries (e.g., Austria, France, Italy and 
Spain) (Gómez et al., 2011).  
However, drought insurance for irrigated agriculture has not been developed, and 
drought losses in irrigated areas in these countries are covered through expensive and 
publicly supported emergency funds (Meuwissen et al., 2003; Rejda, 2008). It thus seems 
that the main explanation for the absence of drought insurance for irrigated agriculture in 
the EU has more to do with insufficient institutional development than with the cost, 
which would actually be lower for the public sector than with the current system. Indeed, 
drought insurance for irrigated agriculture is increasingly regarded in some member 
states as an inexpensive means of compensating farmers and reducing illegal abstractions 
in an economic context marked by budget cuts. For example, preliminary negotiations 
between the insuring firms and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environmental 
Affairs are already ongoing in Spain (Representatives of the Spanish Association of 
Agrarian Insuring Firms, personal communication) 
In such a policy context, assessing the implementability and advancing the potential 
water savings that can be attained through drought insurance for irrigated agriculture 
becomes of paramount importance. This paper presents a methodology which combines 
a stochastic water availability model, a decision model and site-specific agronomic 
production functions in order to estimate i) the potential water savings and ii) the fair risk 
premium that would stem from a hypothetical drought insurance market. The fair risk 
premium is the quotient of the expected indemnity (which is equivalent to the share of 
the yield losses effectively compensated by the insurer
3
, measured in constant prices
4
) to 
the production value in a normal hydrological year (i.e. without drought), and can be 
interpreted as the minimum long-term cost for this scheme to be provided by a 
competitive and risk-neutral insurance firm. Thus, it is a crucial value in assessing the 
financial viability of private drought insurance for irrigated agriculture. It is important to 
note that the fair risk premium is a first step in the development of drought insurance 
markets for irrigated agriculture and does not imply that the final risk premium will be 
close to this value; as stated above, this will depend on the incidence of the moral hazard, 
adverse selection and systemic risk problems and on the availability of public support. 
                                                          
2
 For example, in Spain catastrophic losses are covered by the Insurance 
Compensation Consortium. The Consortium assumes cover for the extraordinary 
risks on a subsidiary basis and will pay indemnification when a private insurer 
has assumed cover and is subsequently not able to settle claims. The Consortium 
is funded via a surcharge on insurance policies and a fixed percentage of every 
premium contracted by insurance companies is paid to the organization. 
3
 Insurance systems compensate only a fraction of the yield losses. This avoids 
full loss recovery and thus reduces the incidence of moral hazard. 
4
 Neither income insurance (price, yield and costs) nor revenue insurance (price 
and yield) exist in the European Union, where yield insurance prevails (Bielza et 
al., 2008a). As a result price variability is not considered in our model. 
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This methodology is illustrated by applying it to the irrigated ligneous crops
5
 in the 
Campo de Cartagena Agricultural District in the Segura River Basin (Spain). 
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we introduce the area where the case 
study is applied — the Campo de Cartagena Agricultural District. Section 3 presents the 
methodology used to estimate the fair premium risk, and Section 4 presents the results 
obtained. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. THE CASE STUDY AREA: CAMPO DE CARTAGENA IN THE SEGURA RIVER BASIN 
(SPAIN) 
 
The Campo de Cartagena Agricultural District is located in the Segura River Basin (SRB) in 
the south-east of Spain (see Figure 1). The SRB is a good example of the abovementioned 
trends. In order to reduce water scarcity, supply side policies have been common in the 
basin. This has included the construction of dams and canals, intense irrigation 
modernization within the framework of the National Irrigation Plan 2000-2008 and, more 
importantly, the construction of a massive water transfer in the 1970s with the capacity 
to transfer up to 600 million cubic meters (or cubic hectometers, hm
3
) per year from the 
Tagus’ headwaters to the SRB, known as the Tagus-Segura Water Transfer (CHS, 2013). 
However, none of these infrastructures delivered the expected outcome, and water use 
continued to increase and eventually exceeded water supply. More recently, C&C policies 
have complemented traditional supply policies. As a result, the SRB has already approved 
its DMP (CHS, 2008) and is about to publish its RBMP, for which there is already a 
preliminary report available(CHS, 2013).  
The SRB has traditionally been an overexploited basin. Many hydrogeological units in the 
basin were declared overexploited in the 1980s (CHS, 2013) and several restrictions to 
water use have been formally established since. This includes a prohibition on issuing 
additional water rights for irrigation since 1986 (CHS, 2013). However, between 1990 and 
2000 irrigated surface grew at an average rate of 6,500 ha/year, and currently only 
155,313 ha of the 225,356 ha under irrigation in the Region of Murcia (comprising 71.4% 
of the total irrigated land in the SRB) has formal water rights (IDR-UCLM, 2005). At the 
same time water use for irrigation, which amounts to 89% of overall water use (CHS, 
2013), continued growing steadily: in 2003, the ratio between water abstraction and 
renewable resources in the river basin was an alarming 1.27; by 2009, this ratio had shot 
up to 2.5, denoting one of the most serious cases of overexploitation in Europe (EEA, 
2009; CHS, 2013). In spite of the development of a new regulatory framework based on 
the SRB’s DMP and RBMP, the economic and political cost of enforcing water use rights is 
recognized as prohibitive given the high income from irrigated lands, which in Campo de 
Cartagena is 80 times larger than from rainfed agriculture (Maestu et al., 2008). As a 
result, illegal abstractions have continued and the SRB accumulated groundwater 
overexploitation now amounts to 7,000 million cubic meters (hm
3
), including aquifers 
whose resources have been exhausted to such a degree that, even in the absence of 
                                                          
5
 Ligneous crops refers to crops from woody plants (i.e. plants that produce 
wood as their structural tissue) which includes trees and shrubs (fruit and berry 
trees, bushes, vines, olive trees). 
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more abstractions, it would take more than a century for them to completely recover 
(CHS, 2008).  
Campo de Cartagena, in the Sistema Cuenca Sub-basin of the SRB, is an agricultural 
district with approximately 13,000 ha of irrigated ligneous crops (28.9% of the total 
irrigated land), of which 39% is devoted to citrus trees. Water use for irrigation amounts 
to 58 hm
3
 in a normal hydrological year, of which 16.7 hm
3
/year is supplied by the 
aquifers in the area (Campo de Cartagena, Mazarrón, Sierra de Cartagena and Triásico de 
Carrascoy, see Figure 1). Since Campo de Cartagena does not possess a stable supply of 
surface water (rivers in the area are non-perennial), aquifers are severely overexploited 
and on average 36% of the formal groundwater abstractions are non-renewable (CHS, 
2008). In addition, illegal abstractions during drought incidence are widespread, in spite 
of the high abstraction costs. This is explained by the profitability of local agriculture, 
which is one of the most productive areas of Spain (Pérez et al., 2011). In this context, the 
implementation of drought insurance for irrigated agriculture may serve to significantly 
reduce the cost of controlling illegal abstractions.  
 
Figure 1: Location of the Segura River Basin in the Iberian Peninsula and detail of the 
Campo de Cartagena Agricultural District. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The fair risk premium is the key element in the design of any commercial insurance and is 
estimated as the ratio between the expected indemnity (a function of the expected yield 
losses described above) and the expected yield value in a reference year (in this case, a 
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normal hydrological year). The expected indemnity and agricultural production are 
estimated from an assessment of the historical evolution of the insured product (Martin 
et al., 2001), in this case water availability, and its impact on the agricultural output 
through the use of agronomic production functions. We follow the standard procedure 
which makes the production functions dependent only on water availability, assuming 
the remaining variables to be constant (Pérez et al., 2011). The methodology that we 
present below allows the calculation of the expected indemnity and the expected 
agricultural production, as well as the resultant fair risk premium, through the 
development of a risk-production model which depends on three stochastic variables 
(rainfall, runoff and stock), institutional decision rules, site-specific agronomic production 
functions and a set of agricultural and insurance market variables. The model is made up 
of five stages: 
i) The first stage calculates the amount of water available in different 
scenarios and its associated probability, which is a function of the three 
stochastic variables: local rainfall (which satisfies plants’ water needs 
through the effective rainfall directly captured by crops) runoff, and the 
amount of water stored in the reservoirs in the whole basin (which are 
used to determine the amount of water delivered to the irrigation system) 
(CHS, 2008).  
ii) The second stage estimates the amount of water delivered to the irrigation 
system in accordance with runoff levels and stored water available and a 
set of decision rules (CHS, 2008). 
iii) The third stage first obtains the expected evapotranspiration. This value 
and the results in i) and ii) are used to calculate the percentage of 
evapotranspiration satisfied in each water availability scenario and the 
water demand in excess of available resources (irrigation deficit), which 
gives incentives to engage in illegal abstractions. 
iv) The fourth stage develops a deterministic agronomic model that estimates 
the yield (and yield value, using agricultural market variables) of every crop 
in each scenario as a function of the percentage of evapotranspiration 
satisfied obtained in iii).  
v) Finally the fair risk premium is estimated as the ratio of the expected 
drought indemnity to the expected production value, taking into account 
some special features of the drought insurance markets traditionally used 
to limit the impact of systemic risk and asymmetric information. 
 
3.1. First Stage: Water availability 
In Campo de Cartagena the water authority assigns the irrigation resources accounting 
for the amount of water stored in the reservoirs of the SRB and the basin’s annual runoff 
(CHS, 2008). Consequently, water availability in Campo de Cartagena is a function of the 
local rainfall and of the annual runoff and water stored in the reservoirs of the whole 
basin. Local rainfall is much lower than in other locations within the basin and has a 
negligible incidence over total runoff or water stock in the SRB due to the downstream 
location of Campo Cartagena. Thus, we consider rainfall as an independent variable. On 
the other hand, although the reservoirs of the SRB are partially dependent on the SRB’s 
runoff, a large share of the water stored in the reservoirs comes from external resources 
transferred from the Tagus’ headwaters through the Tagus-Segura Water Transfer, which 
has the capacity to transfer 600 hm
3
/year (as compared with the SRB average runoff of 
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650 hm
3
/year) (CHS, 2013). In turn, the amount of water transferred from the Tagus River 
Basin (TRB) is a complex decision which depends on a discretionary assessment made by 
institutions based on the runoff and the water stored in the reservoirs of the TRB (CHS, 
2008). In addition, the SRB is an extensively regulated basin and its reservoirs have the 
capacity to store up to 1,141 hm
3
 (1.75 times the average runoff), which means that its 
surface water stored depends not only on annual runoff and water transfers, but also on 
the runoff and transfers (and thus on the runoff and surface water stored in the TRB) of 
preceding years. Consequently, the link between runoff in the SRB and surface stored 
water in the SRB is weak and we treat both variables as independent.   
In the following sections we obtain the probability density functions (PDF) of the three 
relevant variables (rainfall, runoff and surface water stored) in order to determine the 
probability associated with each level of water availability.  
3.1.1. Rainfall 
Rainfall is a stochastic variable which can be adjusted to a PDF. This allows assigning a 
probability (ݕ ൌ ݖሺ݌ሻ) to each rainfall level (݌). Climatological research has supported the 
use of a gamma distribution to characterize the distribution of climatological variables  
exhibiting a physical lower bound of zero but no upper bound, such as precipitation or 
runoff (Martin et al., 2001; [Yue et al., 2001; Scholzel & Friederichs, 2008). Accordingly, 
we obtain the rainfall PDF as the best fit gamma function of the following type: ݕ ൌ ݖሺ݌ȁܽǡ ܾሻ ൌ ଵ௕ೌ௰ሺ௔ሻ ݌௔ିଵሺି௣௕ ሻ     [1] 
where a and b are, respectively, the scale and the shape parameters. Table 1 presents the 
maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) of the parameters. We use rainfall data for the 
Campo de Cartagena Agricultural District in the period 1941-2008 (AEMET, 2012). 
 
Table 1: Rainfall gamma function. The dependent variable is mm of rainfall per year. 
Variable Coefficient 
a (scale) 16.358
a
 
(2.821) 
b (shape) 22.9964
a
  
(2.286) 
No. of observations 68  
Estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a: significant at 1 the per cent level.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration from MARM, 2009b 
 
3.1.2. Runoff 
Annual runoff in our model is measured as a percentage over the storage capacity of the 
reservoirs in the river basin. As with rainfall, we adjust the runoff to a gamma PDF (see 
discussion above). This allows assigning a probability (ݍ ൌ ݂ሺݎȁܽǡ ܾሻ) to each runoff level 
(ݎ). The gamma function can be represented as follows: 
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ݍ ൌ ݂ሺݎȁܽǡ ܾሻ ൌ ଵ௕ೌ௰ሺ௔ሻ ݎ௔ିଵሺି௥௕ ሻ     [2] 
where a and b are, respectively, the scale and the shape parameters. Table 2 shows the 
best fit parameters for the runoff function. We use runoff data for the SRB in the period 
1941-2008 (MARM, 2008). 
 
Table 2: Annual runoff gamma function. The dependent variable is the percentage of 
annual runoff over the total surface water storage capacity.
 
Variable Coefficient 
a (scale) 6.1813
a
 
(1.088) 
b (shape) 0.1143
a 
(0.012) 
No. of observations 68 
Estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a: significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from MARM, 2008 
 
 
3.1.3. Water stored in reservoirs 
Surface water stored is usually closely linked to runoff and rainfall patterns, and thus 
could also be adjusted using a gamma PDF (Scholzel & Friederichs, 2008). However, this is 
not the case in interconnected and extensively regulated basins, where the link between 
surface water stored and runoff is weak. Spanish south-eastern river basins like the 
Segura and Andalusian Mediterranean River Basins and some areas of the Guadalquivir 
and Júcar river basins are a good example of this type of water management. In these 
cases, the literature supports the use of Weibull functions for the adjustment of surface 
stored water PDFs.  (Gómez-Ramos et al., 2002; Pérez et al., 2011; Gómez & Pérez, 2012). 
A Weibull function assigns a probability (ݓ) to each amount of surface water stored (ݏ), 
measured as a percentage over the dam storage capacity (DSC) of the SRB. The Weibull 
function can be represented as follows: ݓ ൌ ݆ሺݏȁܽǡ ܾሻ ൌ ௕௔ ቀ௔௕ቁ௕ିଵ ൬െቀ௦௔ቁ௕൰     [3] 
Table 3 shows the MLEs of the parameters in the function above. We use data on the 
water levels of the reservoirs in the SRB during the period 1941-2008 (MARM, 2008). 
These data are then aggregated to obtain a synthetic index of the total surface water 
stored as a percentage over the DSC of the SRB dams, which is the dependent variable in 
the function above: 
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Table 3: Surface water stored: Weibull function. The dependent variable is the 
percentage of dam-stored water over dam storage capacity (DSC). 
 
Variable Coefficient 
a (scale) 0.3411
a
 
(0.063) 
b (shape) 4.1286
a
 
(0.497) 
No. of observations 68 
Estimated maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a: significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from MARM, 2008. 
 
 
3.2.  Decision rules 
At the beginning of every irrigation season, the water authority estimates the amount of 
water required for irrigation (ܶܫܴ)6 according to the crops present in the sub-basin and 
their historical evapotranspiration data. Then, the water authority assesses annual runoff 
and water availability in the reservoirs (CHS, 2008) and determines the percentage of  ܶܫܴ that will be effectively satisfied (݄).  
Traditionally, the percentage of  ܶܫܴ  effectively satisfied has followed discretional 
decision rules. This situation changed with the approval of the DMPs, which clearly 
establish a set of drought thresholds with specific restrictions associated. Nonetheless, 
DMPs still offer the possibility to follow discretional criteria during exceptional junctures 
(e.g. during extreme droughts or after a lasting drought, to speed up the recovery) (CHS, 
2013), so actually both decision rules are in force.  
3.2.1. Traditional decision rules to determine water delivery for irrigation 
In contrast with the situation created by the recently approved DMPs, the decision rules 
followed until now have been the result of a combination of social agreements, opinions 
of expert judges and discretion, with no written rules to be applied in any case, 
depending on the water available for the crop season. To formalize these decisions, we 
use the available data on the amount of water effectively delivered to farmers measured 
as a percentage of  ܶܫܴ satisfied. The available data span a range of 15 years (1992 to 
2007) (CHS, 2008). We found that the only relevant variable explaining the percentage of ܶܫܴ  satisfied in the past has been the runoff (ݎ ). The relationship between the 
percentage of  ܶܫܴ satisfied (݄) and runoff (ݎ) is linear (݄ ൌ ݄ሺݎሻ) (Gómez-Ramos et al., 
2002). The parameters of the function are estimated using ordinary least squares
7
. 
 
                                                          
6
 Spanish river basins estimate TIR as the amount of water required to cover the 
80
th
 percentile of annual historical evapotranspiration with a global efficiency of 
the water provisioning system of 60%.  
7
 For values of ܶܫܴ over 100%, the function is truncated and equals 1. 
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Table 4: Irrigation resources estimation under the traditional decision rules. The 
dependent variable is a percentage of TIR conceded in the SRB. 
Variable Coefficient 
Runoff (percentage over 
dam storage capacity) 
1.351
a
 
(.131) 
R2 89.14 
Adjusted R2 88.31 
No. of observations 15 
Estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a: significant at 1 the per cent level. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from CHS (2010b) 
 
3.2.2. DMP decision rules over water for irrigation 
The recently approved DMP for the SRB quantifies the particular situation at hand and 
the severity of the problem by using an objective and publicly observable drought index 
dependent on the values of the annual runoff and stock (ܫ௘ሺݎǡ ݏሻ). The drought index is 
calculated as follows (CHS, 2013): 
ܫ௘ ൌ ቐଵଶ ቀͳ ൅ ஻೔ି஻೘೐೏஻೘ೌೣି஻೘೔೙ቁ ǡ ݂݅ܤ௜ ൒ ܤ௠௘ௗଵଶ ቀ ஻೔ି஻೘೔೙஻೘೐೏ି஻೘೔೙ቁ ǡ ݂݅ܤ௜ ൏ ܤ௠௘ௗ   [4] 
where ܤ௜ is an indicator that is unique for each sub-basin. In Sistema Cuenca, Campo de 
Cartagena’s corresponding sub-basin, ܤ௜ is obtained as follows: ܤ௜ ൌ ଶכ஽ௌ஼כ௥ା஽ௌ஼כ௦ଷ   [5] 
where ݎ is the annual runoff as a percentage of the total dam storage capacity (ܦܵܥ) and ݏ is water stock in reservoirs as a percentage of the total ܦܵܥ. Using ݎ and ݏ maximum, 
minimum and average values during the reference period, we obtain  ܤ௠௔௫ǡ ܤ௠௜௡and ܤ௠௘ௗ, respectively. 
The DMP establishes the following four drought thresholds: i) when water stored levels 
are regarded as normal (ܫ௘ ൐ ͲǤͷ), there are no explicit restrictions, and thus the 
percentage of  ܶܫܴ effectively satisfied (݄) is the same as in the baseline or traditional 
decision rules scenario (݄ ൌ ݄ሺݎሻ); ii) water for irrigation is reduced by 10% (݄ ൌ ͲǤͻ) 
when available water falls below the pre-alert threshold (ͲǤ͵ͷ ൏ ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤͷ); iii) if the alert 
limits are exceeded (ͲǤʹ ൏ ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤ͵ͷ), water for irrigation is reduced by at least 25% 
(݄ ൌ ͲǤ͹ͷ); and iv) in emergency situations (ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤʹ), water for irrigation is halved 
(݄ ൌ ͲǤͷ) (CHS, 2008).  
3.2.3. Combined decision rules 
We define ݈௥ǡ௦ as a discrete water restriction variable whose value depends on the 
drought index (and thus on runoff and surface water stored values): 
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݈௥ǡ௦ ൌ ە۔
ۓ ሺ݄ሺݎሻǡ ͲǤͷሻǡ ݂݅ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤʹሺ݄ሺݎሻǡ ͲǤ͹ͷሻǡ ݂݅ͲǤʹ ൏ ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤ͵ͷሺ݄ሺݎሻǡ ͲǤͻሻǡ ݂݅ͲǤ͵ͷ ൏ ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤͷ݄ሺݎሻǡ ݂݅ܫ௘ ൐ ͲǤͷ      [6] 
Water delivered for irrigation is thus a function of runoff and water stored in reservoirs 
(ܶܫܴݎሺݎǡ ݏሻ): ܶܫܴݎሺݎǡ ݏሻ ൌ ݈௥ǡ௦ כ ܶܫܴ     [7] 
3.3. Third stage: Evapotranspiration satisfaction, irrigation deficit and illegal 
abstractions 
We measure the expected crop evapotranspiration (ܧܶ, in mm) for every irrigated 
ligneous crop in La Campiña according to the Spanish Ministry of Environment standard 
method, using data for the period 1941-2009 (MARM, 2011)
8
. The evapotranspiration 
thus obtained is partially covered by effective rainfall (ܧܴ, in mm). ܧܴ is a function of 
stochastic rainfall (݌), whose PDF was obtained in [1], and a series of parameters which 
can be safely assumed to be constant
9
: ܧܴ ൌ ݃ሺ݌ሻ    [8] 
The part of evapotranspiration (ܧܶ) that is not covered by effective rainfall is the 
irrigation water requirements (ܹܴ, in mm): ܹܴ ൌ ܧܶ െ ݃ሺ݌ሻ     [9] ܹܴ can either be satisfied with irrigation or left uncovered, depending on the available 
water resources and the decision rules in force. The total amount of water delivered for 
irrigation was obtained in the previous section (ܶܫܴݎሺݎǡ ݏሻ). Nonetheless, only a fraction 
of the ܶܫܴݎሺݎǡ ݏሻ effectively contributes to satisfying evapotranspiration due to water 
losses during the abstraction, transportation and irrigation processes. The effective 
irrigation resources (ܧܫܴሺݎǡ ݏሻ), or the part of the irrigation resources that effectively 
satisfy evapotranspiration, is a function of ܶܫܴݎሺݎǡ ݏሻ and the overall efficiency of the 
irrigation system (݁௦௬௦), which is around 87% in Campo de Cartagena (CHS, 2008): ܧܫܴሺݎǡ ݏሻ ൌ ܶܫܴݎሺݎǡ ݏሻ כ ݁௦௬௦    [10] 
The percentage of the evapotranspiration satisfied (Ψܧܶ) for a random year with a given 
rainfall (݌), runoff (ݎ) and water stored in reservoirs (ݏ) can now be obtained from the 
previous equations, as follows:  
                                                          
8
 MARM methodology follows a combination of the Thornthwaite and Penman-
Monteith Methods (see, for example, Allen et al., 2006).  
9
 Effective rainfall (ER) is estimated using the Soil Conservation Service–USDA 
methodology for Spain (Cuenca, 1989), which is a function of the humidity 
deficit (f(D)) (whose value for the SRB can be taken from Cuenca (1989)), rainfall 
(p) and expected evapotranspiration (ET) (constant). It is measured in annual 
mm: ܧܴ ൌ ݃ሺ݌ሻ
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Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣ ൌ ௚ሺ௣ሻାாூோሺ௥ǡ௦ሻா்      [11] 
Each Ψܧܶ value has an associated probability (ݑሺݎǡ ݏǡ ݌ሻ), which depends on the stock (s), 
runoff (r) and rainfall (p) values for that year. Using expressions [1], [2] and [3] this 
probability can be expressed as follows: ݑሺݎǡ ݏǡ ݌ሻ ൌ ݑሺݎÇݏÇ݌ሻ ൌ ݂ሺݎሻ כ ݖሺ݌ሻ כ ݆ሺݏሻ     [12] 
Finally, the expected evapotranspiration satisfaction (ܧா்) and the resultant expected 
irrigation deficit (ܫܦ ) and expected potential for illegal groundwater abstractions 
(ܲ݋ݐܩܹ) are defined as follows: ܧா் ൌ ׬ ׬ ׬ ሾݖሺ݌ሻ כ ݃ሺ݌ሻ ൅ ݂ሺݎሻ כ ݆ሺݏሻ כ ܧܫܴሺݎǡ ݏሻሿ௠௔௫ೞ௦ୀ଴௠௔௫೛௣ୀ଴௠௔௫ೝ௥ୀ଴      [13] ܫܦ ൌ ܧܶ െ ܧா்     [14] 
 ܲ݋ݐܩܹ ൌ ூ஽௘೒ೢ     [15] 
Where ݉ܽݔ௥, ݉ܽݔ௣ and ݉ܽݔ௦ are the values of the variables ݎ, ݌ and ݏ that make the 
cumulative density function equal to 1 (i.e. the probability of any value above this limit is 
zero),  ݁௚௪is the efficiency of illegal groundwater abstractions in the SRB, estimated at 
25% (CHS, 2008). 
3.4.  Fourth stage: Agronomic production functions and production value 
The agronomic production of a given crop depends largely on available water, either from 
rainfall or irrigation (Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣). However, making the production function of a crop 
dependent only on the evapotranspiration satisfied suggests the exclusion of other 
variables that may affect the production function (soil type, fertilizers and 
phytosanitaries, climatic variables, etc.). On the other hand if we consider this set of 
variables to be constant (݇) it is still possible to develop sound and rigorous agronomic 
production functions that provide results close to observed values (SCRATS, 2005; Pérez 
et al., 2011). Thus we obtain the agronomic production in kg/ha (ܳ௥ǡ௦ǡ௣): ܳ௥ǡ௦ǡ௣ ൌ ݂ሺΨܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣ǡ ݇ሻ     [16] 
The reference agronomic production functions for the crops considered are obtained 
after a comprehensive bibliographical review (Almarza, 1997; Pérez-Pastor, 2001; 
SCRATS, 2005; Alarcón et al., 2006; Mañas et al., 2007; Vivas Cacho, 2010). In the cases 
where there are no site-specific production functions available, production functions are 
adapted to the characteristics of the area of the case study (SCRATS, 2005; MARM, 2010). 
To do so it is assumed that the local characteristics have fixed effects that shift the 
reference agronomic production functions but maintain their elasticity and marginal 
productivity. The resultant production functions are quadratic:  ܳ௥ǡ௦ǡ௣ ൌ ݔଵ כ Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣ଶ ൅ ݔଶ כ Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣ ൅ ݔଷሺ݇ሻ     [17] 
Where Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣߳ሾͲǡ ͳሿ. ݔଵ  and ݔଶ  are the parameters that determine the impact of 
water availability over the agronomic production and ݔଷሺ݇ሻ is a constant that captures 
the effect that the remaining variables (݇, assumed constant) have over the agronomic 
production. For all the crops it is considered that the agronomic production is null when 
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Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣ falls below 50% (SCRATS, 2005)10. This value is increased to 70% for citrus trees 
and 85% for Pyrus communis and Prunus persica. Then we obtain the value of the 
production, which is the product of agronomic production (ܳ௥ǡ௦ǡ௣) times the updated 
average prices of the last 10 years (ܲ)11 (MARM, 2007).  
௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ ൌ ܳ௥ǡ௦ǡ௣ כ ܲ     [19] 
During a normal hydrological year without drought (i.e. when Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣ ൌ ͳͲͲΨ), we 
refer to the agronomic production as normal agronomic production (ܳ௡௢௥௠). Accordingly, 
the production value in a normal hydrological year is denominated as the normal 
production value ( ௡ܸ௢௥௠).  
3.5.  Fifth stage: Fair risk premium 
The key element of any insurance market is the estimation of the fair risk premium that, 
given the likelihood of a catastrophic event, guarantees a certain level of coverage for the 
insured with no losses for the insurer in the medium-long term. The fair risk premium is 
thus obtained as the quotient of the expected indemnity (ܫܧ) to the production value in a 
normal hydrological year without drought ( ௡ܸ௢௥௠). The latter has already been obtained 
in the previous section; in what follows, we estimate the expected indemnity for drought 
insurance in irrigated agriculture.  
The indemnity conceded by a drought insurance system in the EU after a drought is 
subject to two prerequisites:  
i) First, the drought must be institutionally acknowledged. This is of crucial 
importance for private insurers, as financial public support is only available 
when a drought is institutionally declared. In Spain, a drought is officially 
declared when the DMP comes into force (i.e., there is a prealert, alert or 
emergency state) and irrigation restrictions are implemented. In the 
particular case of the SRB, this happens when  ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤͷ. We generate a 
dichotomous variable, ݐ௥ǡ௦ , to include this condition in our model: ൜ݐሺݎǡ ݏሻ ൌ ͳǡ ݂݅ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤͷݐሺݎǡ ݏሻ ൌ Ͳǡ ݂݅ܫ௘ ൐ ͲǤͷ     [20] 
ii) Second,  insurance systems cover at most a fraction of the yield losses, in 
order to avoid moral hazard. This means that a deductible (Ɋ) applies. In 
                                                          
10
 Actually, there is no data on production values for any species for Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣below 50% (70% for citrus trees). Below this value, water availability is 
not enough for agricultural production, and may even put at risk the survival of 
ligneous crops (SCRATS, 2005). Moreover, DMPs consider ligneous crops a 
priority use (only after household and environmental supply) and guarantee a 
minimum water supply to avoid catastrophic losses. As a result of this, once 
calibrated the quadratic functions of these species may show a negative 
agronomic production under extreme droughts. We rule out this possibility and 
for production values < 0, the function is truncated and equals 0. 
11
 In the EU, drought insurance systems insure only yield losses, excluding price 
variability. As a result, the yield/production value is obtained using constant 
prices. In the case of Spain, prices are assumed to be an average of the previous 
years (Bielza et al., 2008a;2008b; Gómez et al., 2011). 
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Spain this deductible is 30%, implying that a maximum of 70% (ͳ െ Ɋ) of 
the yield losses would be compensated by the insurer (Bielza, 2008b). For 
example, in an extreme situation in which all the yield is lost ( ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ ൌ Ͳ), 
the indemnity would equal 70% of the normal production value 
(ሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠) and thus 70% of the yield losses would be recovered. 
However, if there have been yield losses due to a drought ( ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ ൏ ௡ܸ௢௥௠) 
but the observed production value is still greater than or equal to this 
maximum compensation threshold ( ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ ൒ ሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠ ), the 
indemnity would be zero (0% loss recovery). Finally, if the production value 
is between Ͳ  and ሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠ , the indemnity would equal the 
maximum possible indemnity minus the observed production value 
(ሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠ െ ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣), meaning that the loss recovery ratio would be in 
the interval (0%, 70%). Indemnity in every possible scenario (ܫܰܦሺݎǡ ݏǡ ݌ሻ) 
is thus defined as follows: 
ܫܰܦሺݎǡ ݏǡ ݌ሻ ൌ ቐ ሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠ǡ ݂݅ ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ ൌ Ͳሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠ െ ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ǡ ݂݅Ͳ ൏ ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ ൏ ሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠Ͳǡ ݂݅ ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ ൒ ሺͳ െ Ɋሻ כ ௡ܸ௢௥௠      [21] 
 
Now we use the equations [20] and [21] and the PDFs obtained in Section 3.1 (equations 
[1], [2] and [3]) to obtain the expected indemnity (ܫܧ) for each crop: ܫܧ ൌ ׬ ׬ ׬ ሾݖሺ݌ሻ כ ݂ሺݎሻ כ ݆ሺݏሻ כ ܽሺݎǡ ݏሻ כ ܫܰܦሺݎǡ ݏǡ ݌ሻሿ௠௔௫ೞ௦ୀ଴௠௔௫೛௣ୀ଴௠௔௫ೝ௥ୀ଴      [22] 
where again  ݉ܽݔ௥, ݉ܽݔ௣ and ݉ܽݔ௦ are the values of the variables ݎ, ݌ and ݏ that make 
the cumulative density function equal to 1, and ݖሺ݌ሻǡ ݂ሺݎሻ and ݆ሺݏሻ are the probabilities 
for every value of ݌, ݎ and ݏ, respectively.  
Finally, the fair risk premium (ܨܴܲ) is obtained as follows:  ܨܴܲ ൌ ூா௏೙೚ೝ೘     [23] 
4. RESULTS 
The methodology above has been applied to the particular case of the Campo de 
Cartagena Agricultural District. First, we estimated the expected evapotranspiration 
satisfaction (ܧா்) and the subsequent expected irrigation deficit (ܫܦ) and expected 
potential for illegal groundwater abstractions (ܲ݋ݐܩܹ ). We estimated expected 
evapotranspiration satisfaction at 43.3 hm
3
/year, 92.3% of the total evapotranspiration of 
45.7 hm
3
/year. Accordingly, the expected irrigation deficit amounts to 2.4 hm
3
/year, 
which given the low efficiency of illegal groundwater abstractions results in an expected 
potential for illegal groundwater abstractions of 9.5 hm
3
/year (more than half of annual 
legal groundwater abstractions, estimated at 16.7 hm
3
). It is important to note that this is 
an expected value: for example, during emergency situations (ܫ௘ ൑ ͲǤʹ) the expected 
potential for illegal groundwater abstractions soars up to 38.8 hm
3
/year according to our 
model (while in normal hydrological years it is 0). ܲ݋ݐܩܹ can be interpreted as the potential of drought insurance to prevent illegal 
groundwater use during drought. Accordingly, a successful drought insurance system can 
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help to both stabilize farmers’ income and significantly improve the quantitative status of 
groundwater bodies. However, the viability of this system needs to be assessed first. This 
viability depends on the long-term cost of the drought insurance for the insurer (ܨܴܲ). In 
order to estimate the ܨܴܲ we start by calibrating the parameters of the agronomic 
production functions for the ligneous crops in the Campo de Cartagena Agricultural 
District. 
 
Table 5: Agronomic production functions, ligneous crops in Campo de Cartagena 
Agricultural District (kg/ha) 
 
Crop/Coeff. ݔଵ ݔଶ ݔଷ(݇) ܴଶ 
Prunus dulcis -7,796.7
 a
 15,609
 a
 1,346.7
 a
 0.89 
 
(364.2) (1680.6) (160.9) 
 
Prunus armeniaca 6,224.1
 a
 52.41
 a
 8,933.4
 a
 0.81 
 
(859.5) (6.5) (1395.3) 
 
Citrus × limon -16,967
 a
 53,265
 a
 -13,288
 a
 0.99 
 
(2282.6) (5874.9) (1601.2) 
 
Citrus reticulata -13,712
 a
 49,445
 a
 -12,335
 a
 0.92 
 
(1650.9) (5005.5) (583.4) 
 
Prunus persica -61,794
 a
 110,955
 a
 -24,804
 a
 0.86 
 
(6571.4) (13261.9) (3314.4) 
 
Citrus × sinensis -16,013
 a
 52,947
 a
 -13,208
 a
 0.93 
 
(2148.4) (6266.0) (1485.3) 
 
Pyrus communis -43,034
 a
 88,101
 a
 -25,626
 a
 0.79 
 
(4392.6) (9480.1) (3886.1) 
 
Vitis -11,918 
a
 23,859 
a
 2,058.4 
a
 0.83 
  (562.8) (3452.5) (313.6)   
 
Estimated by OLC. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a: significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration from MARM (2010) (all crops), SCRATS (2005) (citrus trees), Mañas et al. (2007) 
(Prunus dulcis), Almarza (1997) (Vitis), Alarcón et al. (2006) (Prunus persica), Vivas Cacho (2010) (Pyrus communis) 
and Pérez Pastor (2001) (Prunus armeniaca). 
 
Once the agronomic production functions have been calibrated, we apply the 
methodology above to obtain an estimation of the long-term cost of this scheme, both in 
absolute terms (expected indemnity, ܫܧ) and as a percentage over the production value 
in a normal hydrological year (fair risk premium, ܨܴܲ). The table below shows these 
results and also the intermediate values of the agronomic production (ܳ௡௢௥௠) and the 
production value ( ௡ܸ௢௥௠) in a normal hydrological year. Results are displayed for every 
ligneous crop in the Campo de Cartagena Agricultural District: 
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Table 6: Normal Agronomic Production (ࡽ࢔࢕࢘࢓), Normal Production Value (ࢂ࢔࢕࢘࢓), 
Expected Indemnity (ࡵࡱ) and Fair Risk Premium (ࡲࡾࡼ) for the ligneous crops in Campo 
de Cartagena Agricultural District. 
Variable/Crop 
Prunus 
dulcis 
Prunus 
armeniaca 
Citrus 
× 
limon 
Citrus 
reticulata 
Prunus 
persica 
Citrus × 
sinensis 
Pyrus 
communis 
Vitis  ܳ௡௢௥௠  
(kg/ha/year) 9 159 15 210 
23 
010 23 398 25 001 23 726 19 441 13 999 
௡ܸ௢௥௠  
(EUR/ha/year) 5 428 5 286 5 825 2 559 9 630 2 351 3 775 2 313 ܫܧ  
(EUR/ha/year) 0.5 49.7 213.2 233.6 13.5 199.4 5.3 0.2 ܨܴܲ (%) 0.01% 0.94% 3.66% 9.13% 0.14% 8.48% 0.14% 0.01% 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
Citrus trees have the highest ܨܴܲݏ: 9.1% for the Citrus reticulata, 8.5% for the Citrus × 
sinensis and 3.7% for the Citrus × limon. This is largely explained by their comparatively 
high drought vulnerability and the resultant high ܫܧ (which ranges between 199 and 234 
EUR/ha/year), which makes these crops the most expensive to insure. These results are 
particularly important as citrus trees are the most significant ligneous crops in Campo de 
Cartagena, representing 11% of the total irrigated surface and 39% of the surface of 
irrigated ligneous crops.   
The remaining fruit trees show lower ܨܴܲݏ. Prunus persica has the highest ௡ܸ௢௥௠, but a 
low vulnerability to drought and thus a low ܫܧ, which results in a ܨܴܲ of only 0.1%. 
Prunus armeniaca has a lower but still high ௡ܸ௢௥௠, a small ܫܧ and a  ܨܴܲ of 0.9%. Pyrus 
communis has a particularly low ܫܧ and a ܨܴܲ of 0.1%12. 
Finally, the lowest ܨܴܲ is that of the Vitis and the Prunus dulcis (0.01%). Vitis and Prunus 
dulcis have traditionally been rainfed crops in the SRB and this explains their higher 
drought resilience (ܫܧ  for the Prunus dulcis and Vitis is 0.5 and 0.2 EUR/ha/year, 
respectively) and their low  ܨܴܲ.  
The low ܨܴܲ of crops like Pyrus communis does not mean that they are not vulnerable to 
suffering drought losses; rather, this means that the largest losses appear in droughts 
with a low probability (very low local rainfall and low runoff and water stored 
                                                          
12
 Although both Pyrus communis and Prunus persica need a high Ψܧ ௥ܶǡ௦ǡ௣ 
(above 80%) in order to have a positive production, the total evapotranspiration 
of these crops (ܧܶ) is low and therefore the irrigation water requirements (ܹܴ) 
are low or even null during years with sufficient rainfall. As a result, the 
likelihood of suffering the impacts of a drought are more reduced than with 
crops with a higher ܧܶ, such as citrus trees.  
C.D. Pérez-Blanco and C.M. Gómez (2013) (in press)                                               18 
 
 
 
simultaneously). In any case, low ܨܴܲ crops are still vulnerable to moderate losses 
during likely droughts, and insurance can help to stabilize agricultural income. 
Nonetheless, the relatively low evapotranspiration of low ܨܴܲ crops implies that their 
potential to reduce illegal groundwater abstractions is limited (e.g. the irrigation water 
demand of Vitis is 47% of that of Citrus x limon). In comparison, the production value of 
water-intensive crops with high ܨܴܲ, such as citrus trees, may drop as much as 100% 
during likely droughts.  
All the FRPs obtained are at least ten times lower than the amount farmers in Southern 
Spain are willing to pay for water security, as estimated by Gutiérrez-Martín & Gómez 
(2011). This is consistent with economic theory, as there is considerable evidence 
showing that farmers are risk-averse individuals who are ready to pay in excess of their 
expected loss in order to have a more secure income (Torkamani & Haji-Rahimi, 2001; 
Binici et al., 2003; Tobarra & Castro, 2011). 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Water overexploitation, particularly from agriculture, is the most important 
environmental threat faced by EU Mediterranean areas. This problem is delaying the 
fulfillment of the environmental goals prescribed by Community law and is reducing or 
even stopping household water supply during drought occurrence, which are both 
priority objectives of the Water Framework Directive (EC, 2000). The authorities have 
tried to address this problem with the systematic implementation of supply and C&C 
policies. The most significant drawback of these policies is that they do not change the 
powerful incentives that drive water demand. For example, supply side policies that 
increase the availability of water resources have often been perceived by users as an 
opportunity to increase agricultural income (by shifting from rainfed to irrigated 
agriculture, for example) rather than as a chance to increase water security through the 
improvement of the quantitative status of overexploited water bodies. Consequently, 
these policies have backfired and have ended up reinforcing the trajectory of the system 
towards higher water scarcity and more frequent and intense droughts. 
An effective response to the problem of water overexploitation needs to put in place the 
necessary instruments to orientate individual voluntary choices towards the collectively 
agreed goal of improving the status of water bodies. In the particular case of illegal water 
abstractions in profitable irrigated areas, drought insurance may constitute a powerful 
economic instrument to reduce water use and transfer the cost of water security to 
intensive water users at an acceptable cost. In our case study area the implementation of 
drought insurance schemes would have the potential to save up to 9.5 hm
3
/year on 
average at a basic cost of less than 10% of the production value in a normal year.  
Although drought insurance for irrigated agriculture does not exist in Europe, the 
necessary conditions for its development in drought-sensitive areas of Southern Europe 
may be in place with the new Community legal framework, characterized by the DMPs 
and the RBMPs. RBMPs and DMPs indicate a clear commitment to stop illegal 
abstractions during drought occurrence through an improved surveillance mechanism 
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(which includes an up-to-date groundwater inventory), clear abstraction rules and more 
rigorous application of sanctions. However, the effectiveness of these plans has been 
limited so far due to the incentives to engage in illegal groundwater abstractions during 
drought as a result of the high agricultural income. Drought insurance systems for 
irrigated agriculture can stabilize agricultural income and therefore present relevant 
synergies with DMPs and RBMPs that may be used to reduce the incentives for illegal 
abstraction.  
However, even if the right packaging is found, this does not guarantee its success. There 
is a vast amount of literature that shows how past institutional choices influence the cost 
of changing institutions and may eventually block the adoption of a policy, even if this 
policy is desirable (institutional lock-in, North, 1990). According to this literature, the 
transition towards the implementation of an instrument such as drought insurance may 
be as relevant as the very design of the instrument. There are two key variables in this 
process: transaction costs and sequencing (McCann et al., 2005; Garrick et al., 2013). 
Transaction costs are particularly relevant in the case of insurance markets. The most 
relevant include moral hazard, adverse selection and systemic risk. Assessing the impact 
of transaction costs over the drought insurance premium is beyond the scope of this 
paper, and further research is needed in this direction. In any case, the ܨܴܲݏ obtained 
with our model are shown to be at least ten times lower than the amount of money that 
farmers in Southern Spain would be willing  to pay for water security (Gutiérrez-Martín & 
Gómez, 2011). In principle, this difference leaves enough room to deal with the costs 
stemming from asymmetric information problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
and systemic risk, as suggested by recent research (estimations of transaction costs for a 
variety of agricultural insurance markets can be found for example in World Bank, 2005; 
Bryla & Syroka, 2007; Dick, 2007; and Breustedt et al., 2008). 
Sequencing is based on the concept of adaptive efficiency (e.g. Carey & Sunding, 2001). 
The objective is to select the sequence of institutional innovations with the highest 
potential to reduce the implementation costs of a given policy over time. These 
institutional innovations must be designed with a double purpose: i) to reduce the direct 
transaction costs through cumulative processes of demonstration, learning by doing, etc. 
in order to enhance the acceptability of the scheme such that the transaction costs of the 
next institutional change are reduced (as the policy becomes more socially acceptable); ii) 
the gradual tuning of the instrument so that its effectiveness is increased by the 
progressive improvement of its design.  
One central element in this process is the opportunity to assess how the instrument 
performs and its contribution to the objectives of the water policy. In this sense it is not 
only important to produce evidence on, for instance, the number of farmers using 
drought insurance for irrigated agriculture, but to show that this instrument contributes 
to reducing scarcity through the better quantitative status of groundwater bodies. This is 
an essential requirement to show that the scheme is beneficial not just for those directly 
involved, and to make third parties aware of the advantages of proceeding in this way. 
If these obstacles can be successfully addressed, drought insurance may become a useful 
means of reducing illegal groundwater abstractions during droughts. In fact, drought 
insurance for irrigated agriculture is increasingly regarded in some member states as an 
inexpensive means (when compared to expensive emergency funds, Meuwissen et al., 
2003) of reducing illegal abstractions in an economic context marked by budget cuts, with 
preliminary negotiations already ongoing between the public and private sectors in Spain 
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(Representatives of the Spanish Association of Agrarian Insuring Firms, personal 
communication). 
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Appendix I: Summary of variables and parameters. 
 
Variable Description ݌ Rainfall (mm) ݎ Runoff (percentage over the storage capacity) ݏ Water stored in reservoirs (percentage over the storage capacity) ݕ ൌ ݖሺ݌ȁܽǡ ܾሻ Gamma PDF (Rainfall) ݍ ൌ ݂ሺݎȁܽǡ ܾሻ Gamma PDF (Runoff) ݓ ൌ ݆ሺݏȁܽǡ ܾሻ Weibull PDF ܽ Scale parameter, Gamma/Weibull PDF ܾ Shape parameter, Gamma/Weibull PDF ܶܫܴ Amount of water required for irrigation according to the crops 
present in the sub-basin and their historical evapotranspiration 
data ݄ሺݎሻ Percentage of ܶܫܴ satisfied under traditional decision rules ݄ Percentage of ܶܫܴ satisfied under the DMP decision rules ݈ݎǡݏ Water restriction variable resulting from the combination of ݄ሺݎሻ and ݄ ܶܫܴݎሺݎǡ ݏሻ Percentage of ܶܫܴ satisfied ܧܶ Expected crop evapotranspiration ܧܴ ൌ ݃ሺ݌ሻ Effective rainfall ܹܴ Irrigation water requirements ݁௦௬௦ Overall efficiency of the irrigation system ܧܫܴሺݎǡ ݏሻ Effective irrigation resources Ψܧܶ Percentage of ET satisfied ݑሺݎǡ ݏǡ ݌ሻ Probability of Ψܧܶ ܧܧܶ Expected evapotranspiration satisfaction ܫܦ Expected irrigation deficit ݁௚௪ Efficiency of illegal groundwater abstractions ܲ݋ݐܩܹ Expected potential for illegal groundwater abstractions ܳ௥ǡ௦ǡ௣ Agronomic production function (kg/ha/year) ݇ Other variables in the production function, assumed constant ܲ Average prices, 10 years ௥ܸǡ௦ǡ௣ Production value (EUR/ha/year) ܳ௡௢௥௠ Expected production in a normal hydrological year (without 
drought) (kg/ha/year) ௡ܸ௢௥௠ Expected production value in a normal hydrological year (without 
drought) (EUR/ha/year) ܽሺݎǡ ݏሻ Dichotomous variable – Drought threshold Ɋ Deductible (30% in our case study area) ܫܰܦሺݎǡ ݏǡ ݌ሻ Indemnity  ܫܧ Expected indemnity (EUR/ha/year) ܨܴܲ Fair risk premium (%) 
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5.3 Water pricing  
 
According to the Article 9 of the WFD: “Member States shall take account of the 
principle of recovery of the costs of water services, including environmental and 
resource costs […]” (EC, 2000). However, while water pricing has been extensively 
used as a financial instrument (i.e., to recover the investment and maintenance 
costs of water infrastructures), the recovery of environmental and resource costs 
(i.e., its role as an economic instrument) has been largely neglected. As a result, 
current water pricing policies do not reflect the actual cost of the resource and do 
not provide the “[…] adequate incentives for users to use water resources efficiently, 
and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this directive” (i.e., the 
WFD) (EC, 2000). 
As a result of this narrow interpretation, most of the water pricing instruments that 
have been implemented so far in the EU focus exclusively on the recovery of the 
financial costs of water supply. This is the case of the most emblematic 
“environmental” taxes in Spain, which in reality are tariffs designed in most of the 
cases to recover the costs of sanitation and wastewater treatment infrastructures 
built to comply with EU standards (EC, 1998, 1991). Some of these pricing schemes 
include the Tax on water treatment (region of Castile-La Mancha, NUTS2: ES42), 
Tax on coastal wastewater discharge (Andalusia -ES61-, Murcia -ES62), Tax on 
radioactive waste (Andalusia), Tax on water (in the Balearic Islands -ES53-, Navarra 
-ES22-, Valencia -ES52), Tax on water and water pollution (Navarra, Aragón -ES24- 
and Cantabria -ES13), Tax on certain activities that cause environmental harm 
(Castile-La Mancha), Tax on the environmental damage caused by some uses of 
water from reservoirs (Galicia -ES11) and Tax on wastewater treatment (Madrid -
ES30) (EEA&OECD, 2013). 
 
Although narrowly focused on financial costs, water pricing has rapidly become a 
very widely used tool in water policy and this offers a good opportunity to extend its 
use to environmental and resource costs. In the case of Spanish agriculture, water 
pricing basically consists of three parts: the regulation fee (canon de regulación, 
covering the abstraction and storage costs of surface water), the water use tariff 
(tarifa de utilización del agua, covering the transportation costs of surface water) 
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and some quotas to pay the expenses of the irrigation communities
23
. For 
groundwater only the latter exists, since the financial costs of supplying water are 
assumed by the users (Maestu and Villar, 2007). This complex system generates a 
wide variety of water prices over the different basins. For example, average water 
prices in the Segura River Basin (0.061 €/m
3
) are 1.6 times larger than those of the 
Tagus River Basin (0.038 €/m
3
) (SRBA, 2013; TRBA, 2008). It is necessary to 
underline that this gap does not reflect the higher environmental and resource costs 
of water in water stressed Mediterranean areas, but rather the higher financial costs 
of abstracting and distributing the water in the Segura River Basin.  
Water pricing in Spain has failed to recover the environmental and resource costs, 
which are particularly relevant in the case of agricultural water use (EEA, 2013). 
Moreover, financial cost recovery is below 100% in all the Spanish basins (it ranges 
between 50% and 90% for the abstraction and storage costs and between 54% and 
98% for the transportation costs)
24
 (Maestu and Villar, 2007). Therefore, in these 
areas the mere implementation of the full cost recovery principle for financial costs 
may encourage a more sustainable water use (Caswell et al., 1990; EC, 2000).  
 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that higher prices do reduce water demand. 
Nonetheless, there is a very intense discussion ongoing regarding the capacity of 
water pricing to actually achieve this objective. According to some authors (Caswell 
et al., 1990; Kampas et al., 2012; Rivers and Groves, 2013), whose views are close 
to those of EU institutions (EC, 2012, 2000; EEA, 2013), higher water prices do 
reduce agricultural water demand. These authors state that water pricing has the 
highest potential to balance water demand and supply and may serve as a 
mechanism to achieve the river basin closure. Moreover, water pricing systems can 
be designed to prevent aquifer overexploitation where metering is available. In 
                                                          
23
 This payment can adopt different forms from one irrigation community to the other and 
from one area to the other. In traditional irrigation communities that use surface water, 
users make an annual payment according to the surface under irrigation. In more water 
stressed irrigation communities, a dual payment system applies: a payment for the surface 
under irrigation and a payment for the time during which the land is being irrigated. In new 
irrigated areas and irrigation communities with mixed water sources (surface and 
groundwater) a dual payment system applies as well. This is also the case in irrigation 
communities that rely mostly on groundwater, since the most relevant cost is that of the 
energy needed to pump the resource. Only where more efficient irrigation systems are in 
place (drip irrigation) a volumetric system applies (Maestu and Villar, 2007). 
24
 In addition, on May 2012 the Spanish government approved the Royal Decree-Law 
17/2012 on urgent measures regarding the environment. The most relevant modifications 
are in the articles 1.3 and 4, which include a clause creating exceptions to the application of 
the cost recovery principle for water (BOE, 2012). 
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conclusion, always according to these authors, water pricing contributes to make the 
economy more resilient by increasing buffer stocks and reducing conflicts around 
water. However, other authors state that water pricing not only does not reduce 
agricultural water demand (due to the large gap between the price and value of 
irrigation water) (Hellegers and Perry, 2006; Perry, 2005), but also may end up 
increasing water consumption through the incentives to adopt more efficient 
irrigation technologies that reduce return flows and aquifer seepage (see the 
Hydrological Paradox in Chapter 3) (Medellín-Azuara et al., 2012).  
If any evidence is to be extracted from the literature, this would be that both 
positions may be right and that the impact of water pricing over water use is case 
study sensitive. In any case, what this debate clearly points out is that water pricing 
policies should not be regarded as a panacea. A thorough ex-ante assessment is 
necessary prior to the implementation of this instrument in order to control for any 
possible rebound effect in water consumption. Although a null or positive effect of 
higher prices over water demand would not affect the role of water pricing as a cost 
recovery instrument, it would demand the implementation of alternative policies to 
attain the environmental goals of water policy. For example, in areas where an idle 
capacity of non-conventional water resources is available (e.g., desalinated water), 
water pricing can be used to make these resources more attractive to farmers and 
promote the substitution of overused and (financially) cheap conventional resources 
by (financially) expensive and underused desalinated water. 
  
In the following paper, prepared by the doctoral candidate and the Professors 
Gonzalo Delacámara and Carlos Mario Gómez Gómez, we develop a revealed 
preferences model that is used to assess the impact of water pricing over water 
demand in the Segura River Basin in Spain. The paper is entitled Water pricing and 
water saving in agriculture. Insights from a Revealed Preferences Model in a 
Mediterranean basin, and is under second review in Agricultural Water 
Management.  
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Abstract:  The large irrigation expansion of the last 50 years has significantly increased 
pressures over water resources in EU Mediterranean basins. Under these circumstances 
water pricing has been especially encouraged, since within the EU policy context it is 
widely believed that higher water prices reduce water demand. This paper presents a 
Revealed Preference Model that provides a clear intuition of the logic behind farmers’ 
choices by using standard economic analysis and implementing a multi-attribute utility 
function. The model is calibrated for the Agricultural Districts (ADs) in the overexploited 
Segura River Basin (SRB) in southeastern Spain. Results show that in highly profitable ADs 
such as those of the SRB, farmers may react to higher prices by reducing their gross 
margin instead of reducing water use (or employment). These results support the 
implementation of more ambitious cost-recovery policies and, where possible, the 
replacement of overexploited conventional resources by more expensive and mostly 
unused non-conventional resources.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The large irrigation expansion of the last 50 years has increased the pressures over water 
resources worldwide. In Southern Europe, irrigated land has doubled its area during this 
period and now represents between 70% and 80% of the total water use (Bosello and 
Shechter, 2013; EEA, 2009).  Some basins have been declared overexploited, and this has 
reportedly been aggravated by more recurrent and intense droughts as a result of climate 
change (Bosello and Shechter, 2013; Jenkins, 2013; EC, 2008).  
This water crisis has led EU institutions to consider different mechanisms to save water in 
the agricultural sector. In particular, water pricing has gained special momentum during 
the last years. Article 9 of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) states: “[…] water-
pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water resources efficiently, 
and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this directive” (EC, 2000).  
The assertion that higher water prices can per se reduce water use was already supported 
in the seminal works by Caswell et al. (1990), Dinar and Subramanian (1997) and Tsur and 
Dinar (1997), among others. More recently, this negative relationship between prices and 
water use can also be found for example in Balali et al. (2011), Kampas et al. (2012), 
Rivers and Groves (2013) and Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008), and from an 
institutional perspective in EEA (2013), Bogaert et al. (2012) and EC (2012). However, 
there is also a significant body of literature that contends that this assumption is at best 
debatable (Cornish and Perry, 2003; Cornish et al., 2004; Hellegers and Perry, 2006; 
Molle, 2001; Perry, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2007). Using empirical data from different 
agricultural areas around the world, these authors show that the large gap between the 
price and value of irrigation water demands a significant increase in water prices in order 
to attain relevant water savings, this resulting in substantial socio-economic losses in 
turn.  
In addition, recent evidence shows that higher water prices may put in place the 
necessary incentives to invest in the modernization of irrigation systems to reduce water 
use per output unit (Medellín-Azuara et al., 2012; Perry, 2011). However, after an 
increase in irrigation efficiency, although water use and withdrawals may actually fall, 
water availability for other uses may drop through increased consumptive use
1
 (either 
through a rise of the irrigated area or through a more water intensive crop portfolio), 
reduced return flows and lost aquifer seepage, in what is known as the hydrological 
paradox (Jensen, 2007; Rodríguez-Díaz et al., 2012; Scheierling et al., 2006; Ward and 
Pulido-Velazquez, 2008). As a result, water bodies may end up with higher exhaustion 
levels than before the water price was increased to "save" water. 
                                                          
1
 Water withdrawals refer to water removed from its source for a specific use, 
while water use is the amount of water demanded by users. The two flows are 
not the same because of leaks. Finally, water is consumed when a part of the 
water evaporates or becomes contaminated (Kohli et al., 2010).  
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Accordingly, although much work has been done on the economics of irrigation water 
pricing, there is still a remarkable lack of understanding of what impacts can be 
realistically expected from water pricing policies. This paper intends to shed light on this 
debate and applies a Revealed Preference Model (RPM) to explore the effects of water 
pricing over agricultural water demand and consumption and the potential of this policy 
for water savings and/or conservation. RPMs offer an edge on the traditional agricultural 
decision models used to date (i.e., linear programming, positive mathematical 
programming and multi-criteria decision models), such as multi-attribute and non-linear 
utility functions, more flexibility, a sound calibration mechanism and in general a stronger 
coherence with basic economic principles (see Section 3 for a more in-depth discussion 
on this). The model is calibrated for each of the 12 Agricultural Districts (ADs) in the 
Segura River Basin (SRB) in Spain. After the calibration process, a simulation is run in 
which the price of conventional water sources (groundwater and surface water) is 
progressively increased. After several iterations, the water demand curve for each AD is 
estimated. Lastly, these results are aggregated in order to obtain the water demand curve 
for the entire SRB District.  
It is important to note that the ratio of water demand/use over water consumption 
remains constant along the curve, since the high irrigation efficiency in the area 
discourages further investments to the irrigation systems in place
2
. Results show that 
water demand in the SRB is highly inelastic, mainly as a result of the high gross margin 
characteristic of irrigated areas in southeastern Spain, which absorbs most of the price 
shock. Thus, the potential of water pricing per se to induce water savings and/or 
conservation in the agricultural sector in this area is very limited.  
However, water pricing can be used to promote the swap of overused and cheap 
conventional resources by more expensive and underused desalinated water.  
In addition, the inelastic water demand and the large gross margins observed in 
agriculture may serve as an argument in favour of more ambitious cost-recovery policies.  
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the area where the case study is 
applied, the Segura River Basin in Spain, one of the most overexploited and profitable 
basins in the EU (EEA, 2009). Section 3 presents the steps that we follow in the calibration 
process of the RPM and how the calibration errors are estimated. Section 4 shows and 
discusses the results obtained and aggregates them into a single water demand curve for 
the whole SRB. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                          
2
 Water scarcity, recurrent droughts, high expected income and government 
subsidies have already pushed irrigation efficiency in the SRB to levels above 
90% in many ADs (SRBA, 2013). At this point, shifting to more efficient devices 
without government subsidies may not be profitable due to the higher operation 
costs (e.g., energy demands) and more complex management practices 
(Corominas, 2010; Gutierrez-Martin and Gomez, 2011). 
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2. WATER USE AND WATER PRICING IN THE SEGURA RIVER BASIN (SRB), 
SPAIN 
 
The SRB is located in southeastern Spain, comprising most of the territory of the Region 
of Murcia (NUTS2: ES62, according to ISO 3166-2) and parts of Castile-La Mancha (ES42), 
Andalusia (ES61) and Comunidad Valenciana (ES52). This area benefits from several 
competitive advantages, including abundant and cheap land
3
 and labor
4
, adequate solar 
radiation
5
 and proximity to high demand markets.  
All these factors make the SRB a thriving agricultural area that shows some of the highest 
productivity values in Spain and in the EU (Pérez-Blanco et al., 2011). Agricultural land 
covers 679,976 ha (52.1% of the total area of the basin), of which 269,022 ha are irrigated 
(20.6% of the total area and 39.6% of the agricultural land). The SRB comprises 12 ADs or 
comarcas (i.e., shires), namely, Sierra Segura and Hellín (in the Castile-La Mancha Region), 
Vinalopó and Meridional (in the Comunidad Valenciana Region), Nordeste, Noroeste, 
Centro, Río Segura, Suroeste-Valle Guadalenti and Campo de Cartagena (in the Murcia 
Region), Vélez and Bajo Almanzora (in Andalusia) (see Figure 1)
6
. It should be noted that 
these ADs are highly heterogeneous: those located in the coastal areas have the most 
profitable crops and demand more water than those in upstream areas, where less water 
intensive and rainfed crops are grown.   
Competitive advantages of the SRB explain the significant irrigation expansion witnessed 
in the area during the last 50 years (Eurostat, 2013). However, water in the SRB is scarce. 
Eventually, renewable water resources were unable to meet the increasing water 
demand, and the SRB became an overexploited basin. Many hydrogeological units in the 
basin were already declared overexploited in the 1980s and several restrictions to water 
use have been formally established since. This included the prohibition to issue additional 
water rights for irrigation since 1986 (BOE, 1986). However, since 1990 irrigated surface 
                                                          
3
 Spain has 261,000 km
2
 of agricultural land, the largest in the EU only after 
France; this represents 52.9% of the total area, as compared to the EU average 
of 43% (Eurostat, 2013). 
4
 Due both to the local labour cost and an elastic labour supply fed for many 
years from immigration, average gross annual earnings in Spain are 26,568, only 
slightly above the EU-27 average of 25,942 and well below the Eurozone average 
of 30,462 (Eurostat, 2013). 
5
 Spain has 2,910 sunshine hours per year, while national averages of other 
member states – with the exception of Portugal, are below 2,500 (FAO, 2013). 
6
 Four ADs located within the limits of the SRB have been excluded of our study 
since they represented less than 1% of the agricultural water use. These ADs are 
Sierra Alcaraz, Centro and Almansa (in the Castile-La Mancha Region) and Sierra 
Segura (the part located in the Andalusia Region).  
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has grown at an average rate of 6,500 ha/year (WWF, 2006), and this has boosted 
agricultural water use, which currently represents 89% of the total water demand of 
1,900 million cubic meters (or cubic hectometers, hm
3
) in the basin. Since renewable 
water resources in the basin equal 760 million cubic meters (SRBA, 2013), there is a large 
water deficit that is mostly covered through the overexploitation (in some cases, through 
illegal withdrawals) of the water stock stored in the SRB’s aquifers (Gómez and Pérez-
Blanco, 2012). 
The traditional response of water authorities to water scarcity in Spain has mostly 
consisted in supply-side policies to increase water availability. In the SRB in particular, this 
entailed subsidies to drill new wells, the construction and modernization of 
transportation, distribution and irrigation networks and the building of the Tagus-Segura 
Water Transfer (TSWT), a major diversion project with the  to transfer up to 1,000 million 
cubic meters/year from the Tagus River Basin located 242 km away
7
.  
Although these policies have made new irrigation developments possible that have 
helped to invigorate the local economy and to retain population in rural areas, they have 
also caused severe environmental problems, such as aquifer depletion and the 
destruction of riverine ecosystems (e.g., the formerly perennial Segura River currently 
does not reach the Mediterranean Sea during most of the year).  
When it was clear that conventional water sources were already at their limit, authorities 
turned to non-conventional water sources, including treated wastewater and, especially, 
desalinated water. Only in the last decade, public authorities invested more than €400 
million in the construction and modernization of desalination plants in the SRB (GWI, 
2012). In an effort to maintain the pace of infrastructure investment, the Spanish Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food and Environment is now trying to negotiate an additional €700-
million loan, following a €500 million loan used to bailout the public water utility in 
charge of supplying desalinated water in southeastern Spain (Acuamed) in 2012 (GWI, 
2013). All this investment and rising energy prices have made desalinated water an 
expensive source with a production cost around 1€/m
3
 (Maestu and Villar, 2007). In spite 
of the subsidies to make this water source more attractive to farmers (bulk desalinated 
water is sold in many agricultural areas at 0.36€/m
3
) (GWI, 2012), the low when not null 
price of conventional water sources make desalinated water unattractive (in the SRB, 
conventional bulk water prices range from 0 €/m
3
 in irrigated areas supplied with 
groundwater to 0.22 €/m
3
 in those areas receiving water from the TSWT) (SRBA, 2013).  
                                                          
7
 Although the actual capacity of the TSWT is 1 000 million cubic meters/year, it 
has been limited to 600 million cubic meters/year by law. However, since its 
opening in 1978, this infrastructure has been working much below this legal limit 
and has transferred in average 329.3 million cubic meters/year (SRBA, 2013). In 
addition, it has been the cause of a major conflict between the regions of 
Castile-La Mancha (largely belonging to the Tagus River Basin District) and 
Murcia (largely belonging to the Segura River Basin District).  
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Consequently, desalinated water is mostly used as a buffer stock during drought events, 
and only in those areas without access to reliable groundwater sources. As a result 
desalination plants, with the capacity to supply up to 1/6 of the annual water demand, 
are being used below 20% of their capacity (i.e., they are supplying 1/30 of the annual 
water demand) (SRBA, 2013).  
On top of that, this water policy has generated unrealistic expectations on the capacity of 
the system to absorb additional pressures. As a result, all these investments have 
paradoxically ended up increasing water demand, reducing water availability due to 
aquifer depletion and undermining the robustness and resiliency of the system and its 
ability to cope with future droughts. Only in the last decade, the ratio between water 
abstraction and renewable resources in the SRB has nearly doubled: in 2003, it was an 
upsetting 1.27; by 2013, this ratio had hit up to 2.5, denoting one of the most serious 
cases of overexploitation in Europe (EEA, 2009; SRBA, 2013).  
The WFD explicitly states that water pricing has to be used as an incentive to adapt water 
demand to the EU environmental standards, especially in overexploited areas such as the 
SRB (EC, 2000). Higher prices for conventional water sources in agriculture may improve 
the status of water bodies in the SRB in two ways: i) they can reduce the expected 
income and thus constrain water demand from low productive crops; and ii) they favour 
the substitution of the overexploited conventional water sources by the largely idle non-
conventional water sources. 
Although the average bulk water price for agriculture in the SRB is the highest in Spain 
(0.096 €/m
3
 for conventional water sources, almost twice as large as the Spanish average 
of 0.05 €/m
3
) (Maestu and Villar, 2007; SRBA, 2013), this price only reflects the higher 
financial cost of supplying water in the SRB as compared to other basins in Spain (mainly 
due to the large infrastructure investments and maintenance costs). Therefore, this water 
price does not take into account the economic value of the resource, including (among 
others) the environmental costs of water supply, which could significantly increase water 
price
8
.  
Moreover, the observed water price is not even enough to guarantee a financial full cost 
recovery, with cost recovery ratios ranging between 54.08% (for own surface water 
resources) and 80.82% (for the TSWT) (Maestu and Villar, 2007). This is even more 
shocking once it is considered that most of these investments were ultimately aimed at 
                                                          
8
 According to the Article 9 of the WFD: “Member States shall take account of 
the principle of recovery of the costs of water services, including environmental 
and resource costs […]” (EC, 2000). However, while water pricing has been 
extensively used as a financial instrument (i.e., to recover the construction and 
maintenance costs of water infrastructures), the recovery of environmental and 
resource costs has been largely neglected. This can be extended to most EU river 
basins.  
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guaranteeing water security in agriculture, a private activity
9
. This alone could justify a 
price increase based on the grounds of the cost recovery rationale. However, such a 
policy may also have adverse effects over the local economy, which heavily relies on 
agriculture. In the Region of Murcia, comprising 71.4% of the total irrigated land in the 
SRB, agriculture represents 4.9% of GDP and 10.36% of employment. The latter figure has 
special relevance for a region that holds an unemployment rate of 30.4% (INE, 2013).   
Consequently, an appropriate evaluation of the impact of water pricing has to consider 
not only the effects over total water use, but also the implications of this policy over the 
economy as a whole. In the next section we develop a RPM that, once calibrated, allows 
for a comprehensive assessment of the trade-off between environmental and productive 
uses of water.  
 
Figure 1. Location of the Segura River Basin and detail of the Agricultural Districts 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                          
9
 Water demand from priority uses, namely, environmental flows and household 
supply, represents less than 10% of the total water demand in the Segura River 
Basin and could be met with less than 25% of the renewable resources available 
in the basin (SRBA, 2013). Since water supply for priority uses is guaranteed by 
law (SRBA, 2008), investments to increase water security were actually aimed at 
reducing uncertainty in other sectors, and especially in agriculture (89% of the 
total demand).  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Economic literature has placed much effort in the last decade to the ex-ante assessment 
of the impact of water pricing over water demand and water consumption. The most 
commonly used methods so far have been based on Linear Programming (LP), Positive 
Mathematical Programming (PMP) and Multi-Criteria Decision Methods (MCDM). 
However, in spite of being widely accepted, these methods are not exempt of some 
degree of criticism.  
The need to represent complex decision problems with limited information has fostered 
the use of Linear Programming (LP) and Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) to 
simulate farmers’ response against water pricing and to elicit water demand functions.  
Although the origin of LP dates back to the 1950s, it has been widely used in recent years 
to assess water pricing policies due to its low data requirements and flexibility (see for 
example Dono et al., 2010 and Kampas et al., 2012). However, this method has been 
strongly criticized as a result of its failure to approximate, even roughly, realized farm 
production plans and, therefore, to become a useful methodology for policy analysis 
(Paris, 2011). This criticism is grounded on the linear nature of this method, which often 
results in overspecialization and corner solutions.  
In addition, LP might be criticized by the way it deals with the parameter specification 
problem: there is an infinite set of parameters and functions able to lead the model to a 
perfect calibration, and each set of parameters and functions leads to a different 
behaviour in response to changing economic prices and policy constraints. 
PMP came as a response to the above-mentioned critiques. PMP offers many advantages 
over LP, including full calibration, a significant reduction in the number of resource, 
technical, economic and policy constraints, and the use of nonlinear cost functions that 
guarantee smooth simulation results.  
The use of these models to simulate farmers’ behaviour and to obtain water demand 
functions can be found for example in Blanco-Gutiérrez et al. (2011), De Frahan et al. 
(2007) and Heckelei and Britz (2005)). The general idea of these models consists in using 
information contained in dual variables of the calibration constraints to bind the solution 
of the linear profit-maximizing problem to observed activity levels
10
. Once these dual 
variables are identified they are used to specify a non-linear objective function, such as 
the production cost, provided that the marginal cost of the activities is equal to its price 
                                                          
10
 This linear model maximizes the profit associated to a vector of activity levels 
(x, represented by surfaces dedicated to a set of crops), with prices and unitary 
costs considered as constant and subject to a set of resource constraints. 
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in observed activity levels. This guarantees that both the profit maximization and cost 
minimization problems simultaneously lead to an optimal solution that exactly matches 
baseline activity levels (Heckelei and Britz, 2005; Howitt, 1995; Paris and Howitt, 1998)
11
.  
Although effective, this calibration mechanism is not rooted on explicit economic 
principles, which makes this the main criticism against PMP. The analyst using PMP might 
be forced to use ad-hoc arguments to explain empirical results. PMP methods do not 
provide information about estimation errors making uncertainty analysis somewhat 
unfeasible. 
Finally, Multi-Criteria Decision Methods (MCDM) have also played a major role in the 
assessment of water pricing policies (Rodrigues et al., 2013; Chung and Lee, 2009; 
Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004; Berbel and Gómez-Limón, 2000). Contrary to PMP 
methods, in MCDM farmers do not act simply as profit maximizing agents; instead of that, 
agents consider other relevant attributes in their decision. Therefore, MCDM assume that 
farmers’ preferences can be represented by a weighted sum of different criteria, such as 
expected profits, risk, management issues and/or others, which provides a better 
explanation of current decisions. Although this method has succeeded in reproducing the 
baseline decision, the assumption that farmers respond with linear preferences to 
changes in policy is again an issue prone to discussion.  
Therefore, the construction of water pricing simulation models has been confronted so 
far with a trade-off between the model’s capability to provide numerical results for policy 
evaluation and its coherence with basic economic principles. However, it is still possible 
to develop a methodology that is consistent with these principles and yields useful results 
for policy analysis through the use of Revealed Preference Models (RPM). These applied 
models provide a clearer intuition of the logic behind farmers’ decisions by using 
standard economic analysis and by implementing a multi-attribute utility function. 
Moreover, RPM do not need to assume linear preferences (as in LP and MCDM) or 
implicit costs functions that are not observable (as in PMP). Although the complex 
programming and optimization procedure and the high data requirements of these 
models have made difficult their use as a policy assessment and project analysis tool, the 
advances in computational methods of the last two decades and the recent proliferation 
of high quality agricultural microeconomic databases in several EU countries make their 
implementation feasible.    
 
3.1. The Revealed Preference Model (RPM) 
 
                                                          
11
 The dual variables, obtained in the first stage and used to build the nonlinear 
objective function in the second, are assumed to capture any type of 
aggregation or model specification bias, any kind of risk attitude or price 
expectation as well as any lack of data or data measurement error 
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This section presents a RPM able to calibrate observed decisions with a procedure rooted 
in basic microeconomic theory. This method not only allows to obtain simulation results 
but also offers a clear interpretation of farmers’ responses to changing incentives and 
resource and policy environments. In this model, agents (the ADs of the SRB) decide on 
their crop portfolio trying to maximize their utility, which is a function of a set of relevant 
attributes that may contain expected profit, risk avoidance, management complexities 
and/or others. It is assumed that the explanation of any decision, consisting in a 
distribution of the available land among the different crop options, relies on an 
underlying utility function formed by the many attributes that agents use to assess all the 
alternatives they have, given crop prices and costs, resource availability and the other 
relevant economic, agronomic and policy constraints. According to that,  the observed 
decisions respond to a decision problem as follows: ሺሻ ൌ ሺଵሺሻǢଶሺሻǢ ଷሺሻǥ୫ሺሻሻ   [1] 
s.t.:    Ͳ ൑ ୧ ൑ ͳ      [2] σ ୧୬୧ୀଵ ൌ ͳ      [3]  א 	ሺሻ       [4]  ൌ ሺሻ א ୫      [5] 
Where  א ୬ is the decision profile or the crop portfolio (a vector), showing one way to 
allocate land among crops, and each ୧ measures the share of land devoted to the crop i, 
including a reservation option (୬) consisting of rainfed agriculture. From the agent’s 
perspective any particular crop may be considered as an asset with a known present cost 
and an uncertain value in the future (as crop yields are not known in advance). As the 
available land is taken as given, this investment may be represented as a share (୧) of 
available land. 	ሺሻ represents the space of feasible decision profiles, given the different 
constraints
12
: policy, economic, agronomic and environmental. Finally ୧, or alternatively 
the vector , are the attributes that farmers value. For example, farmers might prefer 
decisions with high expected profits, highly predictable yields and prices and not too 
many managing actions besides planting and harvesting. To accept taking high-risk 
options, risk averse farmers will ask for a compensation, for example, higher expected 
profits, and the same can be said about the willingness to accept crop decisions that 
demand additional management skills.  
Let us assume that the observed decision profile and the whole set of constraints defining 
the feasible decision set are known. Also assume that the set of potentially relevant 
                                                          
12
 These constraints vary for each AD. In our model we consider the following: 
land availability, available water resources, agricultural vocation (crops that have 
not been planted in an area before cannot appear in that area in the short run), 
crop rotation, CAP restrictions and ligneous crops restrictions (the surface of 
ligneous crops cannot change significantly in the short run). 
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decision attributes such as, for example, the expected profit, the variance of the expected 
profit, the hired labour demanded, the cost of inputs over the total cost and all the 
variables that might be relevant from the farmers’ point of view are measurable.  
Therefore, the first problem that it is necessary to deal with in order to reveal farmers’ 
preferences is to know which among the potentially relevant attributes are actually 
relevant to explain the observed decision. The method to answer this question consists in 
assuming that the relevant set of attributes is the one to which the observed decision is 
closest to the attributes possibility frontier. In real situations this efficiency frontier 
cannot be analytically defined with a closed mathematical function and the only way to 
represent it is by using numerical methods. One practical solution consists in drawing a 
line from the origin ordinate and through the observed decision attributes and ranging 
them as far as possible in the space of feasible attributes. This way we can measure the 
distance from the observed attributes to the efficiency frontier attributes. This procedure 
can be repeated for any set of potentially relevant attributes and the best candidate to 
reveal farmers’ preferences will be the one whose observed values were closest to its 
associated efficiency frontier. Formally, this problem must be solved for every member of 
the Power set (P(z), which comprises all possible combinations of potentially relevant 
attributes for the farmer) and for its associated observed attributes in the Power set 
(P(zo)) 
13
. 
The solution to this problem is an application assigning a distance ɔ୪ሺ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ʹ୫ሻ to 
each member of the power set ሺሻ. Each member of the power set (i.e., each possible 
combination of potentially relevant attributes) is denoted by ɒሺሻ, and its associated 
observed attributes by  ɒ୭ሺሻ. The relevant set of attributes (ɒכሻ will be the one with the 
lower distance to the efficiency frontier measured by the parameter ሺɔ െ ͳሻ. Summing 
up, the preference-eliciting problem can be presented as: ɒ ɔ୪ െ ͳ       [6] 
Where:ɔ୪ ൌ ൣሺɔሻǤ Ǥ ɒሺሻ ൌ ɔ൫ɒ୭ሺሻ൯Ǣ Ͳ ൑ ୧ ൑ ͳǢσ ୩୬୩ୀଵ ൌ ͳǢ  א	ሺሻǢ ɒԖሺሻ൧      [7]  ൌ ሺͳǥ Ǥ ʹ୫ሻ       [8] 
By solving this problem the set of attributes that better explains current farmers’ 
decisions (ɒכሻis obtained. Among the many factors that might be of relevance in farmers 
preferences, this set of attributes is the one that takes the observed decision closer to the 
attributes efficiency frontier.  
Once a farmer’s decision is shown as close as possible to the efficiency frontier, the 
second problem consists in eliciting the farmers’ preferences that explain the observed 
                                                          
13
 A power set P(Z) is the set of all the 2
m
 subsets of Z and the power set P0(Z) is 
the set formed by the 2
m
 subsets of the numerical set of observed attributes.  
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decision as a utility maximizing choice. Taking into account the relevant decision 
attributes obtained at the calibration stage, the multi-attribute utility function is the one 
that is able to represent farmers’ preferences in such a way that the observed decision 
becomes the optimal choice. Using basic economic principles and knowing the efficiency 
frontier in the surroundings of the observed decision allows one to integrate such a utility 
function. Rational decisions imply that in equilibrium farmers’ marginal Willingness To 
Pay in order to improve one attribute with respect to any other is equal to the marginal 
opportunity cost of this attribute with respect to the other. In other words, the marginal 
transformation relationship between any pair of attributes over the efficiency frontier 
(୩୮) is equal in equilibrium to the marginal substitution relationship between the 
same pair of attributes over the indifference curve tangent to the observed decision 
(୩୮).  
Now we obtain the relative opportunity cost of each one of the relevant attributes with 
respect to the others. This opportunity cost is measured by the marginal transformation 
relationship between any pair of attributes (ș୩୮ ൌ ୩୮ ൌ ୩୮). This value can be 
numerically obtained by solving partial optimization problems in the proximity of the 
observed decision (as for example, searching by how much expected profits would need 
to be reduced in order to have 1% less uncertainty or, equivalently, what is the maximum 
expected profit attainable with a slightly lower risk level). The numerical results of the 
marginal relationship of transformation of any pair of attributes in a reference point over 
the efficiency frontier (Ⱦ୩୮) are the basic information to integrate the farmers’ utility 
function. Provided that farmers behave rationally, in equilibrium, the value (Ⱦ୩୮) 
representing the relative opportunity cost of any attribute in terms of any other is equal 
to the marginal substitution relationship between the same pair of attributes (which 
represents the farmers’ marginal WTP for an improvement of a given attribute in terms of 
any other). In other words, in equilibrium, decisions over crop surfaces are such that: 
ș୩୮ ൌ ୩୮ ൌ ୩୮ ൌ െ ப୙ ப୸౦ൗப୙ ୸ౡൗ  ; ǡ  א ሺͳǡ Ǥ Ǥ ሻǢ  ്   [9] 
This information for the reference point over the efficiency frontier is enough to integrate 
a utility function leading to the observed decision as the optimal decision given the 
existing resource, economic, balance and policy constraints. For example, if we assume 
utility function with constant returns of scale such as the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
below: ሺɒሻ ൌ ς ୰஑౨୪୰ୀଵ ;      σ Ƚ୰୪୰ୀଵ ൌ ͳ     [10] 
Then the marginal substitution relationship among any pair of attributes is:  
െப୙ ப୸౦ൗப୙ ୸ౡൗ ൌ െ ஑౦஑ౡ ୸ౡ୸౦       [11] 
And the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas utility function are obtained from the following 
system: 
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െ ஑౦஑ౡ ୸ౡ୸౦ ൌ Ⱦ୩୮      [12] σ Ƚ୰୪୰ୀଵ ൌ ͳ      [13] 
In Section 4 we use this type of function, which offers the advantage of having a unique 
solution according to the Walras’ Law (a condition which is guaranteed by the constant 
returns of the utility function represented above). Thus the model is calibrated for each 
AD using the high-quality microeconomic data available in MAGRAMA (2009). This 
database contains data on land use, water demand, irrigation efficiency, employment 
(both hired and family labour), machinery and equipment, other direct costs, indirect 
costs, prices and yields for every crop during the period 2004-2009 and for 82% of the 
irrigated surface in the SRB.  
 
3.2. Calibration errors 
 
Farmers’ decisions are simulated in accordance to the observed crop portfolio, which is 
the crop portfolio that maximizes the representative farmer’s utility function in 
accordance to a set of relevant attributes. Therefore, deviations of the model’s crop 
portfolio (୧כ) from the observed crop portfolio (୧୭) during the calibration stage may 
result in prediction errors in the model, and this is the first calibration error (୶). The 
second source of error is the distance between the observed attributes and the 
attributes’ efficiency frontier (୤). A large distance would mean that the agent is actually 
taking a sub-optimal decision, and this goes against the main economic assumption that 
farmers are individuals that seek to maximize their utility. Finally, the third calibration 
error (ȫ) is the distance between the observed attributes (୰୭) and the calibrated ones 
(ȫ୰כ). If this distance is large, it would mean that the model is not capturing the real 
source of utility for the representative farmer, and therefore it would be simulating 
someone else’s utility function.  
Summing up, the RPM provides three types of calibration errors that give an idea of the 
accuracy of the model’s adjustment: 
-The relative distance between the observed crop pattern and the model’s one: 
୶ ൌ ଵ୬σ ൭ቀ୶౟౥మି୶౟כమቁభ మൗ୶౟౥ ൱୬୩ୀଵ      [14] 
-The distance between the observed attributes and the attributes’ efficiency frontier: ୤ ൌ ሺɔ െ ͳሻ      [15] 
-The distance between the observed attributes and the calibrated ones: 
C.D. Pérez-Blanco, G. Delacámara and C.M. Gómez (under review)                    14 
 
 
 
த ൌ ଵ୪ σ ቆ൫୸౨౥మିத౨כమ൯భ మൗ୸౨బ ቇ୪୰ୀଵ      [16] 
Finally, the mean calibration error is defined as a combination of these three calibration 
errors: 
 ൌ ඥୣ౮ାୣಜାୣ౜ଷ       [17] 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The methodology as above is applied to the particular case of the SRB. First, we calibrate 
the RPM for each one of the 12 ADs considered in the basin (the agents). Second, we 
conduct a simulation in which we progressively increase water prices and we assess the 
effects over water demand, income and employment in agriculture. Finally, we aggregate 
the results obtained for every AD at a river basin level.  
 
4.1. Model calibration  
 
Farmers have to find their optimum crop portfolio subject to a set of feasible options. It is 
reasonable to think that farmers will choose that crop portfolio that maximizes their 
income and minimizes their risk and management complexities. Accordingly, we consider 
the following variables in our model:  
i)         Expected profit per hectare, measured by the gross variable margin: ଵሺሻ ൌ σ ୧Ɏ୧୧      [18] 
Where Ɏ୧ is the gross variable margin per hectare of the crop i.  
ii)  Avoided risk, measured by the difference between the risk associated to 
the crop decision ത leading to the maximum expected profit (ɐഥ) and the risk 
associated to the alternative crop decision  (ɐ൫Ɏሺሻ൯):  ଶሺሻ ൌ ɐഥ െ ɐ൫Ɏሺሻ൯    [19] 
Where ɐ൫Ɏሺሻ൯ ൌ த൫Ɏሺሻ൯, being ൫Ɏሺሻ൯ the variance and covariance 
matrix of the per hectare crop profits (Ɏሺሻ) of the crop decision . 
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iii) Total labour avoidance, the first way to measure management 
complexities avoidance through the reluctance to use too much labour (both 
hired and family labour). ଷሺሻ ൌ ഥ െ ሺሻ     [20] 
Where ሺሻ ൌ σ ୧୧୧  is the total labour used per hectare, being ୧ the total 
labour required per hectare for a crop i, and ഥ is the labour required to 
implement the crop decision leading to the maximum expected profit.  
iv) Hired labor avoidance, the second way to measure management 
complexities avoidance through the reluctance to use too much hired labor. ସሺሻ ൌ ഥ െ ሺሻ     [21] 
Where similar to previous case ሺሻ ൌ σ ୧୧୧  is the total hired labor used per 
hectare, being ୧ the total hired labor required per hectare for a crop i, and ഥ is 
the hired labor required to implement the crop decision leading to the maximum 
expected profit. 
v) Direct avoided costs, the third way to measure management complexities, 
which includes all the seeds, fertilizers, hired equipment and all the other 
intermediate expenditures required to implement a particular crop decision.  ହሺሻ ൌ ሺሻ െ ഥ     [22] 
Where ሺሻ ൌ σ ୧୧୧  is the direct cost of a crop decision x, being ୧ the direct 
cost per hectare for a crop i, and ഥ is the direct cost required to implement the 
crop decision leading to the maximum expected profit. 
 
As a result, our Cobb-Douglas Utility Function adapts the following form: ሺଵǡ ଶǡ ଷǡ ସǡ ହሻ ൌ ଵ஑భଶ஑మଷ஑యସ஑రହ஑ఱ;      σ Ƚ୰ହ୰ୀଵ ൌ ͳ  [23] 
Where there are five unknown variables ሺȽ୰Ǣ  ൌ ͳǡǥ ͷሻ. Following the methodology 
above, we assess the relevance of each attribute by estimating the values of the alpha 
coefficients for every AD. These coefficients are used to calibrate the Cobb-Douglas Utility 
Function. Finally, we also obtain the calibration errors for every AD. The results are 
displayed in Table 1:  
 
Table 1. Alpha coefficients and calibration errors 
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AD/Variable Ƚଵ Ƚଶ Ƚଷ Ƚସ Ƚହ ୤ த ୶  
Sierra Segura 0.24 0.09 - 0.23 0.44 13.06% 4.64% 13.61% 7.19% 
Hellín 0.13 0.52 - 0.35 - 7.34% 1.21% 7.13% 3.62% 
Meridional 0.29 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.37 12.23% 5.25% 9.59% 5.47% 
Vinalopó 0.38 0.03 0.20 0.07 0.32 2.42% 2.24% 2.04% 1.51% 
Nordeste 0.56 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.24 8.35% 6.77% 5.29% 4.29% 
Noroeste 0.18 0.11 0.30 0.41 - 8.31% 3.75% 5.30% 3.25% 
Centro 0.25 0.01 - - 0.74 6.06% 2.61% 7.36% 3.91% 
Río Segura 0.99 0.01 - - - 7.23% 5.14% 7.41% 4.51% 
Campo de 
Cartagena 
0.39 0.16 0.34 0.08 0.02 26.79% 6.97% 21.42% 11.26% 
Suroeste-Valle 
Guadalentí 
0.36 0.30 - - 0.33 18.02% 5.33% 16.77% 8.80% 
Bajo Almanzora 0.33 0.31 0.25 - 0.11 41.16% 16.81% 41.18% 22.24% 
Vélez 0.29 0.01 0.58 0.11 0.01 2.27% 11.09% 21.70% 12.19% 
Average 0.36 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.22 12.77% 5.98% 13.23% 7.35% 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
There are only two attributes present in the utility function of every AD: expected profit 
(ଵ) and avoided risk (ଶ), though the former has a higher relevance in explaining farmers’ 
decisions. The alpha coefficient for the expected profit has a value over 0.2 in all the ADs 
with the exception of Hellín (0.13) and Noroeste (0.18). This attribute is of special 
relevance in the Río Segura AD (0.99), where it explains most of the farmers’ decisions 
(avoided risk has only a marginal relevance, with an alpha of 0.01). 
On other hand, avoided risk is relevant in the Hellín AD (0.52) and in the highly productive 
and drought exposed ADs of Campo de Cartagena (0.16), Suroeste-Valle Guadalentí (0.30) 
and Bajo Almanzora (0.31). 
Avoided management complexities (ݖଷ, ݖସ and ݖହ) are relevant in a number of ADs, 
especially in Sierra Segura (where the sum of the alpha coefficients of the avoided 
management complexities attributes equal 0.67), Meridional (0.63), Vinalopó (0.59), 
Noroeste (0.71), Centro (0.74) and Vélez (0.70).  
Our model shows in general low calibration errors. Most of the ADs have a mean 
calibration error below 10% (Sierra Segura, Meridional, Suroeste-Valle Guadalentí) and 
many below 5% (Hellín, Vinalopó, Nordeste, Noroeste, Centro and Río Segura). The mean 
calibration error is above 10% in the ADs of Campo de Cartagena (11.26%), Vélez 
(12.19%) and especially in Bajo Almanzora, which shows a calibration error of 22.24%.   
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4.2. Simulation and results 
 
Using the utility functions above we implement a simulation in which we progressively 
increase conventional water prices in all the ADs of the SRB and we study farmers’ 
responses in terms of water use, gross margin, employment generation and gross value 
added. We consider a price increase that ranges from 0 (baseline scenario) to 100 
Eurocents/m
3
 (Δ 1 €/ m
3
). Results are aggregated at a river basin level
14
 to obtain the 
water demand curve of the SRB (Figure 2). The ratio of water use over water 
consumption remains constant, since the high irrigation efficiency already present in the 
area (above 90% in many ADs) discourages further investments on the improvement of 
irrigation systems. Therefore, our results do not show the presence of a hydrological 
paradox.  
 
Figure 2. Water demand curve in the SRB (m
3
/ha) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 2 represents the average water demand in m
3
/ha for the whole SRB. Water 
demand in the basin is highly inelastic for price increases below 0.5€/m
3
, and only starts 
showing a significant reduction in the water use for price increases above this threshold. 
At this point, the more water intensive crops start to be replaced by rainfed crops.  
This does not mean that an increase in water prices does not have significant impacts 
                                                          
14
 In the case of inter-basin ADs, we applied coefficients based on the 
percentage of the surface of the AD that is located in the SRB. 
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over water use below a value of 0.5 €/m
3
. For example, in the upstream ADs of Hellín and 
Sierra Segura, a price increase above 0.13 and 0.28 €/m
3
, respectively, would cause the 
substitution of all the irrigated crops in these areas by rainfed crops, with a much lower 
income (Pérez-Blanco et al., 2011). However, as a result of the low relevance of these ADs 
in terms of total water use (less than 100 h m
3
/year), this effect is diluted when 
conducting an assessment at a river basin scale. Nonetheless, from an equity perspective, 
this impact is by no means negligible.  
It is important to note that a water price over 0.6€/m
3
 is unrealistic for a river basin 
where the average bulk water prices are below 0.1 €/m
3
, since it would imply a price 
increase over 600%. Consequently, we should not expect a significant effect of water 
pricing policies over total water use in the SRB. However, an average water price increase 
of 0.26 €/m
3
 would balance out the prices of conventional resources (0.096 €/m
3
) and 
desalinated water (0.36 €/m
3
) (SRBA, 2013), provided that the latter are kept subsidized. 
This could be used to promote a substitution of the overexploited conventional resources 
by the largely idle desalinated water, thus improving the quantitative and qualitative 
status of the continental water bodies in the SRB.  
On the other hand, this highly inelastic water demand curve constitutes a strong 
argument in favour of more ambitious cost-recovery policies in the area. (Financial) cost-
recovery levels in Spain have been traditionally below 100%, and in the SRB they range 
between 54.08% and 80.82% (Maestu and Villar, 2007). Given the large amounts invested 
to increase water security in the agriculture of the SRB and in the light of our results, it 
may be reasonable to aim towards a progressive increase of the cost recovery ratio in the 
basin (always considering that the asymmetric impact over the different ADs explained 
above need to be balanced).  
However, even if water demand is not significantly altered, a higher water price may 
negatively affect gross margin and employment and thus the local economy. In Figures 2, 
3 and 4 we show the expected impact of a higher water price over Gross Variable Margin 
(GVM) (Figure 3), agricultural employment in the SRB (only hired labour, family labour 
excluded) (Figure 4) and Gross Value Added (GVA) (Figure 5). 
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Figure 3. GVM (€/ha) and water price increase (€/m
3
) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 4. Employment generation (000s of working days) and water price increase
(€/m
3
) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
 
C.D. Pérez-Blanco, G. Delacámara and C.M. Gómez (under review)                    20 
 
 
 
Figure 5. GVA (€/ha) and water price increase (€/m
3
) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Higher water prices have initially a small positive effect over agricultural employment. 
Water is progressively replaced as a production factor by labour, and more labour 
intensive crops generate a higher agricultural employment. This happens until water 
prices hit 0.4 €/m
3
. Rather the opposite, a water price increase has a negative effect over
GVM and GVA. With a price increase below 0.4 €/m
3
, farmers maintain water use and 
employment at levels close to those observed in the baseline, but at the expense of 
significantly reducing their GVM and thus also the GVA of irrigated agriculture. This 
means that a price increase of up to 0.4 €/m
3
 mostly results into a transfer of farmers’
GVM to the public sector. Above this price increase, employment, GVM and GVA fall.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Within the EU policy context, it is widely believed that higher (also called right) water 
prices reduce water demand (EEA, 2013; Bogaert et al., 2012; EC, 2012, 2008, 2000). 
Therefore, water pricing has been traditionally regarded as an effective means to reduce 
water use in overexploited basins such as the SRB. However, our results show that in 
highly profitable ADs such as those located in the SRB, farmers may react to higher prices 
by reducing their gross margin instead of reducing water use. In our simulations, higher 
prices reduce the gross margin of the farmers, who maintain water use in similar levels 
and may even hire more workers to compensate for marginal water use reductions.  
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Consequently, water pricing may become largely ineffective as an environmental policy 
precisely in the areas where water is scarcest. The basic lesson that can be drawn from 
this and similar evidence is that water prices per se are not right or wrong, although these 
adjectives have been common in EU water policy. The efficiency and effectiveness (i.e., 
the rightness) of pricing policies needs to be assessed based on its ability to reach the 
collectively agreed objectives of EU water policy at a minimum cost (EC, 2000). This 
depends as much on the type of economic instrument being used (water pricing or any 
other) as on its design and the context in place (comprising a wide array of institutional, 
legal and socio-economic factors).  
Water policy should not confuse its goal with the instrument: aiming towards higher 
water prices per se may end up reducing farmers’ income and increasing fiscal revenue 
without any real environmental impact (in our case, until an unrealistic price increase 
over 600%). From a water policy perspective, this should be deemed as a failure. On the 
other hand, if we design a policy mix that promotes the use of available desalinated 
water at the same time that prices are increased, we may end up replacing a relevant 
share of conventional by non-conventional water resources (desalination capacity in the 
SRB equals 1/6 of the average annual water demand of 1,900 million cubic meters, but it 
is currently used below 20%). Such a policy could include a combination of subsidies (to 
the users of desalinated water, for example through lower prices) and higher water prices 
(to the users of conventional resources), but this is case sensitive and also needs to take 
into account the particular institutional setup of the study site. Further research is 
necessary in this direction.  
On the other hand, our findings support the use of water pricing as a tool to increase 
cost-recovery ratios and mitigate the large budgetary deficits of water authorities in 
Spain. Although the impacts of this policy over ADs may be asymmetric, the public sector 
could partially redistribute the acquired revenues through reduced taxes and higher 
subsidies in negatively affected areas. 
Another relevant policy implication from the financial point of view concerns the 
allocation of agricultural subsidies in the SRB and other highly profitable basins. Subsidies 
to the agricultural sector in OECD countries still represent 22% of the agricultural income, 
and over 50% of these subsidies are considered to directly distort trade and competition 
(OECD, 2010). Considering the large gross margins observed and the little impact of water 
pricing policies over farmers’ decisions, it could be advisable to review the allocation of 
these distorting subsidies in some areas.  
The methodology developed in this paper is flexible and can be used to assess the impact 
of different agricultural policies over farmers’ decisions, in the SRB or in other river basins 
where the necessary data is available. Future research should try to find a way to improve 
the current results through minimizing calibration errors. In our case study, calibration 
errors were above 20% in the Bajo Almanzora AD, and above 10% in the Campo de 
Cartagena and Vélez ADs. The solution to this problem may consist, for example, in 
finding new attributes that help explain better farmers’ behaviour or in finding a more 
suitable utility function form.  
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6 General conclusions and 
recommendations 
 
Developing and implementing effective water policies is troublesome. First of all, 
water is a unique commodity. It is an essential good with many sequential uses that 
intersperse public and private uses in an often complex hydrogeological system. 
Besides, water is a heterogeneous and finite good, and this is aggravated by its 
bulkiness (it is not always possible to transport adequate water from the source to 
the potential user at an acceptable cost). All this makes water management a 
complex task. In addition, water management has become increasingly complicated 
over time as a result of the poor performance of supply and C&C policies that have 
been implemented precisely to address the water crisis. Shockingly, these policies 
have gone on for decades, resulting in a systemic policy failure that has left several 
regions worldwide facing a potential environmental catastrophe. 
This model, with its insistence upon increasing the system’s capacity through the 
use of already overexploited water sources, has contributed to exacerbate the water 
supply crisis induced by climate change. Furthermore, it has failed to put in place 
the necessary incentives to drive water demand towards the collectively agreed 
goals of water policy. This is a complex task of paramount importance: even if water 
policy goals are collectively agreed by the society, experience shows that individuals 
with common objectives cannot be always counted on to act voluntarily to achieve 
them. If the appropriate incentives are missing, agents may incur in free riding 
(individuals who do not contribute individually and still benefit from the efforts of the 
others) or rent seeking behavior (individuals who benefit from collective action and 
throw the costs on others). This may end up threatening the sustainability of the 
system. Therefore, the challenge is to find suitable tools that motivate collective 
action through the use of incentives. 
Economic instruments have the potential to provide powerful incentives for 
individuals to adopt certain behaviors that favor the collectively agreed goals of 
water policy. In spite of sharing this common ability, economic instruments are far 
from being homogeneous. As explained in the previous sections, there is a wide 
variety of economic instruments, including market (e.g., water pricing, water 
markets, drought insurance, subsidies) and non-market instruments (e.g., voluntary 
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agreements). While some of these instruments are still proposals, others have been 
already tested in many areas worldwide, with different results. For example, in the 
case of water markets, one can draw a thick line between the disappointing 
environmental performance in Australia and Chile and the promising outcomes 
achieved in Spain and the US up to this point. This means that economic 
instruments are not a panacea for water management problems. Instead, they are 
creatures of design. Moreover, their final outcome also depends on the context, 
i.e., on the policy mix and the institutional setup in which they develop. 
 
6.1 Design challenges 
 
Economic instruments can be designed in many different ways, and therefore may 
attain many different results. This means that in order to fully use the potential of 
economic instruments to translate existing opportunities into real outcomes in terms 
of protecting water resources, some drawbacks in traditional policy making need to 
be overcome. The most important are listed below: 
Cost saving does not mean revenue raising tools.  Economists understood long 
ago that economic incentives have the potential to improve the environmental status 
at a cost below that imposed by traditional C&C and supply policies. The experience 
of different countries with economic instruments over the past decades reinforces 
this point of view (NCEE, 2001; Stavins, 2003; Strosser et al., 2013). Although in 
some cases cost reductions do not materialize to the extent expected, it is generally 
acknowledged that economic instruments are usually more cost effective than their 
alternatives. However, this just means that financial resources can be spared 
through the use of economic instruments, but not always raised. Focusing on the 
latter may end up morphing an economic instrument for water management into a 
financial instrument without any positive environmental impact. This confusion 
needs to be clearly overcome. Economic instruments for water management must 
be primarily addressed towards attaining the collectively agreed environmental 
goals in water policy; otherwise, these may not be achieved at all. This confusion 
regarding the priority objective of economic instruments largely explains why the 
vast majority of economic instruments applied in the EU so far had limited to no 
direct impact on water users' behavior and on the status of aquatic ecosystems 
(Strosser et al., 2013). 
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Economic instruments should be visible. In some instances it is difficult to 
quantify the direct environmental gains that result from the use of specific economic 
incentives, let alone the indirect improvements such as those in human health. This 
is because the performance of a given economic instrument depends on many 
factors that interact with each other: the very design of the economic instrument, the 
policies with which it is combined (i.e., the policy mix), the institutional setup and 
also the macroeconomic trends existent at the time it is implemented. However, 
there is little doubt that economic instruments are providing a new and unique 
element to environmental management, which in many cases results in direct and 
indirect benefits beyond what is possible with conventional policies. Quantifying the 
impact of economic instruments then becomes of paramount importance to build a 
sound knowledge-base for successful policy making. This can be used to anticipate 
the effect that economic instruments may have in areas that resemble the conditions 
of previous study sites. Furthermore, although ex-post data is a good start, some of 
the most promising instruments are yet to be implemented (e.g., drought insurance). 
This demands also the development of methodologies that allow for an ex-ante 
assessment. This thesis intended to advance in this direction, but additional effort is 
needed.  
Transparency matters. Economic instruments may contribute to improve the 
technical efficiency of water use and thus offer a technical solution to disputes over 
competing uses of the resource (e.g., water pricing may encourage the adoption of 
modern irrigation technologies). Technical efficiency, though, is only part of the 
policy dilemma. Rebound effects and other undesirable outcomes may appear, 
threatening the ultimate objective of saving water. It is therefore crucial to introduce 
economic instruments through a meaningful dialogue with stakeholders. Acceptance 
of economic instruments and policy structures by water users requires transparency 
regarding the design of the instrument. 
Dynamism is the key. Economic instruments need to be dynamic if they are to 
drive a change from a static to an adaptive water policy. However, this has not been 
the case so far. For example, although the Article 9 of the EU WFD required water 
pricing policies to contribute to the environmental objectives of water policy (EC, 
2000), in reality European countries have focused on financial cost recovery and 
little has been advanced towards environmental cost recovery. Experience has 
shown that, once adopted, economic instruments may face rigidities (rent seeking 
practices, free riding behavior and other constraints) that resemble those faced by 
conventional policies. This is not to say that economic instruments are equally 
unable to attain an adaptive water policy; in fact, due to their limited dependence on 
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infrastructure development, economic instruments have a crucial advantage over 
conventional policies in the avoidance of sunk costs.  
Designed to minimize transaction costs. Transaction costs may block the 
adoption of socially desirable water policies. This is because policy makers tend to 
perceive transaction costs (especially the bargaining costs required to come to an 
acceptable agreement with all the parties involved) as being larger than 
environmental costs (Martin et al., 2008), thus delaying the implementation of the 
necessary policy reform. This perception is explained by the different barriers and 
obstacles to water policy reform that stem from the vested interests of some 
important water users (asking for financial support to overcome water management 
problems, instead of promoting a sustainable water use). Eventually, institutions 
tend to overcome these barriers driven by economic efficiency, although the 
transition is far from being automatic and smooth. A well designed economic 
instrument that minimizes transaction costs may considerably shorten this transition 
period and also minimize the negative environmental impacts of delaying the water 
policy reform.  
 
6.2 The relevance of the context: towards an effective 
policy mix 
 
If properly designed, economic instruments may be able to overcome many of the 
failures that are in the origin of some disappointing water policy performances. 
However, the effectiveness and efficiency of economic instruments to attain the 
water policy goals also depends on the context in which they are implemented. The 
particular role of an instrument cannot be understood in isolation, but as an integral 
part of a package (the policy mix) designed as an element of a major change in 
water policy. Besides, this whole performance is conditioned to the institutional 
setup in force. 
The institutional setup plays a relevant role in the performance of economic 
instruments. Its adaptation (or alternatively, the adaptation of economic instruments 
to it) might be a precondition for success. For instance, the way water use rights are 
defined in some countries may not allow for ordinary water trading, thus increasing 
transaction costs through costly negotiation processes involving high-level official 
decisions. In the same way, drought insurance for irrigated agriculture may only be 
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feasible in those countries where insurance systems are sufficiently developed (e.g., 
countries where drought insurance for rainfed agriculture already exists).  
Also an adequate policy mix is a prerequisite for water management to succeed. Up 
to this point we have stressed that this policy mix should include economic 
instruments, but it should not be limited to them either. Economic instruments are by 
no means substitutes for supply and C&C policies, but tools that can strengthen 
water governance, i.e., complementary instruments. For example, drought 
insurance in Spain would be unconceivable without the existence of DMPs and 
River Basin Management Plans, both being C&C policies. Similarly, water markets 
worldwide would not be possible without water transport infrastructures, which have 
been developed and maintained over time through supply oriented policies.  
Furthermore, although one particular instrument might seem to be better suited for a 
particular objective, if properly designed, each instrument can generate positive 
spillovers (e.g., drought insurance directly reduces agricultural water 
overexploitation during drought events, but it may also help to stabilize agrarian 
income and to regain the control over groundwater bodies on which urban users 
also rely). In addition, these synergies are often reciprocal (e.g., water pricing would 
allow better functioning water markets, while water trading would reduce the cost of 
water security –and thus water prices).  
 
The basic lesson to be drawn is that rather than being silver bullets to solve the 
problems of water management, economic instruments are key components of 
adaptation strategies that, working under a particular institutional setup, need to be 
designed and implemented in combination with other policies (either economic 
instruments or conventional policies) so as to exploit their self-reinforcing 
advantages. This may significantly improve the cost-effectiveness of water policy. 
Noteworthy, apart from these internal synergies, a successful policy mix may also 
have external spillovers; these include improvements in human health, the 
promotion of gender equity and school attendance rates in developing countries and 
an improved response to the food and energy crises, among others. Relevant 
byproducts and ramifications stem from water policy. 
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